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Résumé 
 
La plupart des interactions sociales humaines font intervenir des objets, et ceci dès le 
plus jeune âge. Dans ces interactions, les enfants semblent prendre en compte qui est le 
propriétaire de l’objet. La notion de propriété ne concerne donc pas seulement une personne 
et un objet, mais constitue une relation entre différentes personnes vis-à-vis d’un objet. Cette 
relation est régie par un ensemble de règles ou droits de propriété. Nos travaux portent sur la 
compréhension qu’ont les enfants de la notion de propriété. A quel âge les enfants acquièrent-
ils la compréhension des droits de propriété ? Avant de manier la notion de propriété de 
manière explicite, les enfants en ont-ils une compréhension plus implicite ? Plus 
particulièrement, nous avons exploré la compréhension et l’évaluation de transferts de 
propriété illégitimes et légitimes chez des enfants de 5 mois à 5 ans. Nous avons étudié deux 
types de transgressions de propriété : l’acquisition illégitime d’un objet (sans intention de 
transfert de la part du propriétaire) et l’absence de restitution d’un objet à son propriétaire. 
L’ensemble de nos études ont consisté à présenter aux enfants des transferts de propriété entre 
deux personnages de manière non verbale, dans des dessins animés ou des films mettant en 
scène des marionnettes, puis à mesurer la compréhension et l’évaluation de ces transferts par 
les enfants. 
Les études du Chapitre 2 (Etudes 1 et 2) se sont intéressées à l’évaluation que font les 
enfants de l’acquisition d’un objet. Les deux expériences de l’Etude 1 ont exploré la 
compréhension et l’évaluation de transferts de propriété illégitimes et légitimes par des 
enfants de 3 ans et 5 ans, ainsi que des adultes (population contrôle). Cette étude est la 
première à examiner simultanément la compréhension explicite et implicite qu’ont les enfants 
de la notion de propriété. En effet, les questions posées concernent respectivement les droits 
de propriété, ainsi que l’évaluation sociale et morale des agents impliqués. Dans l’Etude 1a, 
les participants ont vu un personnage acquérir un objet soit de manière illégitime (condition 
vol), soit de manière légitime (condition réception par don). Dans l’Etude 1b, c’est une action 
illégitime (condition vol) qui était comparée à une action légitime (condition don). Les 
enfants de 5 ans (comme les adultes) ont montré une compréhension de la notion de propriété 
à la fois implicite par leur évaluation sociale/morale, en préférant l’agent de la condition 
légitime (receveur du don ou donneur) par rapport à l’agent de la condition illégitime 
(voleur), et explicite par leur capacité à attribuer des droits de propriété différents selon la 
légitimité du transfert. Les enfants de 3 ans n’ont pas distingué les conditions illégitime et 
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légitime, ni dans leur évaluation, ni dans leur attribution de droits de propriété. Ces résultats 
suggèrent que les enfants acquièrent simultanément les compréhensions implicite et explicite 
de la propriété. Dans l’Etude 1, aucune réaction émotionnelle n’était présente. 
Nous avons examiné dans l’Etude 2 le rôle des émotions du premier possesseur dans 
l’évaluation que font les enfants de 3 ans de l’acquisition d’un objet. En présence d’indices 
émotionnels (les mêmes dans la condition légitime et illégitime : le premier possesseur étant 
triste après le transfert dans les deux cas), les enfants de 3 ans sont parvenu à distinguer les 
deux conditions dans leur évaluation sociale/morale. Cette distinction n’a pu être basée 
uniquement sur la présence de l’émotion négative étant donné que l’émotion présentée était la 
même dans les deux conditions. Nous suggérons que les enfants de 3 ans ont détecté la 
transgression morale dans le cas du vol, et se sont basés sur l’émotion négative pour la 
confirmer. 
Les études du Chapitre 3 (Etudes 3 à 5) se sont intéressées à l’évaluation que font les 
enfants de la restitution d’un objet à son propriétaire. Les jeunes enfants (de 2-3 ans) ont un 
biais à considérer que le premier possesseur d’un objet est son « propriétaire » et que l’objet 
ne peut être transmis définitivement à quelqu’un d’autre. Nous avons donc cherché à 
déterminer si les enfants de 3 ans (Etudes 3 et 4) considèrent implicitement l’absence de 
restitution comme une transgression, et l’évaluent négativement en comparaison avec la 
restitution d’un objet au premier possesseur. Dans leurs réponses aux droits de propriété, les 
enfants de 3 ans ont considéré qu’après le transfert le second possesseur devait rendre l’objet 
au premier possesseur. Cependant, ils n’ont pas distingué la restitution de la non restitution 
dans leur évaluation sociale/morale, et ceci même en présence d’indices émotionnels (Etude 
4). Les enfants de 5 ans (Etude 5) en revanche ont préféré un personnage qui rendait un objet 
à son potentiel propriétaire par rapport à un personnage qui conservait l’objet, que les 
situations aient été présentées avec ou sans indices émotionnels. Dans les transferts de 
propriété que nous avons étudiés, les adultes aussi ont considéré que le second possesseur 
devait rendre l’objet au premier possesseur, même lorsque nous avons voulu montrer que ce 
dernier ne voulait plus de l’objet (Etude 3). Les adultes montraient donc également un « biais 
pour le premier possesseur ». 
Dans le Chapitre 4, nous avons analysé les réponses aux questions de propriété 
(concernant le droit de conserver l’objet) pour chacun des transferts légitimes présentés dans 
les études précédentes et déterminé les interprétations que les participants ont eu des transferts 
en termes de don ou de prêt. Nous avons mis en relation ces interprétations avec les indices 
présents dans chaque situation indiquant que le transfert était plutôt un don ou un prêt. Ces 
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analyses ont mis en évidence la difficulté à considérer un transfert de propriété comme étant 
un don, même chez des adultes. Par défaut (sans ajout d’indices pour montrer un don ou un 
prêt) les transferts de propriété ont été majoritairement perçus comme des prêts. Lorsque nous 
avons ajouté des indices visant à montrer que le propriétaire de l’objet renonçait à cet objet 
une grande proportion de personnes a tout de même considéré les transferts comme des prêts. 
Il semblerait qu’en l’absence d’indices spécifiques indiquant un don (tel qu’un paquet cadeau) 
un transfert unidirectionnel d’un objet est considéré comme étant un prêt. Ce qui confirme 
l’existence d’un biais au premier possesseur qui est présent même chez l’adulte. 
Les études du Chapitre 5 (Etudes 6 à 9) ont exploré l’évaluation de transgressions de 
propriété par de très jeunes enfants (de 18 et 24 mois) et des bébés (de 5 mois). Les stimuli 
ont été rendus plus saillants par rapport à ceux qui ont été utilisés avec les enfants plus âgés. 
L’Etude 6 a testé chez des enfants de 2 ans la comparaison présentée dans l’Etude 1a entre 
une acquisition illégitime et une acquisition légitime. L’Etude 7 (comme l’Etude 2) a testé 
l’effet de la présence d’émotion sur l’évaluation. Nous avons partiellement répliqué avec des 
enfants de 2 ans et une mesure plus implicite de leur évaluation sociale les résultats trouvés 
précédemment avec des enfants plus âgés. En l’absence d’indices émotionnels (Etude 6), les 
enfants de 2 ans n’ont pas montré de préférence entre un personnage s’appropriant un objet de 
manière illégitime (par vol) et un personnage acquérant l’objet de manière légitime (par don). 
En présence d’indices émotionnels (Etude 7), un sous-ensemble seulement des enfants de 2 
ans (ceux qui ont répondu rapidement) ont préféré le receveur légitime. 
Les Etudes 8 et 9 se sont intéressées à l’évaluation de la restitution (comme l’Etude 3, 
mais en présence de réclamation de l’objet par le premier possesseur) chez des enfants de 18 
et 24 mois, et des bébés de 5 mois, respectivement. Dans certaines conditions (en fonction de 
la rapidité et la clarté des choix), les jeunes enfants et les bébés ont eu tendance à préférer le 
personnage qui rendait un objet au premier possesseur par rapport au personnage qui gardait 
l’objet. Les résultats que nous avons trouvés montrent des variations considérables dans les 
comportements des enfants. Nous discutons des difficultés méthodologiques à mesurer les 
préférences sociales des jeunes enfants et des bébés en liaison avec des résultats similaires 
publiés dans la littérature. 
Les études de cette thèse montrent un important développement de la compréhension 
explicite de la notion de propriété entre 3 et 5 ans. Chez des enfants plus jeunes, nos résultats 
montrent des tendances à évaluer implicitement des transferts de propriété illégitimes et 
légitimes. Nous soulignons également l’importance de la méthodologie dans le test des jeunes 
enfants. 
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sociale, évaluation sociale, développement cognitif. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Since a very young age, the majority of human social interactions involve objects. In 
these interactions, children seem to take into account who owns what. The notion of 
ownership thus does not involve only a person and an object, but is a relationship between 
several persons with respect to an object. This relationship is organized by a set of rules or 
property rights. Our work deals with children’s understanding of the notion of ownership. At 
what age do children acquire the understanding of property rights? Before an explicit mastery 
of the notion of ownership, do children have a more implicit understanding of it? More 
precisely, we explored the understanding and evaluation of illegitimate and legitimate 
transfers of property in children from 5 months to 5 years of age. We studied two types of 
ownership transgressions: illegitimate acquisition of an object (without owner’s intention to 
transfer it), and absence of restitution of an object to its owner. In all our studies, we 
presented to children property transfers between two characters using non-verbal animated 
cartoons or movies with puppets as actors, and then measured children’s understanding and 
evaluation of those transfers. 
The studies in Chapter 2 (Studies 1 and 2) assessed children’s evaluation of different 
modes of acquisition of an object. The two experiments of Study 1 explored 3- and 5-year-
olds’s understanding and evaluation of illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. Adults 
were also tested as a control population. This study is the first one to investigate 
simultaneously children’s explicit and implicit understanding of the notion of ownership, by 
asking questions about property rights, as well as social and moral evaluations of the 
characters implicated in the transfers, respectively. In Study 1a, participants saw a character 
acquiring an object either in an illegitimate way (theft condition) or in a legitimate one (gift-
reception condition). In Study 1b, an illegitimate action (theft) was compared to a legitimate 
action (giving). 5-year-old children (as adults) showed both an implicit understanding of 
ownership through their social/moral evaluation (preferring the legitimate agent (gift recipient 
or giver) compared to the illegitimate agent (thief)), and an explicit understanding of 
ownership through their ability to attribute different property rights considering the legitimacy 
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of the transfer. 3-year-old children did not make any distinction between the illegitimate and 
legitimate conditions in their evaluation, neither in their attribution of property rights. These 
results suggest that children acquire implicit and explicit understanding of ownership at the 
same time. In Study 1, no emotional reaction was present. 
We examined in Study 2 the role of the first possessor’s emotions in 3-year-olds’ 
evaluation of object acquisition. The same cue was present in the legitimate and illegitimate 
conditions: the first possessor being sad after both transfers. In the presence of this emotional 
cue, 3-year-olds managed to distinguish between the two conditions in their social/moral 
evaluation. This distinction could not have been based solely on the presence of a negative 
emotion, as the emotion displayed was the same in both conditions. We suggest that 3-year-
old children detected the moral transgression in the theft condition, and used the negative 
emotion to confirm it. 
The studies in Chapter 3 (Studies 3 to 5) examined children’s evaluations of the 
restitution of an object to its owner. Young children (2-3-year-old) have a bias to consider 
that the first possessor of an object is its “owner” and that the object cannot be definitively 
transferred to someone else. We thus investigated whether 3-year-old children (Studies 3 and 
4) implicitly evaluate the absence of restitution as a transgression, and evaluate it negatively 
compared to the restitution of an object to its first possessor. In their answers to questions 
about property rights, 3-year-olds considered that the second possessor should return the 
object to the first possessor. However, they did not make the distinction between the 
restitution and no-restitution conditions in their social/moral evaluation, even in the presence 
of emotional cues (Study 4). In contrast, 5-year-old children (Study 5) preferred a character 
restituting an object to its potential owner compared to a character keeping the object, both 
when situations were presented with and without emotional cues. In the property transfers that 
we studied also adults considered that the second possessor should return the object to the 
first possessor, even when we added cues intending to show that the first possessor did not 
want the object back (Study 3). Thus, also adults showed a “first possessor bias”. 
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the answers to the questions about property rights (dealing 
with the right to keep the object) for each of the legitimate transfers presented in the previous 
studies. We deduced participant’s interpretation of each transfer as gift or loan. These 
analyzed revealed the difficulty to consider a property transfer as a gift even by adults. By 
default (without adding cues to show a gift or a loan) the property transfers were perceived as 
loans. When we added cues intending to show that the first possessor relinquished the object, 
an important proportion of people nevertheless considered the transfers to be loans. It seems 
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that in the absence of specific cues showing a gift (such as a gift-wrapping) a unidirectional 
object transfer is considered to be a loan. This confirms the existence of a first possessor bias 
that is present even in adults. 
The studies in Chapter 5 (Studies 6 to 9) explored the evaluations of property 
transgressions in very young children (18- and 24-month-old) and infants (5-month-old). The 
stimuli were made more salient compared to those used with older children. Study 6 tested 
with 2-year-olds the comparison presented in Study 1a between an illegitimate and a 
legitimate acquisition. Study 7 (as Study 2) tested the effect of the presence of emotion on the 
evaluation. Using a more implicit measure of children’s social evaluation, we partially 
replicated here with 2-year-olds the results found earlier with older children. In the absence of 
emotional cues (Study 6), 2-year-olds did not show any preference between a character 
acquiring an object illegitimately (by theft) and a character acquiring the object legitimately 
(by gift). In the presence of emotional cues (Study 7), only a subgroup of 2-year-olds (those 
who answered quickly) did prefer the legitimate recipient. 
Studies 8 and 9 were interested in the evaluation of restitution (as Study 3, but with the 
first possessor begging for the object back) in 18- and 24-month-old children, and 5-month-
old infants, respectively. In some conditions (depending on the rapidity and clarity of choice), 
the young children and infants showed a tendency to prefer the character returning the object 
to its first possessor compared to the character keeping the object. Our results show important 
variations in children’s behaviors. We discuss the methodological difficulties of measuring 
young children’s and infant’s social preferences in relation with similar results published in 
the literature. 
The studies of this dissertation show an important development in the explicit 
understanding of ownership between 3 and 5 years. With younger children, our results show 
tendencies to implicitly evaluate illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. We also 
underlie the importance of the methodology used to test young children. 
 
 
Key words: Ownership, property rights, moral development, moral judgment, social 
cognition, social evaluation, cognitive development. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
- C1 - 
 
1. The notion of ownership and its development 
 
 
1.1. What is Ownership? 
 
Ownership is an unobservable, abstract characteristic of objects. When perceiving an 
isolated object, one cannot know whether it is owned and by whom. Also, the privileges 
conferred by ownership are not directly observable. However, children come to take 
ownership into account in their behaviors. How do they recognize it? Ownership regulates 
social interactions involving objects both in adults and children. Whether one can take or use 
an object depends on who owns it. The owner can be a person, or a group of persons, such as 
a family, or a society. Also, different kinds of “objects” can be owned, including material 
objects, territories, ideas, songs, persons, and relationships. Despite this variety in owners and 
owned objects, and certainly also in the relation between persons and objects that defines 
ownership, the notion of ownership has been found to exist in all human cultures (Brown, 
1991), and elements or precursors of it have been described in non-human animals (Brosnan, 
2011). 
Theories of ownership have been debated for more than two millennia (see Rudmin, 
1988; 1991 for an extended historical review about property theories). In ancient Greece, 
Pythagoras followed by Plato (in his Republic) lauded common property, arguing that private 
property was socially divisive. On the contrary, Aristotle (in his Politics) proclaimed that 
private property was necessary in order to achieve individual moral development and thus 
social harmony. Influenced by Pythagoras and Plato, the Romans and early Christians 
considered that property has to be communal. In the late Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas 
developed Aristotle’s idea that private property is a moral necessity, and that it is natural. 
Cross-cultural research examined property relations in “primitive” societies, where communal 
ownership was found to prevail. Beyond the debate of the best property regime, the 
fundamental question to ask is “what is property or ownership?” 
 
Here, we briefly review some philosophical and psychological theories about the 
concept of ownership, as well as some anthropological research, and legal considerations on 
property (see also Noles & Keil, 2011, for a recent review of theories of ownership in a 
developmental context). We first examine ownership as a dyadic relation: a relation between 
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an individual and an object. We see that ownership is more than possession; it is linked to the 
self, may involve a relation of attachment, and is defined by the notion of control. We 
examine then ownership as a “triadic” relation: a relation between several individuals (the 
owner, and “the non-owners”) with respect to an object, which involves in particular the 
notion of exclusivity. Later, we turn into psychological studies of how adults, children, and 
infants understand ownership, looking at the ontogeny of ownership, and at its potential 
developmental bases. We examine as potential bases of ownership its previously identified 
components: possession, control including the notion of self, attachment, and exclusivity, and 
consider in addition the notion of reciprocity. 
 
1.1.1. Ownership: a dyadic relation 
 
Even though ownership is not observable, some cues of ownership are observable, such 
as an object being “possessed” or held by a person. In property law, possession is considered 
not only to involve physical contact at one instant, but also control over the displacement of 
the possessed object over time. The utterance “possession is nine-tenth of the law” shows the 
importance of possession in attribution of ownership. In philosophical theories of ownership, 
possession is also considered as a constituent of ownership, but not as defining ownership in 
itself: “My merely partial or temporary use of a thing, like my partial or temporary possession 
of it (a possession which itself is simply the partial or temporary possibility of using it) is 
therefore to be distinguished from ownership of the thing itself” (Hegel, 1821/1952). 
Etymologically, “property” means “one’s own”. It implies a link between an individual 
and the object of property. Locke (1690/1881) argued that the relation of ownership originates 
from a man’s investment of his labor onto an object. Locke’s Desert Labor Theory stated that 
a piece of property belongs to the person who created it. Thus, property of objects firstly 
comes from the involvement of oneself in their fabrication. One owns one’s body, one’s 
labor, and the product of one’s labor. In this view, self-ownership seems to be the foundation 
of ownership of external objects, i.e. self-ownership is taken as a primitive notion from which 
onwership of objects that are not part of the self can derive. Locke’s statement that private 
property originates from the application of man’s labor onto common resources had not been 
found valid in cross-cultural research (e.g. Rudmin, 1996). However, the existence of a strong 
link between property and the self was discussed by many other philosophers. In his 
Personality Theory, Hegel (1821/1952) discussed the importance of appropriation of objects 
in the construction of the self. Following Hegel’s ideas, more recently, Radin (1982) 
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developed a psychological Theory of Property and Personhood. She argued that control over 
resources, thus ownership of objects, is important in the definition of personhood. James 
(1890/2007) wrote that “between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line 
is difficult to draw […] a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his”. Considering 
that possessions are part of the self, a property loss leads to a weakening of the sense of self. 
Different objects of possession represent a man’s identity and “give him the same emotions. If 
they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die, he feels cast down” 
(James, 1890/2007). 
Another characteristic of the relation of ownership is the notion of attachment. The link 
between an individual and an object of property can be considered as a link of attachment to a 
particular object. Attachment to an object would be a form of affective attitude directed 
towards the object. Hume (1739/2003) stated “such is the effect of custom that it not only 
reconciles us to any thing that we have long enjoy’d, but even gives us an affection for it, and 
makes us prefer it to other objects which may be more valuable, but are less known to us”. 
In his anthropological work, Hobhouse (1906; 1922) found control to be a fundamental 
characteristic of property (in Rudmin, 1988). Control over property also allows exercising 
control over people. Ginsberg (1934) also stated that property gives power not only over 
things but also over people through things (in Rudmin, 1988). In any case, control of an 
object has to be exercised against others. Thus, the notion of exclusivity needs to be added in 
the understanding of what ownership is. Ownership cannot be described merely as a 
relationship between a person and an object, but has to be considered also as a social relation. 
Ownership is then a relationship between persons with respect to an object. 
 
1.1.2. Ownership: a “triadic” relation 
 
The lay notion of ownership describes it as a relation between a person and a thing. In 
the law, property is seen to be a relationship among individuals with respect to a thing (e.g. 
Blumenthal, 2009). A whole branch of law, property law, is devoted to the regulation of 
people’s relations to objects. This idea that the notion of ownership includes a social 
consensus was already present in Hume’s discussion about property. We can also consider 
Locke’s concept of private property as the exclusive right of a person over a thing. Ownership 
is a social institution; it can only exist in the context of conventions (Kalish, 2005; Kalish & 
Anderson, 2011; see also, Rose, 1985). Some psychological theories of ownership also 
considered it as a social relationship (Litwinsky, 1947; Heider, 1958). To exist ownership has 
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to be recognized by others. A person owns something only if others respect his claim of 
ownership and enforce it. This relationship between persons with respect to things involves 
rights and duties. The philosopher Snare (1972) proposed that owners have three main rights 
with respect to their property. These rights are held only by owners, and are recognized by 
others. Firstly, an owner has the right of possession and use. An owner can use his 
possessions whenever he wants and non-owners are not allowed to interfere with the owner’s 
use of his property. Secondly, an owner has the right of exclusion. An owner can exclude 
anybody else from the use of his possessions; he can decide who is given permission of use. 
Non-owners are allowed to possess and use the owner’s property only if the owner agrees. 
Thirdly, an owner has the right of transfer. An owner can decide to give his property to 
someone else, and by doing so he permanently transfers all the rights of ownership. The new 
owner acquires the right of possession and use, the right of exclusion, and the right of 
transfer. The previous owner relinquishes his rights; he becomes a non-owner. It is important 
to understand that in a transfer of ownership, the new owner gains rights, but also the 
previous owner relinquishes rights. 
 
1.1.3. Summary 
 
We have seen that philosophers described ownership as a relationship between an 
individual and an object. Ownership is linked to the individual’s identity. Objects of 
possession are often cherished, and the owner has control over his objects, as well as their 
access. However, in our social world, it is not only important to know what it means to own 
something for the individual, but how ownership is recognized by others. Without the 
recognition of the ownership relationship between an owner and his possessions, there would 
be no ownership at whole. Thus, ownership has to be seen not only as a relationship between 
persons and things, but also as a relationship among persons with respect to things. This view 
of ownership is the one considered in property law. However, it is also present in 
philosophical and psychological research. The main property rights state that: an owner has a 
right to (1) use his property, (2) exclude others from the use of his property, and (3) transfer 
his property and the associated property rights. 
We consider “possession” as characterized by physical contact with, use of, and 
possibly control over an object. We also discuss “ownership” with the meaning of possession, 
but implying control over objects with respect to others, and the recognition of ownership 
claims by others. We consider “property” as including the notions of rights, duties and 
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responsibilities in use and transfer of owned objects. “A possession” and “a property” are 
considered as objects of possession, ownership or property. We are interested in the 
development of the notions of ownership and property in children. 
 
1.2. Ontogeny of ownership 
 
1.2.1. Importance of ownership in children’s social interactions 
 
Ownership is important in social interactions since infancy. The majority of conflicts 
among young children involve objects of possession (Hay & Ross, 1982; Ramsey, 1987). 
Children want to maximize their possessions. However, despite the large amount of disputes 
about possessions, the frequency of disputes is context-dependent. Lakin et al. (1979; cited by 
Furby, 1980) observed less disputes between 1-year-old children in a “total care” kibbutzim 
(where they spend their days and nights together) compared to children in a “day care” 
kibbutzim (where they only spend day time together). It seems that children spending more 
time together minimize their disputes about possessions. 
The fact that young children engage in conflicts about objects may be interpreted as a 
lack of a sense of triadic ownership allowing them to recognize which objects they can use, or 
as a disagreement concerning the implications of ownership. However, even young children 
consider a common notion of ownership to resolve their conflicts (Ross et al., 2011). Already 
at 6 month of age, when two infants touch a toy at the same time, more often the first 
possessor retains it (Hay et al., 1983). At 2 years of age, children are more likely to win a 
dispute about the use of a toy if they were the first possessor of the toy (Ross, 1996; Ramsey, 
1987; Weigel, 1984). Children often resolve their conflicts without intervention of the 
parents, and according to first or prior possession, which is a way to determine ownership 
(Ross, 1996). On the contrary, parents sometimes end the conflict without consideration for 
ownership rights but rather trying to maximize social harmony (Ross et al., 1990; Ross, 
1996). Children’s attribution of ownership to the first possessor is not only due to personal 
attachment to the object leading to fighting more for it. Indeed, in third-party evaluations, 
children and adults also exhibit a “first possessor bias”, i.e. when explicitly asked about the 
ownership of an object, they tend to attribute it to the first possessor (Friedman & Neary, 
2008; Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Neary, 2009). When children are told who is the owner 
(and do not have to infer it from first possession), they also exhibit an “ownership bias”, i.e. 
they attribute the right to use the object to the owner. Neary (2011) presented to 3- to 7-year-
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old children and to adults disputes between an owner wanting his object (but with no need of 
the object of dispute) and a current possessor (needing the object), and asked participants who 
should get to use the object. Neary showed that children considered the owner to be more 
entitled to the object. Children uphold the rights of the owner even if he had no reason for 
requesting the object or for refusing the use of the object to someone who needed it. Children 
considered ownership more important than possession or need. They entitled the possessor in 
need to use the object only when no ownership was involved in the dispute (i.e. when none of 
the “wanter” and current possessor were the owner of the object). In contrast, adults gave 
entitlement to the object to the possessor in need independently of the presence of the owner 
in the dispute. Only when the non-owner’s need for the object was extremely strong (e.g. to 
prevent harm) did children disregard ownership rights. This shows at least some flexibility in 
children’s ownership bias. 
 
1.2.2. Development of the sense of ownership 
 
Children have some notion of ownership very early. This notion develops to become a 
mature understanding of ownership around 5 years of age (see Rochat, 2011a, for a detailed 
description of different levels of possession from birth to 5 years; see also Rochat & Passos-
Ferreira, 2008). Table C1-1 presents the notion of ownership at different ages, when children 
are involved (as the owner or a non-owner) in an interaction involving property or when they 
are only third-party observers of the interaction. We do not fully consider the development of 
the understanding of ownership transgressions here, as we will discuss it in details later. 
Newborns show minimal possession in the sense of physical binding to things by 
preferentially latching onto nutritious things (breast) and sources of comfort (soft objects) 
(see Rochat, 1987; 2011a; Rochat & Hespos, 1997). 
At 2 months, infants can be seen as owning the effects of their movements (Rochat, 
2011a). We discuss the link between a sense of possession and the control of body and objects 
from 2 months of age on in the next section. Between 3 and 6 months of age, property 
consists in use and possession (Faigenbaum, 2005). At 6 months, infants take into account 
first possession in their interactions with other infants involving objects (Hay et al., 1983). 
At 9 months, infants engage in triadic interactions by including objects in their 
interaction with another person. They use objects to control their social environment; they try 
to gain attention from others by pointing towards or grabbing objects (see Rochat, 2011a). At 
that age, infants also develop a sense of exclusive possession of their mother’s attention, and 
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of some particular objects (blankets, teddy bears), called transitional objects and seen as 
objects of substitution for their mother in her absence (Winnicott, 1982).  
By 18 months to 2 years, children explicitly identify possessions as part of themselves 
(Rochat, 2011a). Children show exclusivity towards more and more objects, by claiming that 
something is “mine”, they exclude the other meaning “it is not yours”. 12-month-old infants 
already understand the meaning of “my” in adults’ speech (Saylor et al., 2011), but by 18 
months, children are able to express their own possession in words. The use of possessive 
pronouns is recurrent in 2-year-old children (Bates, 1990; Tomasello, 1998). With language, 
ownership can be clearly expressed, and children do not need to be in contact with the object 
to express their ownership of it with possessive pronouns. First, owner and object need to be 
present at the same time for children to recognize ownership (Tomasello, 1998), but from 18 
months, children can recognize ownership of absent owners (Tomasello, 1998; Blake el al., 
2010). By 2 years of age, children consider ownership as distinct from physical possession. 
They recognize owners that are not in possession of the objects (e.g. Fasig, 2000), and can 
even recognize owners of objects shown on pictures and not for real (e.g. Rodgon & 
Rashman, 1976). Ownership is not only expressed in children’s use of possessive pronouns, 
but also in their actions. When told that they have ownership of an object, from 21/2 years, 
children share it less and defend it more. They claim control and exclusivity over the object 
(Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1979; Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1981). In peer interactions with objects, 
we can notice that children do grant a peer, who is not in current possession of an object (but 
was in prior possession of it), entitlement to having the object (e.g. Ross, 1996). At 2 years, 
children also exhibit a first possessor bias when observing property transfers between third-
parties (Friedman & Neary, 2008; Blake & Harris, 2009). 
At 3 years, children still exhibit a first possessor bias (Friedman & Neary, 2008; Blake 
& Harris, 2009). However, under some conditions, they come to see possessions as alienable 
(Friedman & Neary, 2008; Rochat et al., 2009), but try to maximize their resources (Rochat et 
al., 2009; Rochat, 2011a). 
At 4 years, children not only consider their own control of objects, but also recognize 
control in others, whom they see as owners (Neary et al., 2009; see also Kim & Kalish, 2009). 
At this age, children also partly understand property rights (Blake & Harris, 2009). 
At 5 years, children understand the feelings of others towards possessions, and base 
their exchanges on fairness (Rochat et al., 2009). At this age, ownership is linked to moral 
values (Rochat, 2009b; Rochat, 2011a). From 5 years of age on, children also have a mature 
understanding of property rights. They acknowledge that only a legitimate acquisition gives 
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the right to keep the acquired object (Blake & Harris, 2009; Kim & Kalish, 2009; see also 
Cram & Ng, 1989 finding a later understanding of transfers). 
 
Age (*) Conditions/Sense of 
ownership 
Objects of ownership References 
birth 1 Physical contact Things on which physical 
binding is expressed 
Rochat, 2011a; Rochat, 1987; 
Rochat & Hespos, 1997 
2 mo 1 Control of body Effects of own 
movements 
Rochat, 2011a 
3-6 mo 1 Use and possession – 
control of objects 
Various objects Faigenbaum, 2005 
6 mo 2 1
st
 possession  Hay et al., 1983 
9 mo 1 Control of people’s 
attention. 
Exclusive possession 
Particular people (mother) 
and things (transitional 
objects) 
Winnicott, 1982 
18 mo 
- 2 y 
1 - Explicit claim of 
possessiveness (no need 
for physical possession). 
- Exclusivity 
Objects explicitly stated 
as linked to self (“mine”) 
All kinds of objects 
- e.g. Rochat, 2011a; 
Tomasello, 1998; Fasig, 2000 
- Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1979; 
1981 
2 1
st
 possession / prior 
possession 
 e.g. Ross, 1996 
 
2 y 
3 1
st
 possession  Friedman & Neary, 2008; 
Blake & Harris, 2009 
1 Alienable property All kinds of objects Rochat et al., 2009 3 y 
3 - 1
st
 possession. 
- Possibility of transfer 
under restricted 
conditions 
 - Friedman & Neary, 2008; 
Blake & Harris, 2009 
- Friedman & Neary, 2008 
2 1
st
 possession / prior 
possession 
 e.g. Ross, 1996 
 
4 y 
3 - Controlled possession. 
- Possibility of transfer 
under restricted 
conditions. 
- Set of rights (partly 
understood). 
 - Neary et al., 2009 (see also 
Kim & Kalish, 2009) 
- Neary & Friedman, 2008; 
Neary & Friedman, 2009; 
Blake & Harris, 2009 
- Blake & Harris, 2009 
1 Alienable property. 
Link to fairness 
All kinds of objects Rochat et al., 2009 5 y 
3 - Set of rights (fully 
understood). 
Possibility of transfer. 
- Link to moral values. 
 - Blake & Harris, 2009; Kim & 
Kalish, 2009 
- Rochat, 2009b; Rochat, 
2011a 
 
Table C1-1. Experience of possession/ownership (*1) and recognition of ownership of others 
(*2; 3) at different ages (mo: months, y: years). 
(*) Perspective (1, in yellow): 1
st
 person – the child is the owner; (2, in blue): 2
nd
 person – the 
child is involved in the interaction as a non-owner; (3, in green): 3
rd
 person – the child is a 
third-party observer. 
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1.2.3. Summary 
 
From birth, infants can be seen as having a minimal sense of ownership. Since infancy, 
ownership issues have a strong impact on social interactions. Most of young children’s social 
conflicts between peers concern property disputes. A large body of research has used 
observational paradigms to study pair interactions in which the target child is involved first 
hand in some property issue. To investigate children’s sense of ownership, it is important to 
consider children’s understanding and evaluation of ownership when they are not directly 
involved in the property issue, but are third-party observers. Researchers investigated 
children’s understanding of third-party interactions from 2 years of age on. At 2 and 3 years, 
children have a first possessor bias, preventing them to see property as alienable. At 5 years, 
children acquire a mature concept of property rights. This concept may develop from the 
earlier sense of ownership. We review now the potential bases of the sense of ownership. 
 
1.3. Developmental bases of the concept of ownership: possession, control, 
attachment, exclusivity, and reciprocity 
 
We examine here the psychological bases of the sense of ownership from a 
developmental point of view, i.e. we wish to examine whether ownership could, through 
development, emerge out of a set of more elementary components that would be already 
present in early infancy and even in animals. The question is whether prior to the explicit 
mastery of the concepts of ownership and property rights, young children have an implicit or 
intuitive knowledge about them. A similar approach was performed in domains dealing with 
numerical, physical, biological or psychological/intentional entities (e.g. Spelke, 2000; Carey, 
2009). For example, it has been shown that before infants master the explicit representation of 
abstract numbers, they have a core number sense (Dehaene, 1997). More precisely, they have 
representations of approximate numerical magnitudes. At 6 month of age, infants are able to 
discriminate between large sets of different magnitudes (Xu & Spelke, 2000; Lipton & 
Spelke, 2003), which is much earlier than the ability to precisely determine the cardinal value 
of each set. In addition, young infants are able to track the cardinality of small sets of objects 
(for a review, Feigenson et al., 2004). This number sense does not map one-to-one to the adult 
concept, but give infants an intuitive base on which to construct symbolic representations and 
exact counting. Do young children have a core ownership sense in a similar way they have a 
core number sense? 
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We describe five candidate components at the basis of ownership, which arise 
principally from the philosophical analysis discussed above:  possession, control, attachment, 
exclusivity, and reciprocity (see Pierce et al., 2003, for a similar approach, exploring the roots 
of what we have called dyadic ownership). These components, such as attachment or 
reciprocity, may not all be primarily linked to a system of ownership. We first examine the 
notion of possession as a candidate for the emergence of ownership. Possession is often 
related to control. Control is a second candidate for the emergence of ownership. The relation 
between a person and a thing also involves attachment, which is examined as a third basic 
component of ownership. We see then that ownership is experienced in a social context. The 
control that an individual applies to his possessions depends on the environment and the 
presence of others. Thus we proceed to the examination of the notion of exclusivity. Finally, 
ownership is an important concept for transactions. We see that transfers are based on 
reciprocity, and we examine social reciprocity as an elementary component at the basis of the 
sense of ownership. For each component, we review studies in human adults, children, 
infants, and partially in animals. The main focus is on children’s conception of ownership. In 
children, we distinguish the role of each component in their own actions from its role in their 
evaluations of the behavior of others. We mainly focus here on one type of possession: 
physical objects, but we also discuss some examples involving the ownership of physical 
place (territory). These two types of possessions are considered here to be under the same 
rules of ownership. 
 
1.3.1. Possession 
 
We first consider ownership as a dyadic relationship between a person and an object. 
This relationship is the most obvious when a person is in possession of an object. By 
possession, we mean physical contact or proximity between an individual and an object. 
 
1.3.1.1. Possession is used to attribute ownership 
 
Contrary to ownership, which is abstract and invisible, possession – considered as 
physical contact - is visible, and can be perceived by others. Various experiments investigated 
children’s understanding of ownership through their evaluation as a third-party observer of 
interactions involving objects. Friedman & Neary (2008) showed that young children rely on 
first possession in their judgments about ownership. When asked “whose object is it?”, 
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children consider that the first character known to possess an object is its owner, from 2 years 
of age on when they have to discover who is the owner of a ball that has been possessed 
sequentially by two characters (Friedman & Neary, 2008) , and from 4 years of age on when 
deciding who should be the owner of an object not previously owned, such as a wild animal 
(Friedman & Neary, 2009; see also Friedman et al., 2011). When the physical possession of 
the object is not seen by children but only described to them, it is harder for young children to 
determine the owner. Adults also use this first possession criterion to allocate ownership 
when they lack other information (Friedman, 2008). We have already seen that young 
children also use first possession to attribute the use of an object to one of them and thus 
resolve conflicts in which they are involved (e.g. Ross, 1996). 
First possession is also used in animals to allocate resources. A drive to possess has 
been described in humans since infancy, as well as in animals. From an evolutionary point of 
view, possessive behavior towards food and territory is evident for survival. Stake (2004) 
considers that humans share a core “property instinct”, having its roots in an evolutionary 
stable strategy determining how to allocate resources without entering in a fight. This strategy 
has to provide a unique winner, and the criterion used to determine possession has to be 
clearly perceived. The first to be in physical contact with a property can be easily recognized. 
For example, speckled wood butterflies use a first-in-time-wins rule for the possession of 
sunspots (Davies, 1978). The first to touch the sunspot will fight harder to maintain 
possession. If two butterflies touch it at the same time, they would fight longer. For 
butterflies, actual contact, not only proximity, was required to fight for the spot. 
 
1.3.1.2. Possession is experienced by physical contact 
 
At a basic level, possession is expressed through direct physical contact. Newborns can 
be seen to express possession by binding onto things. They are already selective in their 
behavior, and will prefer to bind onto nutritious and comfortable things, looking for feeding 
and care (Rochat, 1987; 2011a; Rochat & Hespos, 1997). 
“To hold” and “to have” an object refer to direct physical contact. “He has an object” is 
usually used to describe physical possession. Young children use “I had it” as an argument for 
their ownership claims. Studying the semantics of ownership, Rudmin & Berry (1987) asked 
adults to judge how much different criteria apply to objects listed by the participants as owned 
or not owned, and how much these criteria could be used as general arguments for ownership 
claims. Possession was almost always considered as applicable to the owned objects. 
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However, even houses and cars were considered to be in possession, thus possession did not 
mean only physical contact. 
In humans, throughout life, owners have at least periodical contact with their 
possessions, but ownership of property is extended beyond physical contact. Another clue to 
ownership is a person’s proximity to an object. 
 
1.3.1.3. Proximity is sometimes sufficient to manifest possession 
 
When seeing a person close to a valuable object, we will usually consider the person to 
be its owner and avoid to take the object. The distance observed between the person and the 
object to consider that the two are connected may depend on context and culture. Animals 
also recognize proximity as an indication of possession. Russ et al. (2010) studied 
experimentally recognition of possession in free-ranging rhesus monkeys. In a competitive 
setting, where monkeys had to choose between two food options, they avoided to take food 
with which the human competitor had physical connection through a rope attached to the food 
item (and towards which he simultaneously attended). Monkeys also avoided food that was 
not in physical connection with the experimenter, but close to him, compared to a more 
distant food item. Thus physical connection (other than direct body contact), and relative 
proximity are considered as cues of possession. This respect for possession by proximity is 
also expressed between conspecifics. Hamadryas baboons (Sigg & Falett, 1985) and 
longtailed macaques (Kummer & Cords, 1991) do not attempt to take an object from a 
conspecific that is close to it. We can consider that proximity could be analyzed in terms of 
peripersonal space so that an object in an agent’s peripersonal space, that could be reached 
and grasped by the agent, would be seen as being possessed by the agent. 
Not only visual markers of physical contact or proximity can be used to determine 
possession, but also olfactory ones. Marking also enables animals to assert their property 
claims and avoid object or territory appropriation by others (Ellis, 1985). It is the alteration of 
the object that can be perceived as a manifestation of possession. 
 
We discussed here only the possibility of possession of material objects or territories. 
The notion of possession of immaterial objects such as ideas or songs remains to be reviewed. 
A more abstract cue than contact or proximity is control. An owner has control over his 
property. This notion of control is already present in the notion of possession. Indeed, 
physical contact and distal physical connection with an object assure to the owner the control 
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of the object. Also, we can consider that proximity is a cue of possession if the agent is close 
enough to assure his control over the object. However, the notion of control is wider than the 
notion of possession. 
 
1.3.2. Control 
 
A person can be seen to control an object if the object’s motion, use, or access depends 
on his actions or decisions. 
 
1.3.2.1. Control is used to attribute ownership 
 
Premack & Premack (1995) mentioned that children seeing a pair of entities, the motion 
of one being controlled by the other, consider the former as the possession of the latter. When 
they are mere observers, children seem to recognize control as an indication of ownership. 
Neary et al. (2009) presented to 3- to 5-year-old children situations were one character 
controls the use of an object by another character. 4- and 5-year-olds considered that the 
owner of the object was the character controlling (granting or denying) permission to use the 
object. When comparing prevention occurring through control or through information, older 
3-year-old children attributed ownership to the character preventing the use of the object only 
when it was done through control. 
When first possession and first control compete to attribute ownership of an object 
previously not owned, the owner is judged by adults to be the person who was probably 
necessary for the object to become possessed, i.e. the person who established control over the 
object (Friedman, 2010). In Friedman’s study, people judge for example that Mike, who 
dislodged a wanted gem from a cliff wall by throwing a rock at it, should be the owner, even 
if Dave took the gem first. Mike was here necessary for the gem to be possessed, but Dave 
was not as Mike would have taken the gem anyway. Mike was the first to establish control 
over the gem by dislodging it. The idea that control gives entitlement to ownership is found in 
various cultures. For example, the Huaorani Indians of Ecuadorian Amazon were used to 
consider that a “when a Huaorani encounters a rodent and chases it into a hole, the prey 
belongs to the person who initially found it, although other people may help in ﬂushing out 
the animal and killing it” (Lu, 2001). In this case, the owner of the animal can be different 
from the person actually killing and first possessing it. The owner is the person who 
establishes certainty of capture. Eskimos consider that “a seal which escapes with a harpoon 
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head in it belongs to the hunter who actually succeeds in capturing and killing the creature”, 
however, “a seal harpooned with a bladder float attached to its line goes to the owner of the 
float no matter who captures it, since it is reasoned that the capture is made possible by the 
drag and visibility of the float” (Hoebel, 1954/2006). The involvement in establishing 
possession of food is also considered by chimpanzees to attribute the resource. The 
individuals most involved in a hunt, and particularly those most important for securing the 
capture, get more food than other hunters and non-hunters (Boesch, 1994; Boesch, 2001). 
 
1.3.2.2. Satisfaction by control of the environment motivates to possess 
 
Control over the use of an object is an important dimension in the definition of 
ownership. Furby (1978) investigated the meaning of possession and the motivation for 
possession in children (from 6 to 16 years) and adults from different cultures (American, 
Israeli kibbutz, Israeli non-kibbutz). One of the most important dimensions in the definition of 
possession for all ages and cultural groups was that of control of possessions. It was also 
found to be one of the motivations for possession. We acquire possessions because they “have 
an instrumental function – they make possible certain activities and pleasures. In other words, 
they enable one to effect desired outcomes in one’s environment”. The desire to affect the 
environment would lead to the exploration of the environment since birth, and to attempts to 
take possession of objects. Acquisition of possessions will induce feeling of efficacy and 
satisfaction as they represent control over the environment (White, 1959; Beggan, 1991). By 
exploration and manipulation of the environment, children can feel their causal efficacy, as 
changes in the environment occur through their control. 
Piaget (1936/1952) described infant’s motivation for causal efficacy during the infant’s 
“sensorimotor stage”. Infants engage in “circular reactions” – repetition of behaviors that 
caused an event. From 1 to 4 months, infants exhibit “primary circular reactions”, involving 
only the infant’s body. From 4 to 8 months, infants engage in “secondary circular reactions”, 
involving also external objects: they shake, hit, kick things to trigger outside events. 
 
1.3.2.3. Infants seek contingency 
 
The desire for being the cause of changes in the environment is expressed in infants’ 
contingency preferences. Very young infants not only perceive contingency, but they seek it 
(Gergely & Watson, 1999). Newborns and infants change their sucking behavior on a pacifier 
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when it produces a stimulus, e.g. an image on a screen or a particular sound (DeCasper & 
Fifer, 1980; Kalnins & Bruner, 1973; Siqueland & DeLucia, 1969; Walton & Bower, 1993). 
Infants increase the behavior that is contingent with the external event, appearing to like 
exerting control over the environment. Rochat & Striano (1999) investigated whether 
newborns and infants not only suck on a pacifier to obtain a contingent stimulus, but whether 
they modulate their behavior according to the analogy between this behavior and the stimulus. 
They found that 2-month-olds, but not newborns, modulated their sucking response 
depending on a contingent sound whose pitch variation was matched or not with the pressure 
variation they exerted on the pacifier. This suggests that 2-month-olds not only detect 
temporal contingency, but also explore the causal link between their actions and the effects on 
the environment. Rochat & Striano argue that 2-month-olds engage in exploration of the self 
as agent, demonstrating voluntary control. 
This control can also be experienced on objects (Rovee-Collier, 1987). In a study by 
Watson (1972), 2-month-olds modify their kicking behavior when it is contingent with the 
movement of a mobile. After 3 to 5 days of this contingent behavior, infants smile when they 
are presented with the mobile whose movement they controlled. According to Watson, 
smiling is elicited by the recognition of the mobile as a social stimulus. As this kind of 
stimulus is usually considered in the perspective of an interaction, infants could also be seen 
as recognizing the relationship between themselves and the mobile; attachment to the mobile 
could also be hypothesized. Thus contingency appears as a good candidate for being at the 
origin of the psychological sense of ownership. The experience of causal control on the 
environment is positive. But, 4-month-olds not only experience joy during the learning of a 
contingency between their behavior and an external stimulus, they also show anger during 
extinction of this contingency (Lewis et al., 1990). Infants are not only seeking control of the 
environment and satisfied when they experience it, but they are also affected by the loss of 
this control – as adults exhibit “loss aversion” for their possessions (Kahneman et al., 1991; 
see Brenner et al., 2007, for the distinction between “valence loss aversion” and “possession 
loss aversion”). 
Children seek contingency even if it is costly. They prefer an object for which they 
control the acquisition over a freely available one even if the former is acquired through work 
(Singh, 1970). Contingency preference is also observed in animals. Singh showed that rats 
also have preference for earned food (obtained by bar pressing) compared to free food. 
The pleasure of contingency can be seen as the source of the sense of ownership of the 
object whose behavior is contingently dependent on the infant’s behavior. Differently, the 
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pleasure of contingency could be the source of the sense of the authorship of the infant’s 
action. The sense of agency can also be considered as a component of the sense of ownership. 
Both agency and ownership are linked to the sense of self. 
 
1.3.2.4. Possessions and controlled objects are part of the Self 
 
By 21 months, the claim of possession – “it’s mine” – explicitly incorporates the object 
into the self. This level of self-assertion through possessions develops from the possession by 
2-month-olds of the “perceptual effects of their own embodied actions” by the exploration of 
contingency (Rochat, 2011a). As just mentioned, from 2 months of age, infants explore the 
self as agent through control over objects (Rochat & Striano, 1999; for reviews, see Rochat, 
2001; 2011a; Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008; see also Rochat, 2009a, 2011b, on the 
development of self-consciousness). Seligman (1975, cited by Furby, 1978), referring to body 
parts as ‘objects’, stated that “those ‘objects’ become self that exhibit near-perfect correlation 
between motor command and the visual kinesthetic feedback; while those ‘objects’ that do 
not become the world”. McClelland (1951) suggested that control of possessions can be 
assimilated to control of body parts. Thus the objects that we control become viewed as part 
of the self. 
Self – with one’s own body as a constituent – is one of the categories of human 
possessiveness (Ellis, 1985). We also behave possessively towards our own personal space, 
which consists of our space of actions. Tools allow us to extend our body structure – the 
physical component of self – and thus our space of action. In macaques, some premotor 
parietal neurons, called bimodal neurons, code both for the somatosensory information from 
the hand (distal neurons) or elbow (proximal neurons) and respectively for the visual stimuli 
appearing close to the hand or the space within reaching distance of the hand. Researchers 
(Iriki et al., 1996; see Maravita & Iriki, 2004, for a review) trained macaque monkeys to 
retrieve a distant object by using a rake. They showed that the visual receptive fields (vRFs) 
of the distal neurons are extended to include the length of the rake, and the vRFs of the 
proximal neurons expand to respond to the new action space of the macaque, which includes 
the space reachable by the rake. Thus manipulated objects are incorporated into the 
representation of the body. The change in the body schema of the macaques appears only if 
the tool is intentionally used and not only grasped. This refers to the importance of the notion 
of control – possibly expressed by use – to consider possessions as part of the self in humans. 
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Dittmar (1992) suggested that through the exploration of an object, people experience 
the relation between the object and themselves, and come to redefine the self, including the 
object as part of it. Belk (1988) pointed out that our sense of self is diminished when our 
possessions are unintentionally lost or stolen. Previously controlled objects over which we 
loose control become separated from the self. Items over which we have control are more 
likely to be perceived as part of the self and items for which we lack control as non-self 
(Prelinger, 1959, cited by Belk, 1988; see also Dixon & Street, 1975). Beggan (1992) 
proposed that people value more their possessions because they want to have a positive image 
of themselves. Items relevant for the self are better remembered, also are self-owned objects, 
suggesting their importance for the self (Cunningham et al., 2008). Furby (1978; 1980) found 
the self to be a component of the meaning of possession. The association between possessions 
and the sense of self was present in participants from 6 years of age to adulthood, and in 
various cultures (American and Israeli). Furby discussed the relation between the self and the 
control of an object by one’s actions. 
Investment of the self into objects is also recognized by children as part of the 
relationship between an owner and his possessions. In a real-life scenario with involvement of 
the participants, Kanngiesser et al. (2010) showed that 3- and 4-year-old children recognize 
creative labor, but not mere physical possession, as a source of ownership of a borrowed 
object. The critical component in ownership allocation was the investment of effort in 
manipulating the object, but control of the object’s identity through its transformation also 
played a secondary role. Adults were more reluctant to transfer ownership to the second 
possessor who performed labor on the borrowed object, and endorsed the original owner (see 
also Hook, 1993), but still distinguished between labor and mere possession. In a conflict 
between a first possessor who abandoned temporarily an object and a second possessor, adults 
considered the first possessor to have stronger claim of ownership if he invested labor in the 
object compared to when he did not (Beggan & Brown, 1994). 
 
We have seen that control is used to attribute ownership. Also, control is important in 
our own feeling of ownership; it is at the basis of our tendency of appropriation. Control 
seems to be a core concept of the physical self, arising from self-contingency and extending 
to objects. The notion of self develops through the incorporation of objects to it. Those 
objects for which we experience familiarity may be seen as more closely related to the self. 
Possession and familiarity to objects lead us to attachment to these objects. Attachment 
reflects the intimate relation between an owner and his property. In a study of semantics of 
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ownership, attachment is found to be a criterion applied to owned objects (Rudmin & Berry, 
1987). 
 
1.3.3. Attachment 
 
There is attachment to an object when a person gives sentimental value to the object. 
The loss of this object would be harmful to the person and lead to a feeling of sadness. 
 
1.3.3.1. Familiarity leads to attachment 
 
Familiarity with an object through time may lead to attachment. This is recognized in 
the law, through adverse possession, when a possessor receives legal ownership of a land for 
which the owner shows a lack of possessiveness and defensiveness. Adverse possession is a 
doctrine that takes a property from the current owner to give it to the current possessor (Stake, 
2001). It is based on the assumption that with time a current possessor gets more attached to a 
territory than the absent owner, and would be harmed more if he had to lose possession of the 
land. 
This doctrine could find its roots in evolution. Several authors showed that birds get 
“attached” to their territory (Krebs, 1982; Beletsky & Orians, 1989; Tobias, 1997). Resident 
birds were removed, and then reintroduced only after new birds have settled in their territory. 
The longer the new birds were in possession of the territory, the more “attached” they got, and 
the more aggressive they were against intruders. If the new birds stayed long enough in 
possession of the territory (about 6-7 days in the study by Beletsky & Orians, 1989), they 
even defeated the previous owners. The authors consider that the birds’ willingness to fight to 
keep possession of the territory can be seen as a willingness to avoid a harmful loss of 
possession. The idea is that the longer is the stay, the stronger is the “attachment”, and the 
greater would be the loss of possession. 
Economists and psychologists have extensively studied this phenomenon in humans. 
When asked to trade, people are willing to sell an owned object for a higher price than they 
would be willing to pay to buy the exactly same object. An object acquired through 
ownership becomes part of a person’s endowment and increases in value. This is called the 
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). The endowment effect is supposed to occur because of the 
asymmetry between gains and losses. The pleasure of receiving a new object is smaller than 
the pain of losing an already possessed object. Thus, people exhibit loss aversion (e.g. 
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Kahneman et al., 1991). The endowment effect was also shown to exist in children (Harbaugh 
et al., 2001; Lucas et al., 2008) and non-human primates (e.g. Brosnan et al., 2007; 
Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008). Beggan (1992) proposed an alternative explanation to the 
fact that people value more owned objects. He called this preference for owned objects the 
mere ownership effect, and showed experimentally that it is due to the motivation to increase 
the value of the self. This effect can be seen about an owned object at any moment and not 
only when the object risks to become a loss. Contrary to what is considered in the law and 
was described in bird territoriality about the importance of the duration of possession for 
attachment, Beggan showed that humans’ higher ratings of owned objects are not due to 
familiarity with the object (longer exposure), but merely to ownership. Reb & Connolly 
(2007) showed that the endowment effect may be due to feelings of ownership (attachment) 
elicited by possession and not factual ownership. In children, preference for owned objects 
has been inferred from a study showing that children prefer an object given to them compared 
to an object given to a peer  (Irwin & Gebhard, 1946). 
 
1.3.3.2. Attachment to special objects (transitional objects) is an early form 
of possession 
 
The first possessive behaviors towards objects distinct from the self are expressed 
towards special objects. Around 9 months of age, infants express a particular relationship to 
transitional objects, objects such as blankets or teddy bears having a soothing function 
(Winnicott, 1953; 1982). According to Winnicott, attachment to transitional objects is normal 
in children’s development. Observation of children’s behavior with attachment objects 
showed that the objects are used to comfort the child and cope with separation, particularly at 
the time to go to sleep. School-aged children also have attachment objects. Lehman et al. 
(1995) investigated children’s attachments to transitional objects by interviewing 4- to 8-year-
old children about their conceptions of attachment objects. About half the participants had an 
attachment object, while the other half had never been attached to a particular object having a 
soothing function. For some questions and for the unattached participants, children had to 
conceptualize attachment in others. The younger unattached children could not say what 
makes an object special to an attached child. The older unattached children considered that 
the duration of possession is the characteristic that makes the object special. In contrast, the 
majority of children with attachment said that what makes their attachment object special is 
its texture. Attachment objects may allow the children to experience control. Some children 
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reported that the object does what they say when talking to it. A majority of the younger 
unattached children were willing to trade the object for a new one, whereas younger and older 
attached children were not willing to trade their attachment object, almost half of them was 
not even willing to lend his object to a friend. For attached children, the attachment object is 
unalienable, as it represents a part of themselves. Attached children are aware that the 
attachment object of a friend would not help them to feel comfort, but a lot of them are 
egocentric and consider that their attachment object can have a soothing function for someone 
else. 
In the interview by Lehman et al. (1995), few children considered that their object 
reminded them of their mother or father. In this study, attachment objects do not seem to 
represent – at least explicitly - a substitute to parent when the parent is absent, which could 
depend on the familial context (intact vs. divorced family). On the contrary, Winnicott (1953) 
suggested that attachments to transitional objects would arise from an association with a 
parent. Secure attachment between the child and his parents is important for later social 
relations. 
 
1.3.3.3. Attachment to objects may come from attachment to people 
 
Bowlby (1958, 1969/1982) has proposed hypothetical models of infants’ attachment 
behaviors toward caregivers. Johnson et al. (2007; 2010) investigated experimentally such 
models of attachment in infancy. More precisely, they studied 12- to 16-month-olds 
expectations of caregivers’ responsiveness to the distress of their child, by measuring infants’ 
looking times toward responsive and unresponsive caregivers. They were interested in 
differences between securely and insecurely attached infants. The infants were habituated to a 
separation event, seeing a large ellipse, the “mother”, moving away from a small ellipse, the 
“child”, who began to cry. After habituation (once the infants became bored with the event), 
they were presented with two outcomes. In the responsive outcome, the “mother” came back 
close to the “child”; in the unresponsive outcome, the “mother” moved further away from the 
“child”. The securely attached infants looked longer, i.e. were more surprised, at the 
unresponsive outcome than at the responsive outcome. In contrast, insecurely attached infants 
looked at both outcomes equally. This study showed that securely attached infants have 
expectations about caregivers’ reactions to the distress of their child. Johnson et al. (2010) 
also showed that infants have expectations about the child’s reaction if the mother comes back 
near the child but not completely close to him. Securely attached infants expected the child to 
  39 
approach the mother, contrary to some insecurely attached (insecure-avoidant) infants. These 
results show that infants have mental representations of human interactions including 
attachment relationships. 
 
To sum up what we have reviewed so far, the concept of ownership implicates aspects 
of possession, control, and attachment. Possession as a perceptible cue is a plausible 
elementary component of the notion of ownership. However, it cannot explain the emergence 
of the abstract sense of ownership (see Blake & Harris, 2011, for a discussion about the 
representational nature of ownership in children). Indeed, one can physically possess an 
object (be in physical contact with it) without being the owner, for example, if the object was 
borrowed or stolen. On the contrary, one can own an object that is not in one’s possession 
(not in contact, nor in proximity), as money in the bank. These remarks also apply to control 
over an object. Similarly, one can be sentimentally attached to an object without being its 
owner, and on the contrary own an object to which we do not give any sentimental value. 
Even if ones own feeling of ownership (as a particular relation between oneself and an object) 
is often reflected by those three components, they do not explain the social aspect of 
ownership, i.e. the fact that ownership does not exist unless it is recognized by others. In the 
following sections, we examine two potential components of the social aspects of ownership:  
exclusivity and reciprocity (in transfers based on reciprocity in social interactions). 
 
1.3.4. Exclusivity 
 
As we have seen, control over the environment implies control of the object of 
possession, control of the use of this object and eventually control of the surrounding 
environment through the use of the object. These actions may involve only the subject and the 
object once the object is effectively possessed or owned, but one cannot have control over the 
whole environment. According to Furby (1980), the notion of possessiveness does not emerge 
solely from the motivation to affect the environment, but from its combination with a 
restricting environment. Indeed, infants are not allowed to explore their whole surroundings. 
Adults restrict the access to some places and objects. It is through the distinction between the 
objects, which the infant is allowed to explore and the ones put out of his reach by his parents 
that the child comes to consider the former objects as “mine” and the latter as “not mine”. 
What is “not mine” will later be considered as being “yours”, when the child will be able to 
represent others as also having possessions. This leads us to reconsider the definition of 
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ownership as not only the expression of the self and of a relationship between an individual 
and an object, but as the relationship between several individuals with respect to an object. As 
soon as others may interfere with the child’s exploration of the environment or manipulation 
of an object, the relation between the subject and the object of possession involves a social 
component; it becomes triangular involving self-object-other. As Dittmar (1992) emphasizes, 
“the relationship between a person and her or his possessions always has reference to other 
people; s/he can lay exclusive claim to them only because other people do not”. Control is 
important for possession, but to fully understand ownership we need to add the notion of 
exclusivity. People not only want to control the environment, but they seek exclusive control 
of it. This control may be applied to a variety of possessions: objects, territories, persons. We 
mainly examine exclusive control over objects, but we introduce territory claims in animals. 
Moreover, exclusivity is expressed in the control of access to possessions, which can be 
considered as control of others. We do not develop this latter aspect. We come back to several 
points discussed previously, but examine them here considering the social component of the 
notion of ownership. 
 
1.3.4.1. Owners defend their possessions against others 
 
Possessors defend their belongings against the threat represented by others. At 8 
months, infants claim exclusivity over their mother’s attention (Rochat, 2011a). They act as if 
their mother was their possession and they had to control access to her attention by excluding 
others. As seen previously, they also claim exclusive possession toward transitional objects, 
which are particular objects of sentimental value (Winnicott, 1982). At 2 years, when children 
have acquired language, they use possessive pronouns for their property claims (e.g. Hay, 
2006; Imbens-Bailey & Pan, 1998; Tomasello, 1998). When saying “this is mine”, children 
seek to assert their possession. Here, “mine” means “not yours”. Children claim exclusivity 
over their possessions in order to exclude others from the use of the objects. For example, 2-
year-olds make this claim to defend their toys and exclude their older 4-year-old siblings from 
using them (Ross, 1996). 
A claim of exclusivity can lead to conflicts if others do not acknowledge it. A lot of 
conflicts among infants and children are about possessions (Dawe, 1934; Dunn, 1988; Hay & 
Ross, 1982; Ramsey, 1987; Shantz, 1987; but see Licht, 2008). 2-year-olds cite first 
possession to win disputes about current use but ownership arguments prevail over possession 
ones (Ross, 1996). Children (21/2- to 5-year-olds) exhibit more possessiveness and 
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defensiveness of a toy – they are more likely to maintain possession of the toy and prevent 
others from using it – when they are told that they own a toy than when they are told that the 
toy belongs to the class (Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1979; Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1981). 
When older children (from 3-4 years of age) are mere observers of a situation involving 
ownership, they recognize owners’ claims of possession. Second possessors are judged 
negatively if they do not return an object to the original owner who requests it – claims his 
control of the other’s use of the object (Hook, 1993). Children protest if non-owners want to 
keep or throw an object when the owner is not looking; non-owners are not allowed to control 
the object (Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2011). When a character steals an object, he is 
not allowed to keep it or take it home (Cram & Ng, 1989; Blake & Harris, 2009). Kim & 
Kalish (2009) investigated children’s (4-5-year-olds and 7-8-year-olds) and adults’ evaluation 
of who detains the control over property in a dispute. Subjects were presented with two 
characters and an object. Either the owner or the non-owner proposed an action on the object, 
and the other character objected. Subjects had to decide who can control the object (through 
novel use, alteration, throwing, lending). When subjects were asked who should decide when 
the non-owner proposed an action and the owner objected, the owner was given control at all 
ages. So, participants considered that non-owners are not allowed to use the owner’s 
possession against his wishes, i.e. the owner has exclusive control over others’ access to or 
use of his possessions. Participants were also asked who should decide when the owner 
proposed an action and the non-owner objected, thus they had to evaluate a situation were the 
non-owner intervened in the owner’s use of his possession. We discuss this situation in the 
next section about “deference to possessors”. 
The exclusive control over possessions is also expressed in granting and denying 
permission of use to others. Newman (1978) (cited by Faigenbaum, 2005) reported the 
observation of a 3.5-year-old child who denied permission to another to play with an 
arrangement of boxes she made. Neary et al. (2009) investigated whether children take into 
account who controls another’s use of an object to infer who is the owner. Two characters and 
a toy were presented to the children. One character wanted to play with the toy, and the 
second character permitted or prevented him to use the toy. Children had then to decide 
whose toy it was. In a first experiment, 4- and 5-year-olds identified as the owner of the 
object the character who granted or denied permission to the other to use the object, whereas 
3-year-olds made no distinction between the two characters. In a second experiment, older 3-
year-olds but not younger ones, considered the owner to be the character who prevented the 
other from using the object when prevention occurred through interdiction, i.e. control of 
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permission, but not simply information. The ability to determine ownership from control of 
permission seems to develop in children between 3 and 4 years of age, at least when they are 
not involved in the interaction. From 3.5 years of age on, children seem to consider control of 
another’s access to objects as defining ownership. Younger children and infants may be 
sensitive to social control, but attribute it to dominance.  
In animal control of the territory, there is necessarily the involvement of another 
individual. Animals mark the territory to inform others of their claim for that territory. 
Control of territory is a defensive behavior involving a resident and an intruder. Residents 
control the access of others to “their” territory. Usually, physical characteristics or hierarchy 
of competitors are determinant in disputes among resources, but in territorial conflicts, the 
resident mostly defeats the intruder (e.g. Maynard-Smith &Parker, 1976). This behavior has 
been reported in a variety of species. For example, as already mentioned, Krebs (1982) 
reported that great tits fight more and longer if they have been in possession of the territory 
for a longer period of time. In order to avoid costly fights, this status of residency is often 
recognized by others, who defer to residents (see Stake, 2004). 
 
1.3.4.2. Non-owners recognize and respect owner’s claims of possession 
and ownership 
 
Children claim exclusivity over their possessions and defend them, but they also appear 
to recognize and respect others as possessors. At 6 month of age, infants do not fight over 
objects. When two peers touch the same object, the first possessor tends to retain it (Hay et 
al., 1983). First or previous possession gives entitlement to use. Older children follow this 
first or prior possession rule to resolve conflicts, recognizing the right of exclusivity to the 
first or prior possessor. Children tend to win a conflict over the use of an object when they 
were in initial possession of the object (Ross, 1996; see also Ramsey, 1987; Weigel, 1984; 
Bakeman & Brownlee, 1982). According to Newman (1978, cited in Faigenbaum, 2005), 
recognition of ownership is also expressed in others’ requests to owners of permission to use 
their possession. Request behaviors are also seen in animals (Ellis, 1985). 
In the animal kingdom, the principle of the lion’s share often prevails. Weaker animals 
do not have access to possessions of stronger ones. Non-human primates usually defer to the 
dominant member of the group, but under certain circumstances they respect the possessor’s 
claims of exclusivity. They do not attempt to take an object from a conspecific (Sigg & Falett, 
1985; Kummer & Cords, 1991) or a human (Russ et al., 2010) that is close to it. Proximity is 
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recognized as a cue of ownership. Ellis (1985) suggests that marking plays the same role. It 
“tends to reduce the probability of subsequent possessive behavior toward the object by other 
conspecifics” because others seek their own exclusivity. Kummer & Cords (1991) argued that 
real proximity and capacity to hold the object is necessary to assure that others will not 
threaten one’s possessions. So, some animals seem not to respect the owner-object 
relationship when the owner is absent. On the contrary, human children consider absent 
owners (Tomasello, 1998; Blake et al., 2010), and come to recognize owner’s rights to control 
and exclusivity independently of the proximity with his possessions. 
In the study by Kim & Kalish (2009), subjects had to judge whether non-owners can 
interfere with the owner’s use of his possessions or have to defer to owner’s wishes about the 
use of his possessions (see also Neary, 2011). When an owner proposed to execute an action 
on his possession and a non-owner objected, 4-5-year-old children were at chance in deciding 
who has control over the object. So, according to 4-5-year-olds, the owner does not have a 
complete right of exclusivity when it concerns his own use of the object, non-owners are 
allowed to challenge the owner’s control over the use of the object. We have seen before that 
when it is the non-owner who proposed the action and the owner who objected, children 
considered that the owner could decide. Thus, the owner’s right to control other’s use of his 
property seems to be stronger than his right to control the object. This applies particularly to a 
situation where ownership is transferred. In the absence of ownership transfer, an owner has 
the right to control his property. It gets more complicated for children when there is a transfer 
of ownership and a quarrel about the control of the transferred object. The original owner may 
be seen as retaining some control of the object even in the case of a legitimate transfer. 
 
1.3.4.3. Non-owners enforce owner’s property rights 
 
Non-owners not only respect an owner’s claims of ownership, but they also act on 
behalf of owners to protect owners’ rights against transgressions. From 3 years of age, 
children protest when an actor takes and tries to throw away another’s piece of property 
(Rossano et al., 2011). 3-year-olds also protest against and tattle on a transgressor who 
destroys another’s property (Vaish et al., 2011). Children enforce the property rights of a 
third-party by intervening against a property transgression. 
This behavior is also observed in animals. Heinrich (1999) described how ravens form 
groups to attack intruders (humans or other ravens) entering or wanting to feed or to nest in 
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their territory and even in the territory of neighbors. Protecting another’s property can be an 
instance of reciprocal behavior. 
 
Exclusivity seems to be a core concept, present very early. In humans, we only 
considered ownership of a single individual, who excludes all other individuals from the use 
of his object. We have just seen that in animals (at least in ravens), when a territory belongs to 
a group of individuals, they all protect it against intruders. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether children can also have a concept of joint ownership, where they share an 
object within their group but exclude individuals of another group. Already, when children 
are told that a toy belongs to the class, they share it more than when they are told that it is 
their own toy (Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1979). 
We have seen that children defend their possessions, respect other’s claims of 
possession, and help owner’s to protect their possessions from an early age. They seem to 
have an implicit understanding of property rights. However, it is harder for them to 
understand that property rights may be transferred. 
 
1.3.5. Transfer of ownership, exchange, and reciprocity 
 
There is transfer of property when an object possessed by an individual A comes to be 
possessed by an individual B. However, a transfer of property does not mean that there is 
transfer of ownership. For ownership to be transferred, an owner has to intentionally give his 
property rights to another person. An illegitimate transfer of property, such as in the case of 
theft, does not constitute a transfer of ownership; the legitimate owner is still the person 
possessing the object before the transfer. In the case of an exchange, there is at least two 
transfers, which are not necessarily property transfers. The notion of exchange includes a 
notion of reciprocity. A first transfer from A to B has to be reciprocated by a second transfer 
from B to A. 
 
1.3.5.1. The full concept of ownership transfer is acquired late 
 
A lot of early social interactions between peers involve objects. Those interactions do 
not only imply competition over resources, but also cooperation and sharing. Property 
interactions depend on children’s claims of exclusivity to their possessions and on the 
recognition of these claims by others. Making the distinction between one’s possessions and 
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those of others - acknowledging that others are also possessors - is important in transfers of 
ownership. There is a variety of possible transfers of goods. Understanding intentions is 
crucial to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate transfers of property. Winegar & 
Renninger (1989) observed that 3- to 4-year-old children accepted slightly more to take 
offered objects if the giver had prior possession of the object. This result suggests that they 
understand that in order to transfer an object one has to be the legitimate possessor. Children 
were also more likely to initiate offers if they had prior possession of the object. In Furby’s 
study (1978), the acquisition process allows to define ownership. It shifts from passive 
acquisition (being given an object) at 6 years of age to active one (taking an object) at older 
ages, showing the growing importance of control not only in already possessed objects but 
also in the way of acquiring them. 
The majority of studies investigating children’s understanding of ownership as 
observers involved transfers of objects between two characters. Researchers were principally 
interested in discovering when children accept transfers of ownership, eventually resulting in 
transfers of control. Hook (1993) found that children do not accept that the original owner 
looses his right to control the object in the case of gift-giving before 8 years of age. Cram & 
Ng (1989) focused on the right of control of the recipient and also found that children 
younger than 8 years of age refuse to the recipient of a gift the right to keep and take the 
object home. Kim & Kalish (2009) reported that even if the original owner of a legitimate 
transfer seems to retain control over the object, some transfer of ownership is acknowledged 
from 4-5 years of age on, when children are asked who is the owner. In all observations and 
experiments about the understanding of ownership, it is important to distinguish between the 
label of ownership (“A owns P”) and what it means at different ages. 
In the context of a birthday present, ownership transfer of the gift is accepted by 4-year-
olds; the recipient is considered as the owner and allowed to keep and take the object home 
(Blake & Harris, 2009). Even 3-year-olds consider the recipient as the owner if the birthday 
present is wrapped (Friedman & Neary, 2008). In the absence of a ritualized context (as gift-
giving at birthdays), one need to read the intentions of the characters involved in the transfer 
of an object in order to determine if it is legitimate and thus accompanied by the transfer of 
ownership, which may be difficult for the younger children.  
Before accepting transfers of ownership, children exhibit a first possessor bias: they 
attribute ownership (Friedman & Neary, 2008; Blake & Harris, 2009) or control of others’ use 
of the object (Hook, 1993) to the first character in possession of the object (i.e. the original 
owner), independently of the type of transfer – gift-giving, finding, borrowing, stealing (but 
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see Kim & Kalish, 2009). Apart from the case of transfer of a wrapped gift, but still in the 
context of a birthday present transfer (of a non-wrapped gift), children can accept a definitive 
transfer of property at 3 years when not seeing the object possessed by the gift-giver before 
the transfer, i.e. not seeing a first possessor before transfer. They also consider the gift-
recipient to be the owner of the object when he is not seen in possession of the object, neither 
is the gift-giver (Neary & Friedman, 2009). 
As children acquire the concept of ownership transfer – with transfer of the rights to 
control and exclude – only late, it suggests that the notion of transfer is not a primitive one. In 
adults, unidirectional transfers of ownership without anything in return (whether it is another 
object or social recognition) are rare. People expect transfers to be reciprocated. Thus, the 
primitive component of transfers of ownership may be found in exchanges. 
 
1.3.5.2. Exchange is based on mutual agreement and reciprocity 
 
In order to enter legitimate transactions, children need to understand the rules that apply 
in exchanges. According to Faigenbaum (2005), exchanges have three characteristics: “(1) at 
least two individuals in mutual interaction participate; (2) at least one of the individuals is 
entitled to a certain item (that is, is its owner or legitimate possessor); (3) there is a voluntary 
transfer of such item from one individual to another”. Exchanges are considered here as 
legitimate transactions. Faigenbaum reports that children make exchanges on the basis of an 
explicit contract – with mutual agreement and voluntary transfer – from 3 years of age on. At 
that age, they also give more complex justifications for ownership compared to their earlier 
“it’s mine” assertions. At 2 years of age, children consider their possessions as inalienable; it 
is only by 3 years of age that they come to see them as alienable (Rochat et al., 2009; Rochat, 
2011a). Then, children can enter the world of negotiation (Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008). 
Acquisition of property through exchanges is regulated by reciprocity. Reciprocity 
triggers early exchanges in humans (Harris, 1970; Levitt et al., 1985; Olson & Spelke, 2008; 
Staub & Sherk, 1970). Expectations of reciprocal and fair exchanges are also observed in 
animals (e.g. Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). Anthropologists described small-scale traditional 
societies as relying on a system of “gift”. In this system, gifts confer social power and are 
expected to be reciprocated (Mauss, 1952/1967; Malinowski, 1932). The social aspect of gifts 
is what underlies exchanges among young children. In the first year, infants are already 
willing to offer objects to others, even if they have difficulties actually relinquishing them 
(Hay & Cook, 2007). 18-month-olds engage in spontaneous sharing. These offers are made to 
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engage the other in the interaction, rather than for strict reciprocity (Faigenbaum, 2005). The 
exchange creates a social bond. Exchanged goods can be tangible, but also intangible as a 
promise or a turn in a game. Moreover, children’s taking turn in a game or adult’s taking turn 
in a conversation are other forms of reciprocity. The underlying basis of reciprocity in 
transactions may be found in social reciprocity (which could also be related to infant’s 
seeking of contingency that we discussed earlier). 
 
1.3.5.3. Reciprocity emerges in early social interactions 
 
Alternating interaction is suggested to be a precursor of material reciprocity of 
exchange. Rochat (2007) proposes that social reciprocation allows infants to become 
intentional and eventually to see others as intentional agents. “Social reciprocation is the 
mechanism that allows infants to dissociate first and third person perspectives on objects, 
people, and also on the self”, which are all necessary components of the understanding of 
exchanges (see also Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008). 
At 2 months of age, infants display smiling as a social instrument (and not only an 
automatic response) and engage in reciprocal smiling in face-to-face exchanges, showing 
primary intersubjectivity (Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 1979). Infants consider that these early 
social exchanges follow rules. 2-month-olds respond negatively if a face-to-face interaction is 
interrupted by the adult “freezing” (Tronick et al., 1978; see also Rochat et al., 2002; and 
Rochat, 2001). At this age, infants and mothers also exhibit turn-taking in sounds and gazes 
(Kaye, 1982). From 4 month of age on, infants are sensitive to the timing and organization of 
protoconversations (Rochat et al., 1999). 
At 9 month of age, infants start pointing to direct another’s attention on an object, or to 
ask for an object. They engage in joint attention with others about objects, with the emergence 
of secondary intersubjectivity (Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello, 1999; Trevarthen, 1979). As 
exchanges require mutual agreement, the development of communication is an important step. 
The development of these early social reciprocal exchanges leads 2-year-olds to understand 
the social power of objects. 
 
We considered that exchanges are based both on reciprocity and mutual agreement. We 
have seen that the notion of reciprocity in exchanges of goods may emerge from social 
reciprocity. The notion of mutual agreement refers to the tacit or sometimes explicit 
rules/norms that everybody has to follow regarding the rights attached to ownership and/or 
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transfer. It could find its roots in joint action, based on shared intentionality, which needs the 
understanding of goals and intentions (e.g. Tomasello et al., 2005; Behne et al., 2005). This 
last normative/contractual aspect is needed to arrive at the mature concept of ownership. 
 
1.3.6. Summary 
 
The meaning of ownership is not apparent in the label “own”. It can differ between 
adults and children. If ownership may be considered as a relationship between an owner and 
an owned object, the nature of this relationship needs to be defined. We examined five 
notions that specify the meaning of ownership and are potential candidates for the emergence 
of ownership: possession, control, attachment, exclusivity, and reciprocity. 
Possession is a visible indication of ownership. First possession is considered as a 
justification for ownership, and avoids cost fights in animals and children. However, the fact 
that an object is held in an agent’s hand is not a sufficient condition for asserting that the 
agent owns the object. On the contrary, it is not necessary to see an object in an agent’s hand 
for believing that an absent object may be an agent’s possession. We examined thus another 
cue indicative of ownership : control. 
Control of an object is an important cue to determine an owner or to define one’s own 
ownership. Infants start to explore the environment and the effects of their actions very early. 
They seek contingency between their behavior and stimuli in their environment and express 
positive affect when they experience it. Possession, particularly through control, also appears 
to be linked to the self. First “objects of possession” by infants are the effects of their own 
actions, such as the sound that they produced or the movement of a mobile that they kicked. 
The notion of causality (linked to the notion of control) is important for attribution of 
ownership. It would be interesting to explore causality for itself as a basic component of 
ownership. 
People get attached to objects that are close to them. Psychological ownership gives 
more value – because of higher attachment – to the objects considered as owned. Around 9 
month of age, infants express a particular relationship of attachment to an object having a 
soothing function. Attachment to caregivers may be at the basis of attachment to objects, and 
a potential candidate for the emergence of ownership. Time also leads to attachment. This is 
recognized in law, when a squatter receives legal ownership of a land for which the true 
owner does not act possessively and defensively. The owner of an object has to defend it 
against others. 
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This notion of exclusivity was also examined. It is important to notice that this central 
notion of ownership is present early in children. Owners make possession claims and defend 
their possessions in disputes. In animals, the resident will fight harder for his territory, which 
leads others to respect his possessiveness. Children also recognize people’s claims of 
possession and of control of access to possession by others. The notion of social control has 
several dimensions. It is expressed in (1) control of persons seen as property (e.g. children, 
slaves), (2) control of others’ access to an object, (3) control of others’ behaviors or 
expectations via control of an object. We only examined the second aspect of social control. 
The other aspects would also need to be detailed. One would also benefit from examining the 
link between social power through possession and dominance. To avoid possession conflicts, 
rules are applied. These rules determine who are legitimate possessors and how to participate 
in exchanges. 
From 3-4 years of age on, children recognize a transfer of ownership in the transfer of a 
gift given at a birthday party when asked who is the owner. At 4-5 years of age, children 
accept that the recipient of a birthday gift gains rights of control over the object. But it is not 
until 7-8 years that children accept that a giver or seller relinquishes his rights of control. It 
looks like unidirectional transfer of ownership is not a common situation. A more primitive 
notion seems to be the one of exchange. An exchange has to occur through voluntary transfers 
with mutual agreement. At the core of the exchange is the notion of reciprocity. It can be 
strict reciprocity with an exchange of two material goods or an exchange involving a social 
counterpart. In infants, the importance of exchange lies in the social bond that it creates. We 
examined the notion of social reciprocity as a primitive component of the concept of 
ownership. 
 
We have seen that physical possession can be a cue to determine ownership; control and 
attachment are both crucial for the feeling of one’s own ownership, but the notion of 
exclusivity needs to be added to these latter to understand ownership in a social context. To 
come to understand ownership transfers, the notion of reciprocity is a core concept. What is 
missing to these components to have a full adult mature understanding of ownership? 
Ownership, or property, is a contract between several persons. This contract is constitutive of 
rules that the different parties have to follow. The owner has a set of rights: right to use the 
object, right to exclude others from the use of the object, and right to transfer his property 
rights to someone else (Snare, 1972). The non-owners have the duty to respect these rights: 
they are not allowed to interfere with the owner’s use of his object, they are not allowed to 
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use, take or transfer the object without the owner’s consent, etc. The rules may be implicit or 
explicit and depend on the type of object or owner. The emergence of these rules may be 
dependent of the culture, but in any case ownership is regulated by some rules, that are 
defining a contract between persons with respect to objects. Young children already 
understand the notion of norms. At two years of age, they understand the normative 
implications of rules in games (Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy et al., 2008). At three years of age, 
also the normative structure of property rights is understood (Rossano et al., 2011). Rossano 
and colleagues tested children’s enforcement of property norms when they are in presence of 
transgressions of property rights. They have shown that 3-year-old children understand that 
taking and throwing away another’s piece of cloth is wrong; children protest against these 
transgressions, even when they are not the victims of the transgressions but are seeing them 
performed against a third party. It remains to be tested whether this understanding generalizes 
to other types of transgressions and other types of objects and owners. Moreover, the fact that 
young children understand and enforce property rights does not necessarily mean that they 
understand that property rules are made by people, i.e. that property is a convention (Kalish & 
Anderson, 2011). Also, the mature notion of contract may be acquired late. This notion of 
contract is important to allow ownership to extend in time and space. Indeed, the owner does 
not need to be constantly keeping control of his possessions. A contract allows regulating 
social interactions, and an important aspect of a contract about ownership is to regulate what 
happens after a transgression of property rights. Figure C1-1 summarizes the hypothetical 
components underlying the notion of ownership. 
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Figure C1-1. Hypothetical synopsis of the components (in yellow) of ownership (in green) 
and their development. 
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1.4. Conclusion 
 
Interactions involving objects, and thus ownership, are present in our lives since infancy. 
We looked at the development of the notion of ownership. Very early infants can be seen as 
having a minimal sense of ownership, by preferentially latching onto soft objects. Infants seek 
appropriation of objects in their surroundings. We examined different basic components of 
the sense of ownership: possession, control, attachment, exclusivity, and reciprocity. At the 
end, one important aspect of ownership is its social part. Ownership can exist only if people 
have a contract concerning it. Ownership is normative. These norms regulate social behaviors: 
what one is allowed to do with regard to ownership, and what happens if ownership rules are 
transgressed. Ownership transgressions constitute moral transgressions. One could wonder 
whether the notion of attachment, one potential basic constituent of ownership, is not at the 
basis of the moral aspect of ownership manifested in ownership transgressions. Ownership 
transgressions are considered as moral transgressions because they are transgressions of 
rights, but also because they are harmful. In an ownership transgression, harm occurs because 
the owner is attached to his property. In the next section, we examine the link between the 
sense of ownership and the sense of morality, and discuss studies about children’s evaluation 
and understanding of ownership transgressions. 
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2. The moral dimension of ownership 
 
Claims of ownership are taken into account from a young age. However, transgressions 
of property rights do occur. Ownership transgressions can be seen as conventional norm 
transgressions (such as transgressions of game rules or of social conventions), but they are 
also moral transgressions, as part of transgressions of human rights. A lot of research about 
children’s understanding of morality has been conducted through the investigation of 
children’s moral judgments about agents involved in moral transgressions. We first introduce 
moral studies, and then discuss studies involving ownership transgressions. 
 
2.1. Morality 
 
2.1.1. Basis of moral judgments: Emotion versus Reason 
 
Talking about morality, we have to introduce a classical debate about the origins of our 
moral judgments. In this debate, two schools of thought are opposed: one arguing that 
morality lies in emotions and the other that it lies in reason. Hume (1776/1965) argued that 
morality was grounded in emotions. He considered that good acts lead to feelings of approval 
and bad acts to feelings of disapproval. These feelings were supposed to arise from our 
sympathy towards others (i.e. our sharing of others’ feelings). According to Hume, without 
emotions, reason alone would not prevent us from performing immoral actions. In opposition 
to Hume, Kant (1785/1959) argued for the importance of reason in morality and developed 
his rationalist ethical theory. He considered that moral actions are motivated by, and moral 
judgments arise from practical knowledge of what one ought to do, thus morality depends on 
a normative principle reached through practical reasoning. 
These two lines of thought debated by philosophers are also found among moral 
psychologists. The first psychologists studying the origins of our moral faculties were 
rationalists. The developmental psychologists Piaget (1932/1997) and Kohlberg (1969; 1976) 
considered moral judgments to be based on reasoning processes (see Figure C1-2a). They 
argued that the development of moral judgment is based on the development of cognitive 
skills. According to them, children acquire progressively knowledge of moral principles. 
Piaget and Kohlberg tested children’s moral understanding through their ability to offer 
justifications of their moral judgments. However, we cannot always give a justification to a 
moral judgment. Haidt (2001) called this phenomenon “moral dumbfounding”, and proposed 
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that our moral judgments are based on intuitive emotional responses. According to social 
intuitionists, moral judgments are intuitive, automatic, rapid and unconscious. The Social 
Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001; 2007) postulates that a moral event gives rise to emotions, 
which then lead us to our moral judgments of the event and/or agents involved; reasoning 
only occurs post-hoc to justify the judgments (see Figure C1-2b). The crucial role of emotions 
or reasoning in moral judgments is still debated today. However, in the last decade, a more 
integrative view of morality has emerged, in which both emotions and reasoning are 
considered to play important roles in the formation of moral judgments. The most important 
model including emotions and reasoning is the Dual-process Model of moral judgments 
(Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, 2009). Greene et al. (2001) investigated 
the activation of brain regions associated with emotional processes in response to judgments 
of moral dilemmas. The dual-process model, resulting from these studies, proposes that 
deontological moral judgments (concerning “norms” about how to treat another individual, 
e.g. it is bad to kill) are based on automatic emotional responses, whereas utilitarian or 
consequentialist moral judgments (concerning the “greater good”, e.g. it is more acceptable to 
sacrifice 1 rather than 5 persons) are driven by controlled cognitive processes (see Figure C1-
2c). Interestingly, these two types of processes, emotional and rational, can be in competition 
when there is a conflict between an emotional response (emerging from deontological aspects 
of the situation) and utilitarian considerations (Greene et al., 2004). To deliver a utilitarian 
judgment, people need to inhibit their automatic emotional response with the use of cognitive 
control. Another model including intuitions and controlled processes is the Affect-Backed 
Normative Theory of moral judgment (Nichols, 2002). In this model, moral judgments 
depend on norms prohibiting certain actions and on the emotions produced by those actions. 
Finally, the Universal Moral Grammar Model (Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser, 2006; Hauser et 
al., 2006; Mikhail, 2007) proposes that our moral judgments are based on core intuitive moral 
principles, but does not consider intuitions to be emotional. In this model, both the emotional 
response and conscious reasoning occur post-hoc (see Figure C1-2d). 
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a. Rationalist model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Social intuitionist model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Dual-process model 
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Figure C1-2. Simplified representations of four models of moral judgment: (a) Rationalist 
model, (b) Social intuitionist model, (c) Dual-process model, (d) Universal moral grammar 
model. 
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2.1.2. Children’s evaluations of moral transgressions 
 
2.1.2.1. First studies in moral development found a late moral faculty 
 
Piaget (1932/1997) is one of the pioneers in the study of moral development. He 
considered that morality is based on reasoning and develops through the maturation of 
children’s cognitive functions and through children’s interaction with the social world. Piaget 
studied morality in children using their justifications of their moral judgments. He considered 
that there are two stages of moral development. Until 7-8 years of age, children are in the first 
stage of morality (morality of constraint). In this stage, children strictly respect rules dictated 
by authorities such as adults. They consider theses rules as given and accept that authorities 
have full right to reward those respecting the rules and to punish those transgressing them. 
Also, at this stage, children base their moral judgment on the consequences of an action, 
without considering the intentions behind it. Piaget considered that it is through peer 
socialization rather than adult intervention that children acquire the notions of respect for 
others (by taking another’s perspective), equality and reciprocity, which lead them to the 
second stage of moral understanding. During the interactions of the transitional period, 
children experience that rules can be decided and changed by the group. Children reach the 
second stage of morality (autonomous morality) around 11-12 years of age. In the second 
stage, children consider that moral rules are based on social agreement and are modifiable. 
They also consider that adults are not always fair in their punishments. Finally, they do not 
base their moral judgment anymore on the consequences alone but instead also consider the 
agent’s intentions. 
Following Piaget, Kohlberg (1969; 1976) also accepted a rationalist perspective in his 
investigation of children’s moral development. He studied how children resolve hypothetical 
moral dilemmas through their reasoning. In his most known dilemma, Heinz is faced with the 
decision to steal a very expensive drug to save his wife’s life. Children were asked what 
Heinz should do. Kohlberg proposed that children’s morality develops through six stages, 
merged into three levels. In the first level, the pre-conventional level, children base their 
judgments on egoistic considerations, and consider that good acts are rewarded and bad acts 
are punished. In the second level, the conventional level of moral reasoning, children take into 
account social values and laws. In the third level, the post-conventional level, children’s 
judgments are based on moral principles and ethics. 
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Piaget and Kohlberg set the basis for the study of moral development. However, recent 
studies showed that children have a much earlier understanding of morality than assumed by 
Piaget and Kohlberg. As we develop further below, Turiel (1983) showed that young children 
do not consider that moral rules depend on authority; on the contrary they consider moral 
transgressions as wrong even if an authority figure allows the transgression. Children have 
intuitions about what kind of acts are bad. 
 
2.1.2.2. Moral versus conventional transgressions 
 
The distinction between moral and conventional transgressions was introduced by 
Turiel (1983). Moral transgressions are defined as actions that affect the welfare of others, 
involve injustice or violation of rights (for e.g. hitting someone or pulling someone’s hair). In 
contrast, conventional transgressions affect the social order, but involve no harm, injustice or 
violation of rights (for e.g. going to school wearing pajamas). The distinction between moral 
and conventional transgressions is assessed through the evaluation of their permissibility, 
seriousness, dependence on authority, and generalizability. Moral rules are obligatory, 
generalizable and independent of authority. Conventional rules are context-dependent, 
contingent on social rules and authority commands. Moral transgressions are considered as 
worse and less permissible than conventional transgressions (e.g. Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 
1983). Children are able to distinguish between these two types of transgressions by 3 years 
of age (Smetana, 1981; Smetana et al., 1993), and do so in different cultures (Nucci et al., 
1996; Yau & Smetana, 2003). Turiel and colleagues consider that it is through social 
interactions that children learn the difference between moral events (concerned with welfare, 
justice and rights) being intrinsically right or wrong, and events that are considered as right or 
wrong depending on a social consensus (e.g. Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci, 1985). 
However, children’s ability to distinguish between moral and conventional 
transgressions in the tests of Turiel and colleagues is not sufficient to ensure that they have a 
true understanding of morality. Indeed, the presence of a victim of harm in moral 
transgressions but not in conventional transgressions might be sufficient to allow the 
distinction between both types of events. Moreover, the victim of a moral transgression is 
usually presented as crying. Thus, in these studies, moral and conventional transgressions 
differ by the presence of a negative emotional display, indicating the presence of harm. Based 
on this assessment, it is important to control that children’s distinction between moral and 
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conventional transgressions does not only reflect the presence or absence of harm, and of 
negative emotional cues. 
 
2.1.2.3. Perceived emotions and the evaluations of harm 
 
It is important to know whether the presence of harm is underlying the distinction 
between moral and conventional rules. Tisak & Turiel (1984) therefore studied moral and 
prudential rules, whose transgressions both involve harm. A moral transgression involves 
harm to another. In contrast, in a prudential transgression, a character harms himself out of his 
own carelessness. For example, he runs in the rain, falls and cuts his knee. The authors found 
that children (from 6 years of age on) distinguish between the two types of rules and consider 
the transgressions of moral rules as worse than those of prudential ones. This shows that they 
not only consider the presence of harm in their evaluations, but also take into account the 
presence of a harmful agent (harming someone else on purpose). 
Another question is whether children’s evaluations of moral transgressions are not only 
based on the presence of a negative emotion. Leslie et al. (2006) investigated children’s 
evaluations in three situations: moral transgression (Catherine pulls Sally’s hair, which makes 
Sally cry), conventional transgression (Johnny goes to school wearing his pajamas) and “cry 
baby” scenario (Tammy eats her own cookie, which makes James cry). In both the moral and 
“cry baby” stories, a character’s emotional distress is preceded by another’s action. However, 
4-year-old children (and autistic children) distinguished between these two displays of 
distress. They considered the action preceding crying more positively in the “cry baby” 
condition than in the moral condition, which suggests that they do not base their evaluations 
only on emotional cues but do take into account whether the emotion is justified, i.e. 
following an action that could harm another. Moreover, Weisberg & Leslie (2009) have 
shown that young children recognize that moral transgressions involve harm, even if it is not 
expressed by an emotion. Indeed, they found that 4-year-old children distinguish between 
moral and conventional transgressions even in the absence of an emotional outcome 
following the moral transgression. 
 
2.1.2.4. Early evaluations of physical harm 
 
The scenarios presenting moral transgressions often involve the presence of physical 
harm (e.g. hitting someone). The previously discussed studies showed an understanding of 
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moral transgressions from 4 years of age on, when children were asked to give an explicit 
moral evaluation of the situations (e.g. “Was that a bad thing to do?”). Importantly, this 
understanding was shown not to rely on the perception of superficial distress cues. With 
implicit measures, recent studies (also matching the presence of harm and/or distress between 
the compared situations) showed that transgressions implying physical harm are evaluated 
very early in infancy. They tested infants’ social preferences for harmful and harmless agents. 
Buon et al. (in revision) investigated 10-month-olds preferences towards agents pushing down 
or comforting a girl. More infants chose the teddy bear presented by an agent who comforted 
a girl (and pushed down a rucksack) instead of the teddy bear presented by an agent who 
pushed down a girl (and lifted up a rucksack). In this experiment the amount of positive and 
negative cues was the same in both conditions. So, the infants could not base their evaluation 
on a simple association between the agent and the situation with more cues of positive or of 
negative valence. However, in this study, the emotional consequences (expressed by the girl) 
were different in each condition: positive in the comforting condition and negative in the 
pushing down condition. 
Buon et al. (2008) presented to 10- and 30-month-olds situations with the same 
emotional outcome (a crying character). In one situation, the victim fell down after being hit 
by another character (intentionally harmful agent), who had a causal role in the victim’s 
suffering and acted on purpose. In the other situation, the “victim” (crying character) fell by 
himself and another character (coincidentally present agent) had no causal role in the former’s 
suffering. The results showed that infants prefer to take the teddy bear presented by the 
coincidentally present agent rather than the intentionally harmful agent. Thus, very early, 
infants are able to evaluate harmful situations with equivalent emotional displays. 
 
2.1.2.5. Summary 
 
First studies about children’s moral development (Piaget, 1932/1997; Kohlberg, 1969; 
1976) found a late moral faculty, around 11-12 years. More recent studies found that children 
can explicitly distinguish transgressions of moral and conventional rules, evaluating the 
former as worse, already at 3 or 4 years of age, even when the presence of harm or distress is 
controlled for. Recent studies about infants’ social evaluations of moral transgressions 
provide evidence for a very early capacity (from 10 months of age) to evaluate transgressions 
implying physical harm. Many studies of moral transgressions involved physical harm, 
however some studies did consider other transgressions (e.g. theft) that involve ownership. 
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2.2. Ownership transgressions 
 
Many studies involving transgressions of ownership have been discussed in the 
perspective of moral development. Here, we discuss them in the framework of the 
development of the concept of ownership. 
 
2.2.1. Variability in investigations of ownership transgressions 
 
When ownership transgressions occur during children’s interactions, they give rise to a 
variety of reactions. When children are victims of ownership transgressions, such as stealing, 
they defend themselves by protesting, justifying their claims of ownership, attempting to 
recover the stolen object, or attacking the offender (e.g. Ross, 1996; Hay et al., 2011). They 
also tattle on the transgressor (Ross & den Bak-Lammers, 1998 ; Ingram & Bering, 2010), 
which consists in reporting the transgression to a third-party, usually an adult, with the 
intention to make the transgressor punished. In chimpanzees, stealing also leads to 
punishment. Chimpanzees retaliate against thieves, conspecifics stealing food from them. The 
angrier they get at the thief, the stronger they react (Jensen et al., 2007). 
However, in dyadic interactions, as for chimpanzees, the response of children can be 
due to an emotional reaction or self-interest and not to a real understanding of the normative 
structure of ownership that has been transgressed. A more direct test of ownership 
understanding includes intervention on behalf of a third-party to protect his rights. Several 
studies have shown that children do evaluate third-party interactions involving ownership 
transgressions such as alteration or destruction of another’s property, illegitimate acquisition 
of property, no respect of owner’s right to possess his object (no restitution). In Table C1-2, 
we arrange those studies to interpret them in terms of ownership transgressions, organizing 
them by type of transgression. We consider children’s evaluations of the following 
transgressions of property rights:  
 
• No respect of owner’s property: 
o losing another’s property (it is accidental, but it is a lack of attention) 
o (intentionally) throwing away another’s property 
o altering another’s property 
o (intentionally) destroying another’s property 
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• No respect of owner’s use: 
o preventing owner from using his property 
• No respect of owner’s exclusivity: 
o using another’s property without permission (without asking, or with 
disagreement of the owner) 
• No respect of rules of transfer: 
o illegitimate acquisition (theft) 
o no restitution in the case of a non-definitive transfer. 
 
Children exhibit explicit evaluations of property transgressors, and also implicit 
behaviors towards transgressors and victims of transgressions as indicators of their social and 
moral evaluations. This appears in the variety of methodology used by different authors. We 
include in Table C1-2, the type of presentation of the transgressions (verbal stories or live 
interactions), and the type of measure (e.g. explicit badness rating, assignment of property 
rights, prosocial/antisocial behavior). We can also notice the variety of participant’s ages in 
different studies, going from 3 months to adulthood (only two studies tested children and 
adults), with many studies centered around 3 to 5 years. In Table C1-2, for each transgression, 
studies are ordered by age of mature evaluation
C1-1
 of the transgression, from higher to lower.  
                                                
C1-1
 Mature evaluation corresponds to correct attribution of property rights or to distinction in social or moral 
evaluation between a transgression and a non-transgression of property rights. 
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Ages tested (in 
years) 
Type of 
transgression 
Type of 
presentation of 
the transgression 
(stimuli) 
Type of 
measure 
Minimum age of 
mature evaluation 
References 
 
No respect of another’s property 
 
4; 6; 8; 10; 15; 
adults 
Losing another’s 
property 
Verbal story 
(apparently no 
pictures) 
Explicit badness 
rating 
10 years 
(from 4 to 10 years, 
losing any property 
(own or another’s) 
is as bad) 
Hook, 1993 
4-5; 7-8; adults Verbal story + 
pictures (on 
cards) 
 
(conflict: non-
owner proposes 
action, owner 
objects) 
Assignment of 
property rights 
(who should 
decide) 
(+ Explicit 
attribution of 
ownership) 
7-8 years 
(For many 4-5-
year-olds, 
discarding any 
property (own or 
another’s) is not 
allowed) 
Kim & Kalish, 
2009 (exp 1) 
 
2; 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throwing away 
another’s 
property 
 
Live interaction 
between puppet, 
experimenter and 
child. The puppet 
is the 
transgressor, 
either against 
child or against 
experimenter. 
Protest 
3 years 
(At 2 years, protest 
only when 
transgression 
against the child) 
 
Rossano et al., 
2011 
(taking away 
followed by 
throwing away, 
but analyzed 
separately) 
4-5; 7-8; adults Altering 
another’s 
property 
Verbal story + 
pictures (on cards 
or computer) 
 
(conflict: non-
owner proposes 
action, owner 
objects) 
Assignment of 
property rights 
(who should 
decide / is it 
acceptable to 
take the action) 
(+ Explicit 
attribution of 
ownership) 
7-8 years 
(For many 4-5-
year-olds, altering 
any property (own 
or another’s) is not 
allowed) 
Kim & Kalish, 
2009  
4; 6; 8; 10; 15; 
adults 
 
 
 
Destroying 
another’s 
property 
 
 
Verbal story 
(apparently no 
pictures) 
Explicit badness 
rating 
 10 years (and 
older) 
(from 4 to 10 years, 
destroying any 
property is as bad) 
 
Hook, 1993 
(destroying + 
throwing away) 
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4-6 Verbal story + 
pictures 
Explicit 
judgment of 
badness 
4-6 years 
Weisberg & 
Leslie, 2009 
(theft, 
destruction & 
physical harm 
analyzed 
together because 
no difference) 
3 Live interaction 
between two 
puppets and child. 
One puppet is the 
transgressor. 
Protest, tattling 
against 
transgressor, and 
prosocial 
behavior 
towards victim 
3 years 
Vaish et al., 
2011 
3 Live interaction 
between two 
experimenters 
Antisocial 
behavior 
towards 
transgressor (no 
help) 
3 years 
Vaish et al., 
2010 
(theft & 
destruction 
analyzed 
together) 
1.5; 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Destroying 
another’s property 
 
Live interaction 
between two 
experimenters 
Prosocial 
behavior 
towards victim 
18 months 
Vaish et al., 
2009 
(theft & 
destruction 
analyzed 
together because 
no difference) 
 
No respect of owner’s use  -  Not directly tested as a transgression 
4-5; 7-8; adults  
Preventing 
owner from 
using his 
property 
Verbal story + 
pictures (on cards 
or computer) 
 
(conflict: owner 
proposes action, 
non-owner 
objects) 
Assignment of 
property rights 
(who should 
decide / is it 
acceptable to 
take the action) 
(+ Explicit 
attribution of 
ownership) 
7-8 years 
Kim & Kalish, 
2009 
 
 
 
No respect of owner’s exclusivity  -  Not directly tested as a transgression 
4-5; 7-8; adults Using another’s 
property without 
permission 
(without asking, 
or with 
disagreement of 
the owner) 
 
 
Verbal story + 
pictures (on cards 
or computer) 
 
(conflict: non-
owner proposes 
action (altering, 
discarding…), 
owner objects) 
Assignment of 
property rights 
(who should 
decide) 
(+ Explicit 
attribution of 
ownership) 
7-8 years 
Kim & Kalish, 
2009 
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4-5; 7-8; adults Verbal story + 
pictures (on 
cards) 
 
(conflict: non-
owner proposes 
lending, owner 
objects) 
 
Assignment of 
property rights 
(who should 
decide) 
(+ Explicit 
attribution of 
ownership) 
 
4-5 years 
(when ownership 
was not 
transferred) 
Kim & Kalish, 
2009 (exp 1) 
 
 
3; 4; 5; 6; 7; adults 
 
 
Using another’s 
property without 
permission 
 
Verbal story 
enacted on foam 
board stage with 
small replicas 
 
(conflict: non-
owner wants to 
use object, owner 
objects) 
Assignment of 
property rights 
(who should use 
the object/ 
should the non-
owner stop 
using the object) 
(+ Explicit 
attribution of 
ownership) 
 
 
 
3 years 
(Neary, 2011, 
experiments 1, 
2, 3) 
 
No respect of rules of transfer 
 
4-6 Verbal story + 
pictures 
Explicit 
judgment of 
badness 
4-6 years 
Weisberg & 
Leslie, 2009 
(theft, 
destruction & 
physical harm 
analyzed 
together because 
no difference) 
3  Live interaction 
between two 
experimenters 
Antisocial 
behavior 
towards 
transgressor (no 
help) 
3 years 
Vaish et al., 
2010 
(theft & 
destruction 
analyzed 
together) 
1.5; 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illegitimate 
acquisition 
(theft) & other 
transgression 
 
 
(theft not 
analyzed alone, 
but either with 
other type of 
property 
transgression 
(destruction), or 
with other moral 
transgression 
(physical harm)) 
 
 
 
Live interaction 
between two 
experimenters 
Prosocial 
behavior 
towards victim 
18 months 
Vaish et al., 
2009 
(theft & 
destruction 
analyzed 
together because 
no difference) 
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6-7; 8-9; 10-11 Verbal story + 
pictures 
Explicit 
judgment of 
wrongness of 
act, rule utility, 
authority 
contingency, 
rule 
contingency, 
rule relativity/ 
generalizability, 
importance 
6-7 years 
(younger age 
tested), but theft 
less wrong than 
physical harm. 
(At 8-9 years, theft 
is as wrong as 
physical harm) 
Tisak & Turiel, 
1984
C1-2
 
(theft tested with 
physical harm 
and compared to 
prudential 
transgression) 
5-6; 7-8; 11-12 Verbal story 
+ cartoons (on 
computer) 
Explicit 
assignment of 
property rights 
5-6 years 
Cram & Ng, 
1989 
 
2; 3; 4; 5 Verbal story 
+ dolls and small 
toys as props 
Explicit 
assignment of 
property rights 
(+ ownership) 
5 years 
(At 4 years only 
when presented 
with interactions 
between children; 
At 2 and 3 years, 
first possessor bias) 
Blake & Harris, 
2009 
3; 4 Pictures 
(with 
transgressions 
presented verbally 
in test question) 
Explicit 
judgment of 
seriousness, rule 
contingency, 
rule relativity, 
deserved 
punishment 
4 years 
(At 3 years, not 
universally wrong) 
Smetana, 
1981
C1-2
 
(theft tested with 
other 
transgressions) 
2; 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illegitimate 
acquisition 
(theft) 
 
Live interaction 
between puppet, 
experimenter and 
child. The puppet 
is the 
transgressor. 
Protest 
3 years 
(At 2 years protest 
when transgression 
against the child) 
Rossano et al., 
2011 
(taking away
C1-3
 
followed by 
throwing away, 
but analyzed 
separately) 
4; 6; 8; 10; 15; 
adults 
 
No restitution 
(after non-
definitive 
transfer) 
 
 
Verbal story 
(apparently no 
pictures) 
Explicit badness 
rating 
 8 years (and older) 
(from 4 to 8 years, 
no restitution after 
definitive transfer 
is as bad) 
Hook, 1993 
                                                
C1-2
 Tisak & Turiel (1984) and Smetana (1981) are two examples of studies contrasting moral transgressions 
(including theft) and other types of transgressions (conventional, prudential). There are a lot of similar studies, 
inspired by these two. 
C1-3
 In Rossano et al. (2011), the action of « taking away » the object cannot be fully considered as « theft » 
because the puppet was ignorant of the fact that the object was owned and not abandoned, thus he was ignorant 
that taking away the object was a transgression. 
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3 months; 5 months  
No restitution 
Live puppet 
interaction 
Social 
preference 
(looking time at 
3 months; 
choice of actor 
at 5 months) 
3 months 
Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011 
(no restitution 
tested as no 
cooperation) 
 
Table C1-2. Description of studies involving ownership transgressions, organized by the type 
of transgression involved, and then for each transgression, ordered by age of mature 
evaluation. 
 
In Table C1-2, we see that ownership transgressions were studied with two different 
types of presentation of the transgressions: 
• Verbal story 
• Live interaction (live interaction between experimenters, and potentially child and 
puppet / live interaction between puppets, and potentially child) 
 
The transgressions were studied with four different types of measures:  
• Two explicit measures: 
o Explicit verbal evaluation of badness (explicit badness rating / explicit 
judgment of wrongness/seriousness) 
o Explicit verbal attribution of ownership or property rights (assignment of 
ownership rights / explicit attribution of ownership) 
• Two more implicit measures: 
o BehaviorsC1-4 against transgression (protest / tattling) 
o Implicit social evaluation and prosocial/antisocial behaviors (social 
preference / prosocial behavior towards victim / antisocial behavior towards 
transgressor) 
 
We distinguish two types of evaluation in the studies of ownership transgressions: 
• Social/Moral evaluation 
• Ownership/Property rights attribution 
                                                
C1-4
 Behaviors against transgression (protest and tattling) have an explicit component, as most of them are 
verbal utterances. However, some of the protests are only physical actions to prevent the transgression. 
Moreover, these behaviors are not elicited by the experimenter (contrary to explicit evaluations elicited by verbal 
questions), but are spontaneous, and thus can be considered as more implicit; the motivation to act is implicit. 
Conversely, we can notice that even implicit social evaluations have an explicit component, for example, when 
infants are explicitly asked to choose between two agents and take one them. 
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Table C1-3 summarizes at what ages a mature understanding of ownership 
transgressions was found depending on the type of evaluation (social/moral evaluation or 
ownership/property rights attribution), the type of measure (explicit, of behaviors, or 
implicit), and the type of stimuli presentation (verbal story or live interaction). 
 
 
 
 
Verbal story Live interaction Mean age 
 
Range 
Explicit verbal 
evaluation of 
badness 
Hook (10; 10; 8); 
Smetana (4); 
Tisak & Turiel (6-7); 
Weisberg & Leslie (4-6) 
 
 7.25 
 
[4; 10] 
 
 
 
 
Social/Moral 
evaluation Implicit (non-verbal) 
social evaluation and 
prosocial/antisocial 
behaviors 
 Vaish-09 (1.5); 
Vaish-10 (3); 
Vaish-11 (3); 
Hamlin & Wynn 
(0.25) 
1.9 
 
[0.25; 3] 
Explicit verbal 
attribution of 
ownership or 
property rights 
Cram & Ng (5-6); 
Blake & Harris (5); 
Kim & Kalish (7-8; 7-8; 
7-8; 7-8; 4-5); 
Neary (3) 
 6 
 
[3; 8] 
 
 
 
Ownership/ 
Property 
rights 
attribution 
Behaviors (verbal + 
non-verbal) against 
transgression 
(protest, tattling)
C1-5
 
 Vaish-11 (3); 
Rossano (3) 
 
3 
 
[3; 3] 
 
 
Table C1-3. Studies (and ages of mature evaluation for each tested transgression, in years) organized by 
type of evaluation (social/moral evaluation or ownership/property rights attribution), type of 
measure (explicit, behaviors, implicit), and type of stimuli presentation (verbal story, live 
interaction). Mean age (in years), and range, of mature evaluation of ownership transgressions 
for each type of evaluation and each type of measure and type of stimuli presentation. 
 
 
 
                                                
C1-5
 The studies of children’s protests show a normative understanding of ownership. Moreover, some of the 
protests include “possessive protests” (i.e. “child intervenes against the puppet’s act making use of possessive 
pronouns or naming the owner of the object”, Rossano et al., 2011). 
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2.2.2. Discussion of explicit and implicit methodologies 
 
From Table C1-2, we notice that for a given transgression, different studies found 
different ages at which children understand and evaluate the transgression. It seems to depend 
on the method used in each study. In verbal studies, the age of mature evaluation is higher. 
For destruction, the age of mature evaluation is of 4 to 10 years when tested with verbal 
material (including explicit measures), but only 18 months to 3 years when tested with live 
interactions (and implicit measures). Similar age differences are also found for theft 
depending on the methodology: mature evaluation at 4 to 7 years with explicit measures, and 
at 18 months to 3 years with more implicit measures. The fact that children evaluate a 
transgression explicitly at an older age than they evaluate it implicitly is true for each type of 
transgression. This effect of method on age of mature evaluation of a transgression is found 
both for measures (explicit / implicit) and for stimuli (verbal story / live interaction) as both 
are correlated, as we can notice it in Table C1-3. When the situations were presented as verbal 
stories, the evaluations were explicit. When the situations were presented as dynamic 
interactions, the evaluations were more implicit. In Table C1-3, we see that the effect of 
method on age of mature understanding is present when considering all types of 
transgressions together. Furthermore, this effect is present when understanding of 
transgressions was assessed both through social/moral evaluation, and through 
ownership/property rights attribution. However, a completely implicit measure of ownership 
attribution is missing. 
As far as the comparison between social/moral evaluation and ownership/property 
rights attribution is concerned, we observe a mature evaluation at similar ages for explicit 
verbal evaluations. The age range of mature evaluation is huge, and there is an important 
overlap between the ages found with tests of badness evaluation and those revealed by testing 
attribution of ownership and property rights
C1-6
. Apparently, it seems that children do not 
recognize that something bad happened (and that the responsible agent is bad) before being 
able to determine what rights have been transgressed. However, explicit evaluation of 
property rights was not measured simultaneously to explicit evaluation of badness with the 
same stimuli (in a same study). The results with implicit measures cannot directly be 
                                                
C1-6
 We can notice that the variability in age of mature evaluation for explicit measures could be due to 
differences in questions; some seem to be simpler than others. Moreover, this variability reflects the variability 
in ages tested in different studies, with the age of mature evaluation being the younger age tested in several 
studies. 
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compared, as the measure of behaviors against transgression is not a completely implicit 
measure (see footnote C1-4 above). 
 
2.2.3. Discussion of tested transgressions 
 
From Table C1-2, we can describe separately the analyses of each transgression. We 
notice that some transgressions were more studied than others, and some of them were not 
even directly tested. For example theft was studied with different experimental designs, 
whereas the disrespect of owner’s use of his property was only indirectly tested. 
Concerning the absence of respect for an owner’s property, loss of property was only 
studied verbally and seems to be evaluated late, at 10 years of age (Hook, 1993). Discard of 
another’s property is also evaluated late (at 7-8 years of age) in terms of assignment of 
property rights (Kim & Kalish, 2009). However, children recognize it as a transgression 
earlier (since 3 years of age) as shown by children’s protests, at least when the transgression 
is presented in a live interaction involving the child (Rossano et al., 2011). Alteration of 
property was only studied verbally and seems to be evaluated only from 7-8 years of age 
(Kim & Kalish, 2009). Destruction of another’s property was studied through a variety of 
methods. Using verbal stories and assessing children’s evaluation through explicit judgments 
of badness, destruction of another’s property was considered as worse than destruction of 
one’s own property from 10 years of age on (Hook, 1993). At 4 years, children already 
consider that destroying some property is bad (see also Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). Presenting 
the transgression in the context of a live interaction between persons or/and puppets and 
testing children’s evaluation more implicitly revealed an earlier judgment of the transgression. 
At 3 years, children protest against the transgressor and tattle on him (Vaish et al., 2011); they 
also show antisocial behavior towards the transgressor by withdrawing help from him (Vaish 
et al., 2010), and they show prosocial behavior towards the victim of the transgression (Vaish 
et al., 2009; 2011). This latter behavior is even exhibited by 18-month-olds. We can notice 
that destruction was rarely studied alone. Moreover, the studies evaluating destruction were 
mostly concerned with children’s understanding of moral transgressions, with the exception 
of Hook’s study (1993) presenting the transgression in terms of property rights, but which 
nevertheless tested children’s moral judgments of badness. Destruction may indeed involve 
more concern about harm than about property rights. It is a rather violent action that elicits 
empathy. Even if the destruction of somebody else’s property is evaluated as worse than the 
destruction of a non-owned object (see Vaish et al., 2009, 2011), destruction may be 
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considered negatively in itself, independently of the type of property destroyed and on the 
relationship between the destroyed object and a person. Indeed, Hook (1993) has shown that 
children evaluate negatively the destruction of a character’s own object (although it is not a 
transgression as far as property rights are concerned). However, this may apply only to 
intentional destruction as Vaish et al. (2010) have shown that accidental destruction is not 
evaluated more negatively compared to a neutral behavior. In any case, destruction does not 
need to involve an owner to be judged negatively. Contrary to theft, destruction is not directly 
related to ownership. It involves ownership only in the case of destruction of another’s 
property. Without the notion of ownership, theft cannot occur, but destruction can. 
Concerning the non-respect of an owner’s use of his property or of an owner’s 
exclusivity, only two studies were found to address these questions, using a verbal and 
explicit methodology. The results of these studies suggest an early evaluation (at 3 years) of 
conflicts about use of an object (Neary, 2011), but a late evaluation (at 7-8 years) of conflicts 
involving other actions, such as altering or discarding (Kim & Kalish, 2009). 
As far as transgressions of the rules of transfer are concerned, theft was only studied 
verbally or together with other transgressions. There was no study of implicit evaluation of 
theft in itself. The results showed that children explicitly evaluate theft as a transgression 
from around 5 years of age in terms of property rights (Blake & Harris, 2009), and 4 years of 
age in terms of badness (Smetana, 1981; see also Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). Through implicit 
evaluation, theft was only studied with other moral transgressions. Children evaluate it as a 
transgression at 3 years (Rossano et al., 2011; see also Vaish et al., 2010). It remains to be 
investigated whether the study of theft alone would also be implicitly evaluated as a 
transgression at 3 years, or even earlier. Vaish et al. (2009) found an evaluation of theft by 18-
month-olds but theft was analyzed together with destruction in this study. 
Concerning the study of absence of restitution after a non-definitive transfer, Hook 
(1993) found a mature evaluation only at 8 years of age through explicit badness rating. There 
seems to be a bias (maybe partly due to the first possessor bias) to consider the absence of 
restitution of an object after the request of the first possessor as bad independently from the 
type of transfer, even after gift-giving. In Blake & Harris (2009), when gift-giving is 
presented with strong cues indicating the nature of the transfer (wrapped gift at a birthday 
party), 5-year-old children already consider that the recipient does not need to return the 
object to the first possessor. However, in this study, children were asked hypothetically what 
the second possessor needs to do, they were not presented with an actual request of the first 
possessor and a refusal of the second possessor to respond to the request. In any case, 
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legitimate transfers of property are not well understood before 5 years of age (see also Kim & 
Kalish, 2009). Restitution per se was not directly studied at a very young age. We can notice 
that Hamlin & Wynn (2011), studying evaluations of helpful and hindering characters, 
presented to infants a situation where an object was either returned or not by a second 
possessor to its first possessor. However, there were additional cues in this study that may 
allow evaluating the situation without considerations for ownership, but rather in terms of 
cooperation. Indeed, the first possessor turned himself several times towards the second 
possessor as to promote social interaction. He could potentially be considered as asking his 
object back, but he did not express a typical gesture of begging. It remains to be confirmed 
that very young children do evaluate absence of restitution as a transgression in terms of 
property rights. These two last types of transgressions (theft and absence of restitution) need 
to be studied in more detail. We address these issues in our experimental studies. 
 
2.2.4. Summary 
 
Ownership transgressions, in a developmental context, have been studied through a 
variety of techniques and have focused on two different aspects of ownership. The 
evaluations of ownership transgressions have been studied through explicit moral judgments 
and more implicitly through social preference measures. Ownership/property rights 
attributions have been studied through explicit questionnaires, and more implicitly, through 
the observation of behavior responses (protest, tattling). Explicit tests were performed with 
verbal stories as stimuli, and implicit tests with live interactions as stimuli. Typically, implicit 
tests yield results showing some understanding of ownership transgressions at a younger age 
than explicit tests. No study has directly compared explicit and implicit measures or the 
understanding of rights and moral evaluation. Several types of transgressions have been 
studied, but some of them have not yet been tested implicitly (e.g. theft without violence, 
refusal to return an object to the owner without other possible interpretations of the behavior). 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
Morality is a vast domain. It is composed of people’s behaviors and judgments. 
People’s moral judgments were often studied through their judgments of moral 
transgressions. Moral transgressions, contrary to conventional (or social) ones involve harm, 
injustice or/and transgression of rights (Turiel, 1983). Transgression of rights includes 
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transgression of property rights, and thus the notion of ownership can be linked to the notion 
of morality. More precisely, ownership transgressions are part of morality, as well as their 
evaluation. 
Most research about moral transgressions studied the evaluation of physical harm. Even 
when psychological harm in ownership transgressions was considered (e.g. theft), it was most 
often analyzed together with physical harm (e.g. Smetana, 1981 ; Vaish et al., 2009 ; Vaish et 
al., 2010 ; Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). Moreover, some studied transgressions (e.g. 
destruction) do not correspond necessarily to ownership transgressions (as opposed to violent 
behaviors). Thus, ownership transgressions need to be investigated in more details, such as 
theft by itself, and absence of restitution after a non-definitive transfer. We have seen that 
understanding of ownership transgressions seems to be present at a younger age when 
assessed through implicit measures rather than explicit ones. Age differences between 
acquisition of implicit and explicit knowledge have been reported in another cognitive 
domain, theory of mind (see Baillargeon et al., 2010, for a review). It could be interesting to 
study the development of the concepts of ownership and theory of mind in parallel. 
Concerning ownership transgressions and explicit measures, children may not perform moral 
evaluation before being able to correctly reason about property rights. However, explicit 
moral evaluation remains to be measured simultaneously to explicit evaluation of property 
rights with a common type of stimuli. To conclude, the majority of studies testing ownership 
transgressions were verbal studies. Further studies should explore children’s evaluations of 
dynamic interactions between third parties involving ownership transgressions. 
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PART 2 – EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
  74 
 
1. Aim 
 
Our aim in this experimental section is to investigate children’s understanding and 
evaluation of property transfers. We studied two types of transgressions of property rights: 
theft and absence of restitution of an object to its owner. We tested both children’s moral 
evaluation of agents involved in property transfers and their attribution of property rights to 
second possessors after illegitimate and legitimate transfers. We used a non-verbal 
presentation of the stimuli, and used both explicit and implicit measures. Based on prior work, 
the ages of children tested in our experiments ranged from 5 months to 5 years, and adults (as 
a control population) were also tested in some of the studies. 
 
2. Issues addressed 
 
As seen at the end of Chapter 1, two types of property transgressions were not deeply 
investigated with non-verbal methods in previous studies. Theft alone was only studied 
verbally (Blake & Harris, 2009). When studied with implicit measures, theft was tested or 
analyzed together with other transgressions (Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al, 2009; 2010; 
Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). There was no study of implicit evaluation of theft in itself. Theft 
was compared to various situations: social transgressions, gift-reception, taking of character’s 
own object, taking of a non-owned object. We compared theft to gift-giving and gift-
reception, thus also assessing the question of children’s understanding of property transfers. 
Another type of property transgression received even less interest in previous studies. 
The absence of restitution of the object to its owner after a non-definitive transfer was only 
studied as such by one study using verbal material (Hook, 1993). With an implicit measure, 
this situation was only presented with cues leading to other interpretations of the interaction, 
such as hinder (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011) or absence of cooperation. We investigated children’s 
expectations of restitution after a transfer by assessing their evaluations of character’s 
returning or not an object to its first possessor. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To test young children, the presentation of dynamic interactions seems more appropriate 
than the presentation of verbal stories. Indeed, as we have seen in Chapter 1, when asked to 
evaluate dynamic interactions, children seem to show an earlier understanding of the 
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situations, than when they are presented with verbal stories. Surprisingly, no study addressing 
ownership and property rights attributions presented dynamic interactions to children; these 
studies used verbal stories as stimuli. Here, we used dynamic interactions as our stimuli. To 
limit the logistics of the investigation and to be able to better control the movements 
presented in various situations, we used non-verbal animated cartoons (for 3- and 5-year-olds 
and adults) or puppet movies (for 5-, 18-, and 24-month-olds) instead of live interactions. 
We presented to the participants two movies showing an interaction between two 
characters. In one of the movies an illegitimate action was performed, and in the other movie 
a legitimate action was shown. In the studies investigating the understanding of theft, a thief 
was compared to a legitimate recipient or to a giver. In the studies investigating restitution, a 
character keeping a previously acquired object was compared to a character returning the 
object to the owner. We also tested the role of emotions on children’s evaluations, by adding 
emotional cues in the presented situations. 
As seen in Chapter 1, when using dynamic stimuli, researchers measured only implicit 
responses of children. None of the studies using non-verbal stimuli assessed children’s 
explicit understanding of ownership transgressions. Here, we used both explicit measures 
(with children and adults) and implicit measures (with toddlers and infants) with similar 
stimuli, comparing the same contrasts. Moreover, explicit moral evaluation of badness, and 
explicit attribution of property rights were never studied in conjunction. Here, we used these 
two kinds of explicit measures on the same participants. More precisely, the older participants 
(3- and 5-year-olds, and adults) were asked questions about the illegitimate and legitimate 
agents, addressing both their moral quality and their property rights. The younger participants 
(5-, 18-, and 24-month-olds) were asked to choose between both agents and/or their looking 
time to each agent was measured. 
 
4. Presentation of our experimental studies 
 
In all our studies, children and adults evaluated third-party interactions. In the studies 
described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the situations were presented through non-verbal 
animated cartoons, and participants’ social and moral judgments as well as their assignments 
of property rights were measured. In the studies examined in Chapter 5, the situations were 
presented through movies representing puppet interactions, and participant’s implicit social 
preferences were measured. 
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Chapter 2 presents three studies of 3- and 5-year-old children’s and adults’ 
understanding and evaluation of illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. In Study 1a, an 
illegitimate and a legitimate mode of acquisition were compared: theft and gift-reception. In 
Study 1b, two initiations of transfer were compared: theft and gift-giving. Study 2 assessed 
the role of emotion in 3-year-olds’ understanding and evaluation of property transfers. Adults 
were also tested as a control. Transfers of property were followed by a negative emotional 
reaction of the first possessor. Theft was compared to legitimate reception. The same 
questions than in Study 1 were asked. 
Chapter 3 investigates 3- and 5-year-old children’s and adults’ understanding and 
evaluation of restitution in three studies. In Study 3, we asked whether 3-year-old children 
(compared to adults) evaluate differently a character returning an object to its first possessor 
compared to a character keeping the object. Study 4 addressed this same question (with the 
same ages) in the presence of a negative emotion displayed by the first possessor following 
the restitution or absence of restitution of the object to him. In Study 5, we tested 5-year-old 
children’s understanding and evaluation of restitution with and without emotional cues. 
Chapter 4 analyzes further adult’s and 3- and 5-year-old children’s understanding of 
legitimate property transfers based on participant’s responses to questions about second 
possessor’s property rights in Studies 1 to 5. The notions of definitive and non-definitive 
transfers of property are discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 5 explores the evaluation by younger children of different modes of 
acquisition of property and of different behaviors concerning restitution of property. Study 6 
investigated 2-year-olds’ implicit social evaluation of theft and legitimate reception. In Study 
7, we asked whether 2-year-olds do evaluate differently a thief and a legitimate recipient in 
the presence of emotional cues. Study 8 looked at 18-month-olds’ and 2-year-olds’ implicit 
social evaluation of restitution behaviors. Finally, in Study 9, we tested 5-month-olds’ 
implicit social evaluation of a character returning an object to its first possessor compared to a 
character keeping the object, when the first possessor seemed to ask for his object back (or for 
interaction) following an “accidental” transfer of property. This study aimed at replicating the 
study by Hamlin & Wynn (2011) presenting these same interactions. 
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CHAPTER 2: Understanding and evaluation of property transfers 
- C2 - 
 
1. Study 1: Development of understanding and social/moral evaluation of illegitimate 
and legitimate property transfers 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Several approaches have been undertaken to assess children’s understanding of third-
party interactions involving ownership issues. When the determination of ownership was 
assessed by the examination of rights – as the right to keep the object, leave with it, or take it 
home – accorded by children to characters involved in different types of property transfers, it 
was found that children do not have a mature understanding of property rights before 5 years 
of age (e.g. Blake & Harris, 2009; see also Kim & Kalish, 2009). Failing to answer a property 
right or ownership definition question may mean that the concept of ownership is not 
acquired, or, alternatively, that children have problems answering these kinds of questions. As 
we have seen in Chapter 1, the majority of studies on property rights show an emergence of 
the understanding of those rights at 5 years, principally on the basis of tests using verbal 
stories. Other studies tested children’s evaluations of badness of ownership transgressions 
(e.g. Hook, 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1984; Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). They found similar ages 
of mature understanding of the transgressions than studies testing property rights attributions. 
These studies also used verbal stories as stimuli, thus relying heavily on children’s linguistic 
resources. We have seen that verbal tests seem to underestimate the age of acquisition of an 
ownership concept. 
There are indications that younger children make evaluations of ownership 
transgressions. Recent studies using stimuli that present dynamic interactions between 
characters involved in property issues, and implicit measures of social evaluation, showed 
that children seem to evaluate ownership transgressions before 5 years. However, as seen in 
Chapter 1, almost none of these studies investigated ownership transgressions such as theft 
without involving destruction or aggression. Vaish et al. (2009; 2010) had young children 
evaluate or react to acts of stealing, but the studies were run and analyzed together with acts 
of destruction. Rossano et al. (2011) tested stealing, but it was followed by an act of throwing 
away. This remark also applies to the studies measuring evaluations of badness. All the 
studies using dynamic stimuli measured implicit evaluations. Explicit evaluations were not 
studied with this type of stimuli (but only with verbal stories). Moreover, moral evaluations of 
ownership transgressions, and attributions of property rights were never assessed 
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simultaneously. Here, we test with non-verbal stimuli simultaneously social/moral evaluation 
and understanding of property rights in a situation that has been under-studied: theft (without 
violence). 
The present study is aimed at constructing a situation testing selectively the 
understanding and evaluation of theft as an ownership transgression. We compared this 
illegitimate property transfer to a legitimate property transfer (gift-giving), in two contrasts. 
We considered gift-giving both through the evaluation of the recipient and of the actor of the 
transfer. We used non-verbal animated cartoons instead of verbal narration to avoid potential 
comprehension problems and/or semantic biases that may arise through associations with 
particular words ('stealing' may be negatively valued even if children don't really understand 
what it means). We tested both social/moral evaluation of the agents, and understanding of 
property rights on the same population of participants. We tested adults, 5-year-old and 3-
year-old children. Adults were tested to validate our stimuli and paradigm. 5-year-olds were 
expected to behave like adults, i.e. both succeed in evaluating a thief negatively and in 
responding to property questions.  3-year-olds are known to be able to make social/moral 
evaluations of harmful/hindering agents, but they may not fully grasp the implications of 
property rights. If evaluation of ownership transgressions precedes explicit mastery of 
property rights, one may expect to find that 3-year-olds are able to evaluate illegitimate 
property transfer before they are able to reliably answer questions about property rights. If, 
alternatively, the explicit understanding of property rights drives the evaluation of 
transgressions, one should find a correlation between these two measures, or even, the former 
emerging before the latter. In Study 1a, we compared theft (as an illegitimate mode of 
acquisition) to gift-reception (as a legitimate mode of acquisition). The direction of transfer, 
and the character having the object at the end were matched in this contrast. In Study 1b, we 
compared theft (as an illegitimate action) to gift-giving (as a legitimate action). In this 
contrast, we matched the fact that the actor/initiator of the transfer was evaluated. 
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1.2. Study 1a: Three- and five-year-olds’ evaluations of a thief and a gift-recipient 
- S1a - 
 
This study evaluated the understanding of two modes of acquisition of an object: 
illegitimate (theft) versus legitimate (gift-reception). Children and adults were presented with 
two non-verbal movie cartoons depicting the transfer of a ball between two characters. One 
movie represented an agent stealing a ball from another character. In the other movie, the 
agent was receiving a ball from the other character. 
 
1.2.1. Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-eight 3-year-olds (15 girls; mean age: 45 months, 6 days; range: 36 months, 14 
days to 52 months, 6 days), twenty 5-year-olds (12 girls; mean age: 69 months, 25 days; 
range: 65 months, 27 days to 75 months, 0 days) and twelve adults (8 females) were tested. 
One additional child (5-year-old) was tested but excluded due to technical failure. Participants 
were French speakers. Adults were recruited from a mailing list of people wishing to 
participate to experiments in our laboratory; majority of them were students. Children were 
tested in their preschool. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the four experimental 
groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions (theft first or gift-
reception first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 in theft condition or 
agent 2 in theft condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The participants sat in front of a laptop, with the experimenter on their side. The two 
cartoon movies were presented on the laptop. They were designed with the software Flash 
Professional Version 8.0 allowing a very precise control of the physical parameters and thus 
of the matching between both scenarios. Two characters were present in each movie. At 
whole, three different characters were seen: a protagonist (the same in both cartoons) and two 
agents (one in each cartoon). The protagonist (Mr. Red) was the character first possessing the 
object. The agents (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue) were the characters acquiring the object either by 
theft or by gift-reception, so they also corresponded to the second possessors. These two 
characters were those to be evaluated by the participants. The cartoon characters were 
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elongated rounded shapes with face and arms. They were designed not to have any cultural or 
social characteristics, but were presented as males: Mr. Red, Mr. Green, and Mr. Blue. The 
sequence of events in each condition (see Figure C2-1) is described bellow, with the 
differences between both conditions in bold. 
 
In the theft condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball, and then keeps it under his arm. 
3. The agent steals the ball from the protagonist’s hands. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The protagonist reaches his arms out to receive the ball back. 
6. The agent leaves with the ball. 
7. The protagonist leaves without the ball. 
 
In the gift-reception condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent tries to return the ball to the protagonist, who refuses to take the 
ball back by moving backward. 
6. The agent leaves with the ball. 
7. The protagonist leaves without the ball. 
 
See Appendix AC2-1 for more detailed descriptions of the stimuli. 
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 Theft 
 
Gift-reception 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   
 
 
 
 
 
2.   
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4.   
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
6.   
 
 
 
 
 
7.   
 
Figure C2-1. Images extracted from each of the cartoons in Study 1a. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions. 
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Considering the agent, the movie representing theft was exactly the same compared to 
the movie representing gift-reception, i.e. both agents were executing exactly the same 
movements at the same time in their respective movie throughout the movie. Considering the 
protagonist, the main difference lay in his orientation during the transfer. From the 
perspective of the child, the protagonist was full-face in the theft condition (not looking at the 
agent who was in profile), and in profile in the gift-reception condition (facing the agent). The 
overall amount of time the protagonist was in each of these various orientations was matched 
as much as possible between both movies. The different movements of the protagonist were 
also matched over-all. 
 
Procedure 
 
The study was performed in French, as all studies in this dissertation. Figure C2-2 
presents the procedure and measures. The experimenter presented and named pictures of the 
three characters (Mr. Green and Mr. Blue, and Mr. Red) on the screen before playing the 
movie cartoons. Each cartoon was presented twice, after what, the main agent (Mr. Green or 
Mr. Blue) appeared alone on the screen and the participant was asked four questions about 
him: “Do you like him?”, “Is he a good guy?”, “Is he a bad guy?”, and “Would you like to 
play with him?”. This questionnaire allowed familiarizing the children with the questioning 
procedure. The answers were not considered as a measure and not analyzed. Then both 
cartoons were presented once again one just after the other. At the end, both agents (Mr. 
Green and Mr. Blue) appeared on the screen, one on each side. The participant was asked to 
answer a comparative questionnaire. Adults were asked the same questions than before in a 
comparative way: “Which one do you like?”, “Which one is the good guy?”, “Which one is 
the bad guy?”, “Whom would you like to play with?”. Children were asked to point towards 
the characters: “Show me the one you like”, “Show me the good guy”, “Show me the bad 
guy”, “Show me the one with whom you would like to play”. The answers to these questions 
correspond to our main measure, which represents participant’s social and moral preferences. 
Each movie was presented again individually one last time and the participants were asked 
two questions about the second possessor’s rights (for each condition): “[The second 
possessor] was he allowed to play with the ball?”, “[The second possessor] was he allowed to 
leave with the ball?”. A third question about property rights was asked in this study, but the 
results are only analyzed in Chapter 4. Finally, we also assessed participant’s understanding 
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of the situations. They were asked two comprehension questions in a comparative way: “To 
whom Mr. Red gave the ball?”, “Which one stole the ball from Mr. Red?”. 
 
 
 Movie 1 
 
Movie 1 Qi_eval1 Movie 2 Movie 2 Qi_eval2 
 
      
 
 
Movie 1 
 
Movie 2 Qc_eval Movie 1 Qprop1 Movie 2 Qprop2 
       
 
Qcomp 
 
 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Do you like him? - Is he a good guy? - Is he a bad guy? - Would you like to play with him? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- Show me the one you like 
(adults: Which one do you like?) 
- Show me the good guy 
- Show me the bad guy 
- Show me the one with whom you 
would like to play 
 
 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he 
allowed to play with the ball? 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he 
allowed to leave with the 
ball? 
 
 
- To whom Mr. Red gave the 
ball? 
- Which one stole the ball from 
Mr. Red? 
 
Figure C2-2. Procedure and measures in Study 1a. 
(See Appendix AC2-2 for the original version of the questions asked in French) 
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1.2.2. Results 
 
Social/moral evaluation 
 
Participants were instructed to make a choice between both characters for each question, 
even if their preference was not so strong. This explains why few subjects (and particularly 
very few adults) answered “both” or “none” to the questions. If it was the case, the question 
was asked again to elicit a choice, and the second answer was considered. Still some 
participants did not want to make a choice. An evaluation index was computed from the 
answers to the comparative questionnaire. Each answer was scored 1 if in favor of the gift-
recipient or in disfavor of the thief, -1 if in favor of the thief or in disfavor of the gift-
recipient, 0 if other (“both”, “none”) or absent. The four answers were averaged into an index 
between –1 and 1 for each subject. A positive index corresponds to a preference for the 
legitimate recipient (gift-recipient) over the illegitimate one (thief). Figure C2-3 shows the 
mean evaluation index as a function of Age. 
As preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, we did not include gender in 
further analyses. A 3-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Order (theft first or gift-reception 
first) x Agent (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue as the thief) x Age revealed a main effect of Age 
(F(2,48)=7.79, p=.001). The analysis revealed no interactions, and no main effects for Order 
or Agent. We observe an effect of Age between 3- and 5-year-olds (F(1,40)=5.09, p<.05), but 
not between 5-year-olds and adults (F(1,24)=2.70, p=.11). There is a developmental shift in 
the evaluation of ownership transgressions between 3 and 5 years of age. When separating 
younger and older 3-year-olds, we observe a trend towards a difference in their evaluation 
(F(1,20)=2.96, p=.10), although both groups are at chance when comparing their individual 
evaluation score against zero (younger 3-year-olds: F(1,10)=1.57, older 3-year-olds: 
F(1,10)=1.39). Comparing the evaluation index to a chance score of 0 for each age group 
revealed that 3-year-olds' selection of the gift-recipient and the thief did not differ from 
chance (F(1,24)=0). Five-year-olds (F(1,16)=7.36, p=.015<.05) and adults (F(1,8)=40, 
p<.001) selected more the gift-recipient as opposed to the thief than would be expected by 
chance. The evaluation index of adults is very high
C2-1
. 
 
 
                                                
C2-1
 This ceiling effect might be due to the fact that participants were forced to make a choice between both 
characters. It would be interesting to have also a measure of participants’ evaluations on a scale. 
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Figure C2-3. Social/moral evaluation of characters involved in property transfers as thief or 
gift-recipient (Mr. Green and Mr. Blue) by 3- and 5-year-old children and adults, in Study 1a.  
Answers were scored 1 if in favor of gift-recipient, -1 if in favor of thief, 0 if other or absent for each question. 
The figure shows the means of participants (and standard errors).  * p<.05  *** p<.001. 
 
Comprehension 
 
The lack of social and moral evaluation of 3-year-olds could be due to a lack of 
understanding of the situations and not to a real absence of evaluation of gift-reception and 
theft. Each answer to the comprehension questions was scored 1 if correct, -1 if incorrect, 0 if 
other (“both”, “none”) or absent. The two answers were averaged into an index between –1 
and 1 for each subject. 3-year-olds were at chance in their answers to the comprehension 
questions (who received and who stole the ball) (F(1,24)=0.17); only two 3-year-olds 
answered correctly to both comprehension questions. But their answers could be due to a lack 
of comprehension of the questions and not of the depicted situations. Five-year-olds answered 
above chance to the comprehension questions (F(1,16)=6.54, p<.05), and all adults responded 
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correctly. We separated 5-year-olds in two groups according to their answers to the 
comprehension questions. These two groups responded differently (t(18)=2.27, p<.05). 5-
year-old children who answered wrongly to the comprehension questions had an evaluation 
index similar to the one of the 3-year-olds (t(34)=0.11, p=.92), they were at chance 
(F(1,4)=0.32). Those 5-year-olds who answered correctly to the comprehension questions had 
an evaluation index similar to the one of the adults (t(22)=0.65, p=.52)), they distinguished 
very well between the legitimate and the illegitimate recipients (F(1,8)=20.99, p<.01). 
 
Property rights attribution 
 
The results concerning the attributions of property rights can help us determining 
whether children make the distinction between both presented situations. We analyzed the 
answers to each property rights question for each acquisition mode separately. The first 
question (right to play with the ball) deals with the second possessor’s right of use of the 
object. The second question (right to leave with the ball) is about the second possessor’s right 
to keep the object. Answers were scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if “no”, 0 if other or absent for each 
question. We analyzed separately the results for the three populations (3-year-olds, 5-year-
olds, and adults) with a multivariate General Linear Model for repeated measures with 
Condition (i.e. Acquisition mode) as within-subject factor, and Order and Agent as between-
subjects factors, for two measures corresponding to the two questions. Generally, we 
observed a development in the attribution of property rights: 3-year-olds made no distinction 
between the conditions (F(2,23)=1.65, p>.1), whereas 5-year-olds (F(2,15)=6.11, p<.05) and 
adults (F(2,7)=249.16, p<.001) distinguished between the two conditions. When analyzing the 
results for each question (see Figure C2-4), we found that 3-year-olds made no distinction 
between the conditions for both questions (play: F(1,24)=3.45, p<.1; leave: F(1,24)=0.57, 
p>.1). 5-year-olds distinguished the illegitimate and legitimate recipients in their attribution of 
the right to use the object (play: F(1,16)=12.38, p<.01), but not the right to keep the object 
(leave: (F(1,16)=1.05, p>.1). Adults distinguished between the two recipients in both property 
rights questions (play: F(1,8)=40.5, p<.001; leave: F(1,8)=529, p<.001). See Appendix AC2-3 
for more detailed analyses. 
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Figure C2-4. Attribution of property rights to second possessors (Mr. Green and Mr. Blue) by 
3- and 5-year-old children and adults, in Study 1a. 
Rights attributed to the illegitimate recipient (in black) and to the legitimate recipient (in white). Answers were 
scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if “no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the means of participants 
(and standard errors).  ~ p<.1  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 
 
Overall, Study 1a showed that 3-year-olds did not take into account the mode of 
acquisition to evaluate the recipient of an object: they had no preference between the 
legitimate recipient and the illegitimate one. They did not show understanding of property 
transfers in their attribution of property rights either. 5-year-olds and adults considered the 
mode of acquisition in their social and moral evaluation and they preferred the legitimate 
recipient as opposed to the illegitimate one. They also distinguished between the second 
possessors by attributing different rights to them. 
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1.2.3. Discussion 
 
Our results show a development between 3 and 5 years of age in children’s ability to 
distinguish between different modes of acquisition of an object, particularly between an 
illegitimate and a legitimate acquisition, and to use this distinction in their social and moral 
evaluations. 3-year-olds had no preference between the illegitimate and the legitimate 
recipients. They performed at chance, making no distinction between the two types of 
transfer. 5-year-olds and adults preferred the gift-recipient as opposed to the thief. They took 
into account the acquisition mode in their social and moral evaluation of the characters 
acquiring an object. We need to be careful when interpreting the results of 3-year-olds. Their 
lack of evaluation of the agents could be due to a lack of identification of the situations 
presented. Indeed, they were not able to correctly identify who was the gift-recipient and who 
was the thief when explicitly asked (even if this lack of identification could also be due to the 
difficulty of comprehension of the questions). Furthermore, 5-year-olds who answered 
wrongly to the comprehension questions also failed to make a distinction between the two 
agents in their social and moral evaluations. But overall, contrary to 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds 
showed an understanding of property rights. They attributed different rights to the second 
possessors depending on the legitimacy of their acquisition of the ball. As adults, 5-year-olds 
considered that only a legitimate recipient had the right to play with the object. A character 
acquiring an object illegitimately was not allowed to keep the object. So, 5-year-olds showed 
distinction between the situations in their property rights attributions, and also in their social 
and moral evaluations. 3-year-olds made no distinction at all between illegitimate and 
legitimate recipients. Children seem not to differentiate agents in their evaluations before they 
are able to correctly attribute property rights. 
Importantly, the majority of 5-year-olds made a distinction between the two situations, 
and to make this distinction, they only relied on the actions of the animated characters. 
Because there were no verbal materials during the presentation of the video clips, they could 
not rely on verbal cues regarding the valence of the actions or the intentions of the agents. In 
addition, the emotional expressions of the agents were matched. In particular the victim of the 
moral transgression showed no distress. 5-year-olds did not base their judgments on the 
outcomes of the actions, as they were matched in both situations, but on the intentionality of 
the transfer.  In our study, the principal cue to detect the intention of transfer is the body 
orientation of the first possessor: he is turned away from the agent (in profile with respect to 
the agent) in the theft condition, and towards the agent (facing him) in the gift-reception 
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condition. The second cue indicating intentionality concerns the initiator of the act of transfer. 
In the theft condition, it is the agent who initiates the transfer by approaching the first 
possessor; while this latter is not showing any sign of will to interact with him. In the gift-
reception condition, the first possessor initiates the transfer by reaching his arms out with the 
ball in direction of the agent. These cues may not be sufficient for the younger children to 
understand the type of transfer being performed. But 5-year-olds seem able to use these subtle 
cues to distinguish both situations (without verbal material) and to evaluate the actions. 
To control that the characters are not only distinguished based on the fact that only one 
of the agents is an actor, i.e. initiating the transfer, whereas the other is more passive, in the 
next study, we test a contrast in which both agents are active. In Study 1b, we compare the 
negative action of theft to the positive action of giving. Moreover, the action of theft is made 
clearer. In Study 1a, after the theft, Mr. Red comes as close as he can to the agent, but it is not 
clear that he wants his ball back. One could consider that he was not stolen but that he let the 
agent take his ball as he is not clearly claiming it back. At the end, Mr. Red reaches his arms 
out when the thief approaches, but does not react more when the thief eventually leaves with 
the ball. So it stays unclear whether he really wanted the ball back. Hook (1993) showed that 
children from 4 to 8 years of age evaluate negatively a character refusing to return an object 
to the first possessor requiring it independently of the type of transfer (gift-reception, loan, 
finding, theft). In our study, if the intention of retrieving the ball would be clearer, maybe 
even 3-year-olds would consider the thief negatively. This is the second point investigated in 
Study 1b. In the theft condition of Study 1b, Mr. Red reacts immediately after the theft by 
reaching his arms out towards the thief with a sound expressing begging for the ball. We test 
the effect of a non-emotional (or at least not explicitly emotional) reaction from the first 
possessor: claim for his object back. 
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1.3. Study 1b: Three- and five-year-olds’ evaluations of a thief and a giver 
- S1b - 
 
This study aimed at comparing characters based on their active social behavior in a 
situation of property transfer: illegitimate (theft) versus legitimate (giving). Children and 
adults were presented with two non-verbal movie cartoons depicting the transfer of a ball 
between two characters (illegitimate transfer action vs. legitimate transfer action). One movie 
represented an agent stealing a ball from another character. In the other movie, the agent was 
giving a ball to the other character. 
 
1.3.1. Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty 3-year-olds (8 girls; mean age: 43 months, 29 days; range: 37 months, 23 days 
to 50 months, 27 days), twelve 5-year-olds (4 girls; mean age: 67 months, 19 days; range: 63 
months, 21 days to 72 months, 15 days) and twelve adults (8 females) were tested. 
Participants were French speakers. Adults were recruited from a mailing list of people 
wishing to participate to experiments in our laboratory; majority of them were students. 
Children were tested in their preschool. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the 
four experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions 
(theft first or giving first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 in theft 
condition or agent 2 in theft condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The disposition of the participants during testing and the material used to design the 
cartoons were the same as in Study 1a. The same three characters as in Study 1a were seen: a 
protagonist (the same in both cartoons: Mr. Red) and two agents (one in each cartoon: Mr. 
Green and Mr. Blue). Only the movie cartoons differed from those presented in Study 1a. The 
sequence of events in each condition (see Figure C2-5) is described bellow. 
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In the theft condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball, and then keeps it under his arm. 
3. The agent steals the ball from the protagonist’s hands. 
4. The protagonist begs for the ball back. 
5. The agent plays with the ball. 
6. The agent leaves with the ball. 
7. The protagonist leaves without the ball. 
 
 
In the giving condition: 
1. The protagonist (2
nd
 possessor) arrives with empty hands, and the agent  (1
st
 
possessor) arrives with a ball. 
2. The agent plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist begs for the ball. 
3. The agent gives the ball to the protagonist. 
4. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
5. The agent tries to return the ball to the protagonist, who refuses to take the ball 
back. 
6. The agent leaves without the ball. 
7. The protagonist leaves with the ball. 
 
See Appendix AC2-1 for more detailed descriptions of the stimuli. 
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 Theft 
 
Giving 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   
 
 
 
 
 
2.   
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4.   
 
 
 
 
 
5.   
 
 
 
 
 
6.   
 
 
 
 
 
7.   
 
Figure C2-5. Images extracted from each of the cartoons in Study 1b. Outlined in purple, the tested 
contrast (theft vs. giving). 
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Considering the agent, the movie representing theft was exactly the reversal in time 
compared to the movie representing giving, i.e. both agents were executing exactly the same 
movements but in inverse order. Considering the protagonist, his orientation was reversed in 
time when comparing both movies, but the main difference lay in his orientation during the 
transfer. From the perspective of the child, the protagonist was full-face in the theft condition 
(not looking at the agent who was in profile), and in profile in the giving condition (facing the 
agent). The overall amount of time the protagonist was in each of these various orientations 
was matched as much as possible between both movies. The different movements of the 
protagonist were also matched overall. 
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as in Study 1a. The experimenter presented and named 
pictures of the three characters on the screen before playing the movies, and asking the 
questions (see Table C2-1). As in Study 1a, participants’ social and moral preferences were 
measured and analyzed. Here, in the case of gift-giving, when assessing second possessor’s 
property rights, the questions concern the rights of the protagonist and not of the agent 
(contrary to Study 1a), as the protagonist is the second possessor of the ball. Finally, 
participant’s comprehension of the situations was assessed through the questions: “Which one 
gave the ball to Mr. Red?”, “Which one stole the ball from Mr. Red?”. 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Do you like him? - Is he a good guy? - Is he a bad guy? - Would you like to play with him? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- Show me the one you like 
(adults: Which one do you like?) 
- Show me the good guy 
- Show me the bad guy 
- Show me the one with whom you 
would like to play 
 
 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he 
allowed to play with the ball? 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he 
allowed to leave with the 
ball? 
 
 
- Which one gave the ball to Mr. 
Red? 
- Which one stole the ball from 
Mr. Red? 
 
Table C2-1. Measures in Study 1b. 
(See Appendix AC2-2 for the original version of the questions asked in French) 
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1.3.2. Results 
 
Social/moral evaluation 
 
As in Study1a, subjects were instructed to make a choice between both characters for 
each question, even if their preference was not so strong. An evaluation index was computed 
from the answers to the comparative questionnaire. Each answer was scored 1 if in favor of 
the giver or in disfavor of the thief, -1 if in favor of the thief or in disfavor of the giver, 0 if 
other (“both”, “none”) or absent. The four answers were averaged into an index between –1 
and 1 for each subject. A positive index corresponds to a preference for the legitimate agent 
(giver) over the illegitimate one (thief). Figure C2-6 shows the mean evaluation index as a 
function of Age. 
As preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, we did not include gender in 
further analyses. A 3-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Order (theft first or giving first) 
x Agent (Mr. Blue or Mr. Green as the thief) x Age revealed a main effect of Age 
(F(2,32)=17.22, p<.001). The analysis revealed no interactions, and no main effects for Order 
or Agent. We observe an effect of Age between 3- and 5-year-olds (F(1,24)=8.61, p<.01). 
There is a developmental shift in the evaluation of ownership transgressions between 3 and 5 
years of age. Comparing the evaluation index to a chance score of 0 for each age group 
revealed that 3-year-olds' selection of the giver and the thief did not differ from chance 
(F(1,16)=0.39, p=.54). Five-year-olds (F(1,8)=7.84, p<.05) selected more the giver as 
opposed to the thief than would be expected by chance. All adults selected the giver over the 
thief. 
When comparing the results of Study 1a and Study 1b, a 3-way ANOVA of Order x 
Agent x Study revealed no main effect of Study for any of the three age groups (3-year-olds: 
F(1,40)=0.19, p=.67; 5-year-olds: F(1,24)=0.21, p=.65; adults: F(1,16)=1.6, p=.22)). 
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Figure C2-6. Social/moral evaluation of characters involved in property transfers as thief or 
giver (Mr. Green and Mr. Blue) by 3- and 5-year-old children and adults, in Study 1b. 
Answers were scored 1 if in favor of giver, -1 if in favor of thief, 0 if other or absent for each question. The 
figure shows the means of participants (and standard errors). * p<.05  
 
 
Comprehension 
 
The lack of social and moral evaluation of 3-year-olds could be due to a lack of 
understanding of the situations and not to a real absence of evaluation of legitimate and 
illegitimate actions. 3-year-olds answered above chance to the comprehension questions 
(F(1,16)=7.2, p=.016<.05), but 5-year-olds answered only marginally above chance to these 
questions (F(1,8)=4.5, p=.067). The understanding of the situations cannot be fully assessed 
through the answers to the comprehension questions. Only adults all responded correctly. 
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Property rights attribution 
 
The analyses of the answers to the property rights questions of the three populations (3-
year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults) were performed with a multivariate General Linear Model 
for repeated measures with Condition (i.e. Acquisition mode) as within-subject factor, and 
Order and Agent as between-subjects factors, for two measures corresponding to the two 
questions. The results revealed a development in the attribution of property rights (see Figure 
C2-7). In general, 3-year-olds made no distinction between the conditions (F(2,7)=1.22, 
p>.1), whereas 5-year-olds (F(2,5)=13.54, p=.01) and adults (F(2,7)=22.31, p=.001) 
distinguished between the two conditions. When analyzing the results for each question, we 
found that 3-year-olds made no distinction between the conditions for both questions (play: 
F(1,8)=2, p>.1; leave: F(1,8)=0.17, p>.1). 5-year-olds and adults distinguished between the 
two recipients in both property rights questions (5-year-olds: play: F(1,6)=30, p<.01; leave: 
F(1,6)=14.4, p<.01; adults: play: F(1,8)=50, p<.001; leave: F(1,8)=27, p=.001). See Appendix 
AC2-3 for more detailed analyses. 
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Figure C2-7. Attribution of property rights to second possessors (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue, and 
Mr. Red) by 3- and 5-year-old children and adults, in Study 1b. 
Rights attributed to the illegitimate recipient (in black) and to the legitimate recipient (in white). Answers were 
scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if “no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the means of participants 
(and standard errors).   * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 
 
 
Overall, Study 1b showed (as Study 1a) that 3-year-olds had no preference between the 
illegitimate agent and the legitimate one. They did not show distinction between the two types 
of property transfers in their attribution of property rights either, even if they seem to show 
some understanding of the situations. 5-year-olds and adults considered the valence of the 
agent’s action in their social and moral evaluation and they preferred the legitimate agent as 
opposed to the illegitimate one. They also distinguished between the second possessors by 
attributing different rights to them. 
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1.3.3. Discussion 
 
This study aimed at comparing an illegitimate agent taking an object from another 
character and additionally refusing to give it back after the begging of the first possessor, and 
a legitimate agent giving an object to another character. As for Study 1a, our results of Study 
1b show a development between 3 and 5 years of age in children’s social and moral 
evaluations of illegitimate and legitimate characters involved in situations of object transfers. 
3-year-olds had no preference between the thief and the giver. They performed at chance, 
making no distinction between the two types of transfer. 5-year-olds and adults preferred the 
giver as opposed to the thief. They based their judgments on the valence of the social act, 
evaluating the legitimate agent more positively than the illegitimate one when questioned 
about their social and moral preferences. These results confirm that 5-year-olds’ distinction in 
Study 1a is not based on a difference of quantity of action, but on a real evaluation of the 
behaviors. 
Contrary to Study 1a, here 3-year-olds responded above chance to the comprehension 
questions. In particular, they clearly identified the thief, possibly thanks to the immediate 
reaction of the victim after theft. But, this label was given as a forced choice, and children 
may not consider the stealing agent as having the characteristics to be evaluated as a real thief 
and judged badly for his actions. As 5-year-olds responded only marginally above chance to 
the comprehension questions, caution is still needed in assessment of children’s 
understanding of the situations. Contrary to Study 1a, here 3-year-olds did not answer 
completely at chance to the property rights questions; the giver was allowed to play, and the 
thief was not allowed to leave with the object. However, they still made no distinction in their 
property rights attributions between the two compared situations. As in Study 1a, 5-year-olds 
(as adults) made a distinction between the illegitimate and legitimate recipients also in their 
attributions of property rights. A legitimate recipient had the right to play with an object, 
whereas an illegitimate recipient had not. Only a character acquiring an object illegitimately 
was not allowed to keep the object (leave with it). So, as in Study 1a, 5-year-olds 
distinguished the situations in their property rights attributions, and also in their social and 
moral evaluations. 3-year-olds made no distinction at all between illegitimate and legitimate 
recipients. Children seem not to make different social and moral evaluations of characters 
involved in property transfers before they are able to correctly attribute property rights. 
However, we can notice that the addition of a request after theft helped all participants in their 
attribution of property rights. Some other cues may also be helpful. 
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As in Study 1a, 5-year-olds made a distinction between the illegitimate and the 
legitimate agents, and to make this distinction, they did not rely on verbal cues of the valence 
of the actions, nor did they rely on explicit emotional reactions of the protagonist. Children 
could not rely on distress cues as no distress was expressed in any situation. In particular the 
victim of the moral transgression showed no distress, but only a request. A lot of studies 
about children’s evaluations of illegitimate (or antisocial) and legitimate (or prosocial) actions 
present characters expressing emotions as the consequences of the other character’s actions 
(e.g. Leslie et al., 2006; see also Blake and Harris, 2009), even if these emotions are 
sometimes subtle (e.g. “happy” jumping ball in Hamlin et al., 2007). In our study, 5-year-olds 
could not base their judgments on the emotional consequences of the actions. 
In Study 1b, the protagonist was asking for his ball back right after the theft. Thus, the 
thief is performing two negative actions: the theft and the refusal to give an object back after 
the request by its owner. The refusal to give back is considered negatively from 4-5 years of 
age on. Hook (1993) found that children from 4 to 15 years of age and adults considered a 
character who refused to return an object to the prior possessor as being very bad. In Hook’s 
study however it was made clear by narration that the first possessor asked for the object back 
and that the second possessor refused to give it. This explicit verbal focus on the refusal to 
give the object back may have helped the children in their evaluations. In our theft scenario, 
the claim of the first possessor was less obvious. Then the fact that the second possessor left 
may not have been considered as a refusal to restitute the object (even if he was compared to a 
character giving the ball after the begging of the protagonist). The reaction of Mr. Red may 
still have helped the younger children to recognize that there was an illegitimate transfer of 
property, even if it did not emerge in their social and moral evaluations. Indeed, 3-year-olds 
recognized correctly the thief in the comprehension questions, and participants at all ages took 
into account the refusal to return the object when answering to the property rights questions. 
Thus reaction of the first possessor after theft seems important to understand the situation. 
Blake & Harris (2009) found an amplification of correct responses to questions about 
property rights in the case of an emotional reaction of the first possessor following the 
transfer. In our study, the theft was entirely non violent, and the victim did not express any 
emotion. This kind of theft may not be characteristic enough of an illegitimate or antisocial 
action to trigger negative evaluation of the agent by very young children. Alternatively, young 
children may simply not consider ownership in their social and moral evaluations. This is 
consistent with previous studies by Smetana (1981), who showed that 3-year-olds do not 
consider theft as bad in the absence of rule. Only 4-year-olds do evaluate theft negatively 
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even in the absence of rule, whereas both 3- and 4-year-olds consider physical harm 
negatively. 
 
1.4. General Discussion 
- S1 - 
 
Our two studies showed a developmental change between 3 and 5 years of age in 
children’s ability to distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. Study 
1a showed that 5-year-old children (as adults) made the distinction between an agent 
acquiring an object in an illegitimate fashion (theft) and in a legitimate one (gift-reception). 
This distinction was honored both in their social/moral evaluation of the agent (with a 
preference for the legitimate recipient) and in their answers to explicit questions about 
property rights. In contrast, 3-year-olds made no such distinction. Study 1b showed similar 
results: 5-year-olds (as adults) also distinguished an illegitimate actor (thief) from a legitimate 
one (giver), both from the viewpoint of social/moral evaluation (preferring the giver) and 
property rights, whereas 3-year-olds did not. In a previous study about moral evaluation of 
property transgressions (Hook, 1993), it is not before 8 years of age that children 
distinguished between different modes of acquisition, notably between theft and gift-
reception, considering all second possessors as bad if they refused to restitute an object to the 
first possessor. We have therefore shown that children are able to differently evaluate theft 
from gift-reception (Study 1a) and theft from giving (Study 1b) already at 5 years of age. 
The distinctions made by 5-year-olds between the illegitimate character (thief) and the 
legitimate one (gift-recipient or giver) cannot be explained by a low level factor or a bias. In 
both studies, the quantity and quality of movements were controlled and matched between 
both compared situations. In Study 1a, the end result of the transfer is the same in both 
situations, which controls for a bias towards a preference for the character having an object at 
the end, and potentially considered as rich or lucky. Indeed, some experiments have shown 
that children prefer "lucky" characters than unlucky ones (Olson et al., 2006; 2008). In Study 
1b, we matched the level of activity of the illegitimate and legitimate characters, both being 
the initiator of the transfer of property. This shows that our results cannot be due to a 
difference in level of activity. In addition, we did not use any verbal cueing in our studies, 
potentially indicating the valence of the actions. Therefore 5-year-olds could only distinguish 
between illegitimate and legitimate behaviors on the basis of the agent's behaviors, not 
because of a label given to him. In Blake & Harris’ studies (2009), children were presented 
with verbal stories of gift-reception and theft. Thus, they could have relied on the negative 
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valence of the word “steal” to side with the first possessor, without the need of additional cues 
about the distress of the stolen character. In addition, their understanding of the situations was 
enhanced when the victim of theft reacted negatively and the recipient of a gift reacted 
positively. In our studies, children could not rely on explicit emotional reactions of the 
protagonist. In particular, they could not rely on distress cues showed by the victim of the 
moral transgression (theft), as such cues were not present. Thus, our effect cannot be due to 
the perception of distinct emotional consequences. 
We suggest that 5-year-olds’ distinction between the illegitimate and legitimate 
characters is due to the negative evaluation of the character performing a property right 
transgression. The distinction could however also be based on a positive evaluation of the 
legitimate character. Indeed, in Study 1b, the negative illegitimate behavior was compared to 
a positive legitimate one. In this situation we cannot disentangle the effect of the negative 
action from the effect of the positive one. Two arguments can however be advanced in favor 
of our interpretation. First, it has been claimed that, generally, children are more sensitive to 
negative than to positive acts. Such children’s negativity bias has been found across many 
studies (see Vaish et al., 2008 for a review). This suggests that they should be more sensitive 
to a theft than to a gift. Second, in Study 1a, we compared an active negative illegitimate 
behavior (stealing) to a neutral (rather than positive) legitimate behavior (receiving), and 
found an effect not different in magnitude to that of Study 1a. It would still be interesting to 
perform a direct comparison of a giver and a gift-recipient to investigate the potential effect of 
the legitimate behaviors in the evaluations, but the absence of difference in the results 
between our two studies validates our claim that it is the negative evaluation of theft that 
leads the comparative evaluation of both agents in each of the contrasts. 
One motivation of our work was to determine if there is dissociation between children’s 
ability to evaluate ownership transgressions and their ability to correctly attribute property 
rights. The owner of an object has the right of use of his object and nobody else can interfere 
with this use. He also has the right of exclusivity of use of his possession. This means that the 
owner has the right to allow someone else to use his object or to exclude someone from the 
use of his object. Finally, the owner can transfer his ownership rights to someone else (Snare, 
1972). Previous research showed that children lack a mature understanding of property rights 
until 5 years of age (Blake & Harris, 2009; Kim & Kalish, 2009). As in previous studies, we 
investigated the right of the second possessor to leave with the object, and found consistent 
results. Only from 5 years of age on, children attributed different rights to illegitimate and 
legitimate recipients. In addition, we also investigated the second possessor’s right of use of 
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the object, which was not studied previously. Similarly, 5-year-olds but not 3-year-olds made 
a distinction between the recipients according to their mode of acquisition, allowing only the 
legitimate recipient and not the illegitimate one to use the object. 5-year-olds may consider 
the rights of the owner (or first possessor) of an object in their evaluation of characters 
interacting with him and potentially interfering with those rights. Alternatively, the evaluation 
of property transfers may not rely on considerations of property rights but be processed by an 
independent system that may be operational at a younger age. We investigated whether young 
children exhibit a property sense through their evaluations of property transgressions before 
they explicitly reason about property rights and are able to answer questions concerning those 
rights. However, we found no dissociation between these two measures. Our results suggest 
that the two are “correlated”
C2-2
. At 3 years of age, children do not have a mature 
understanding of property rights, and they are not evaluating property transgressions either. 
At 5 years of age, children are able to correctly answer questions about property rights, and 
they are also able to judge transgressions of property rights. This shows that 5-year-olds 
reliably track and evaluate property transfers in third parties. As discussed earlier, since our 
movies did not include any verbal materials regarding property transgressions, the valence of 
the behaviors had to be inferred from the actions of the characters. To determine the valence 
of the actions, children had to identify the intentions of the different characters, but could not 
rely on explicit emotional consequences. Our results extend previous findings about the 
understanding of property transfers at 5 years of age to children’s social and moral 
evaluations of second possessors involved in those transfers. Further studies could investigate 
whether children’s evaluations are based on their understanding of property rights, or present 
independently. In any case, the evaluative system seems not to be operational at a younger 
age, but only at the same age when children understand property rights. 
In our studies, 3-year-olds did not evaluate differently illegitimate and legitimate 
property transfers. This is consistent with their lack of understanding of property rights. Does 
it mean that there is no sense of ownership present in very young children? Other studies 
suggest apparent evaluation regarding ownership in young children. Vaish et al. (2009) have 
shown that 18- and 25-month-olds show more empathy and sympathy for a character whose 
property has been stolen or destroyed, compared to a character to whom nothing bad 
happened. It seems thus that very young children do encode ownership transgressions, and 
                                                
C2-2
 We consider that there is a “correlation” in the sense that at a given age children are able to correctly answer 
to either none of our measures or to both of them. See Appendix AC2-4 for statistical analysis of correlations 
between our two measures. 
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show concern for the victims of such transgressions. At 3 years of age, children intervene in 
third parties interactions when there is a property right transgression (Rossano et al., 2011; 
Vaish et al., 2011). They protest against the act of a puppet stealing, throwing out, or 
destroying a piece of property from the experimenter or another puppet. 3-year-old children 
also withdraw their help more from an individual who stole or destroyed the property of 
someone else than from a neutral individual who made no transgression (Vaish et al., 2010). 
All these studies however did not directly measure children’s judgment about a transgressor. 
We don’t know whether children’s ability to detect a transgression would lead to a negative 
moral evaluation of the transgressor. Moreover, the actions presented in these various studies 
included not only theft but also destruction of property, which is more violent and thus may 
involve another system, based on harm and not on ownership. Other researchers directly 
measured infant’s evaluations of characters in interactions involving a piece of property. 
Hamlin & Wynn (2011) have shown that infants as young as 5 month of age show preference 
for a character returning a ball to the first possessor of the ball compared to a character 
keeping the ball. However, their results could be interpreted in terms of cooperation (i.e. as a 
preference for a cooperative partner compared to a non-cooperative one), or as the authors 
claim in terms of goal attribution and prosociality (i.e. as a preference for a helper compared 
to a hinderer), and not in terms of ownership. Overall, these studies did not really measure the 
evaluation of theft, as did our studies. These studies have shown that by 3 years of age 
children understand and evaluate prosocial and antisocial behaviors (see also Hamlin et al., 
2007), but they did not show clear evaluation of property transfers. Most often the antisocial 
acts that were studied involved physical harm. Theft seems to be an act more difficult to 
identify as antisocial for young children. Smetana (1981) showed that both 3- and 4-year-olds 
consider hitting as wrong, but only 4-year-olds consider taking another’s property as wrong in 
the absence of rule. Only when young children are involved in the events, they take property 
transgressions into consideration. When they participate in the interactions, 20- and 30-
month-olds respond negatively to moral transgressions including hitting or taking of property 
(Smetana, 1984). However, our results suggest that when young children do not take part in 
the interactions but are only third-party observers they do not evaluate property transgressors. 
There are two possible interpretations of our results showing a correlation between 
property rights and evaluation. The first possible interpretation is that our stimuli were not 
clear enough to engage the younger group in social and moral evaluation. In the absence of 
emotional consequences, theft may have not been clearly identified as a property right 
transgression. In a study by Weisberg and Leslie (2009), the presence of a victim’s negative 
- C2 - 
 104 
emotion amplifies the badness of an action. The second possible interpretation of our results 
is that evaluations of property transgressions are made at the same time as property rights are 
learned. Children have an understanding of property rights at 4-5 years of age (Blake & 
Harris, 2009), and they also evaluate theft negatively at 4 years of age (Smetana, 1981; 
Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). Earlier, children may not consider ownership issues in their 
evaluations. Alternatively, children may encode the action of theft as being a transgression 
but not necessarily evaluate this action and the actor as being bad. Indeed, young children 
show concern for a victim of theft (Vaish et al., 2009), but do not consider theft as wrong in 
the absence of rule before 4 years of age (Smetana, 1981). 
The next study tries to tease apart these two interpretations. We investigate whether 3-
year-old children are engaged in social and moral evaluations when the stimuli are clearer 
with emotional cues that could confirm the presence of a transgression. We have seen that 
Studies 1a and 1b did not entail negative consequences expressing harm. In particular, there is 
no display of distress by the victim of theft. Without any emotional cue confirming the 
presence of harm, 3-year-olds may not engage in social and moral evaluations. In Study 2, we 
examine the evaluation of the mode of acquisition (illegitimate vs. legitimate) as in Study 1a, 
and compare it to the evaluation of the same situations but with the presence of negative 
emotional consequences. Importantly, the same consequences are displayed in both the 
illegitimate and the legitimate conditions, so that children could not rely only on the presence 
of crying but would have to evaluate the whole situation in each condition. If 3-year-olds 
make a distinction between the illegitimate and legitimate recipients in the presence of 
distress cues, it would mean that they have the ability to evaluate property transfers, but that 
they only need to be in presence of clear property transgressions to activate evaluations. 
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2. Study 2: The role of emotional cues in young children’s evaluation of ownership 
transgressions 
- S2 - 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Study 1 showed that 3-year-olds do not distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate 
actions in interactions involving ownership, while 5-year-olds do. In these experiments, the 
owner did not react to the agent’s illegitimate action. Arguably, without any reaction of the 
owner, 3-year-olds may simply not engage in social and moral evaluation. In situations 
dealing with ownership transgressions, as the theft condition of Study 1, the transgression 
may be difficult to detect because there is no evidence of the presence of “harm”. The first 
possessor is not protesting or expressing negative emotion. With this absence of evident 
negative consequences, younger children may consider that nothing bad happened, and thus 
not engage in social and moral evaluation of the agent. Thus, emotions may be necessary to 
young children to understand the situation. As negative emotional expression is often a cue of 
the presence of harm it could act as a trigger to social and moral evaluation of property 
transfers. Then, emotions could be used at early ages to tune the system processing situations 
involving ownership. 
The role of emotion in moral judgments was largely debated. As discussed in the 
general introduction (Chapter 1), there are two schools of thought about moral judgments: 
rationalists (e.g. Kant, 1785/1959; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1932/1965) consider that moral 
judgments are made through a rational process, whereas intuitionists (e.g. Hume, 1776/1965; 
Prinz, 2006; Haidt, 2001; see also Hauser, 2006) consider that moral judgments rely on 
emotions. These two points of view about the necessity of emotion for moral judgment are 
also present in research about children’s moral judgments. Some authors (Kohlberg, 1976; 
Piaget, 1932/1965; Turiel, 1983) consider that children’s moral judgments are based on 
reasoning, whereas others (Blair, 1995; 1996; 1997; Hoffman, 2000) insist on the importance 
of emotions in moral development. The proponents of an emotional account for moral 
judgment consider that the judgments are based on the emotion felt by the evaluator when 
seeing a moral transgression. The evaluator’s emotion is argued to affect his judgments. But 
the role of the emotion perceived in the situation (i.e. displayed by the victim of a moral 
transgression) stayed largely unexplored. In the large majority of studies about children’s 
moral judgments, the victim of a moral transgression was always seen or said to be expressing 
a negative emotion (e.g. Smetana, 1981; 1983; Nucci, 1985; Turiel, 1983). These studies 
- C2 - 
 106 
showed that children are able to distinguish moral from conventional transgressions and the 
authors claimed that children are able to make true moral judgments at 3 years of age. But the 
distinction between moral and conventional transgressions could have relied only on the 
difference of emotional display (presence of a negative emotion in the moral transgression, 
but no distress in the conventional transgression) and not on the understanding of harm and 
thus on a true moral sense. 
However, Leslie et al. (2006) showed that children do not rely only on the emotional 
display to make their judgments, because they do distinguish between justified and unjustified 
emotions and do not judge a non-transgression as being bad even if it is followed by a display 
of distress. The character displaying distress after a non-transgression is recognized as a “Cry 
Baby”, crying for no reason. Emotion seems not to play a role in children’s ability to 
recognize a moral transgression as they do not consider a non-transgression with the presence 
of emotion to be a moral transgression, but emotion may still play a role in moral judgments 
and particularly for the recognition of less evident types of moral transgressions, such as 
ownership transgressions. Vaish et al. (2009) showed that emotional expression by the victim 
of an ownership transgression is not necessary to elicit young children’s sympathy and 
empathy towards the victim. However, a sympathetic reaction does not constitute a moral 
judgment. Children’s sympathy for the victim may not lead them to blame the agent of the 
transgression. Vaish et al. (2010) explored children’s evaluation of the actor of the 
transgression. They showed that children punished (by withdrawing help) an actor who 
intentionally harmed or intended to harm a victim. In this study, the victim was displaying 
sadness. So, we still do not know whether young children would consider as bad an actor 
harming a victim who does not display a negative emotion. In a study of Weisberg & Leslie 
(2009), the action of theft (analyzed together with destruction and physical harm) was judged 
negatively by 4-year-olds even without emotion, but the presence of emotion amplified the 
badness of the action. It seems that the emotion of the victim of a transgression may play a 
role (even if not central) in moral evaluations. In this study, it is still not the agent who was 
evaluated, but the situation. More importantly, the stimuli used were verbal and thus the word 
“steal” may have provided a verbal cue indicating the valence of the action. Also in a study 
using verbal material, Blake & Harris (2009) showed that the presence of congruent emotions 
help children to reason about ownership transfers. Blake & Harris (2009) tested two versions 
of their stories about legitimate and illegitimate acquisitions, varying the emotional content of 
the consequences of the actions. In the emotionally enhanced scenarios, gift-giving was made 
clearer by the display of a positive emotion by the recipient, and theft was made clearer by the 
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display of a negative emotion (sadness) by the first possessor. The authors found an effect of 
story version: children gave more correct replies to questions about property rights to both 
stories in the emotional version. 
 Do emotional cues help young children to evaluate transgressions of ownership rules 
where the presence of harm (or illegitimacy of the action) may be difficult to detect and the 
valence of the action is not suggested by the narration? Here, in Study 2, we explore whether 
young children’s moral evaluation of an agent involved in a property transfer is modulated by 
the affect displayed by the first possessor during the interaction. We performed this study 
with 3-year-olds and adults, in a 2*2 factor design: legitimacy of the agent’s behavior (within 
subjects): illegitimate versus legitimate conditions, and presence of the first possessor’s 
emotion (between subjects): non-emotional versus emotional conditions. More precisely, we 
compared agents’ mode of acquisition of an object: theft (illegitimate condition) versus 
legitimate reception (legitimate condition). In each condition, the transfer was immediately 
followed either by no reaction of the first possessor of the object (non-emotional condition) or 
by the same negative emotion (sadness) of the first possessor of the object (emotional 
condition). The non-emotional condition is a replication of Study 1a, but with slightly 
different stimuli to have a minimal difference when comparing it to the same contrast with 
emotion. Importantly, as we wanted to avoid the judgments being based only on the 
consequences and not on the action in itself, we equalized the outcome of both presented 
situations: in the emotional condition, the same emotion of sadness was displayed after both 
transfers (the illegitimate as well as the legitimate transfers). This leads to two different 
situations: the emotion of the first possessor is justified in the case of theft, but is unjustified 
in the case of giving. This latter case could be compared to the “Cry Baby” scenarios of Leslie 
et al. (2006), where a character is crying in the absence of a moral transgression. Young 
children may then judge a character who causes an expected and justified negative emotion as 
being more “bad” than a character who is only (coincidentally) present when another 
character unexpectedly shows a negative emotion. As the emotion displayed was the same 
whether the transfer was illegitimate or not, emotion alone could not act as a cue to 
differentiate between the illegitimate and legitimate agents. Rather, we hypothesize that 
negative affect acts as a trigger to moral evaluation. 
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2.2. Method 
 
As in Study 1, children and adults were presented with two non-verbal movie cartoons 
depicting the transfer of a ball between two characters. One movie represented an agent 
stealing a ball from another character (who cried or not after the transfer). In the other movie, 
the agent was receiving the ball from the other character. 
 
Participants 
 
Forty 3-year-olds (20 girls; mean age: 42 months, 20 days; range: 40 months, 10 days to 
45 months, 14 days), and twenty-four adults (16 females) were tested. Participants were 
French speakers. Adults were recruited from a mailing list of people wishing to participate to 
experiments in our laboratory; majority of them were students. Children were recruited from a 
database of parents who accepted to participate with their child in our studies; they were 
tested in our laboratory. Half of the participants of each age (twenty 3-year-olds (11 girls) and 
twelve adults (7 females)) were assigned to the non-emotional condition and half of them to 
the emotional condition. For each condition of emotion, participants were assigned randomly 
to one of the four experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation 
of conditions of legitimacy (theft first or legitimate reception first) and of the characters 
associated to a condition of legitimacy (agent 1 in theft condition or agent 2 in theft 
condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The participants sat in front of a laptop with the experimenter on their side. Children 
were tested with their parent(s) behind them or on their side. The two cartoon movies were 
presented on the laptop. The same three characters as in Study 1, and an additional character 
were seen. Two characters were present in each movie. At whole, four different characters 
were involved in the situations: two protagonists (one in each cartoon: Mr. Yellow and Mr. 
Red) and two agents (one in each cartoon: Mr. Green and Mr. Blue). Mr. Yellow was always 
presented with Mr. Green, and Mr. Red with Mr. Blue. The protagonists were the characters 
first possessing the object. The agents were the characters acquiring the object either by theft 
or by gift-reception, so they also corresponded to the second possessors. These two characters 
were those to be evaluated by the participants. Compared to Study 1, Mr. Yellow was 
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introduced because of the emotional condition, where the crying of the same protagonist to 
two different actions by the agents could reduce his credibility and thus diminish the 
legitimacy of crying in the theft condition. The sequence of events in each condition (see 
Figure C2-8) is described bellow, with the differences between both conditions of legitimacy 
in bold, and between both conditions of emotion in italic. 
 
In the theft condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball, and then keeps it under his arm. 
3. The agent steals the ball from the protagonist’s hands. 
 
In the non-emotional condition: 
4. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent but stays inexpressive. 
5. The agent plays with the ball. 
6. The agent stops playing, and the movie ends. 
 
In the emotional condition: 
4. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent and starts to cry
C2-3
. 
5. The agent plays with the ball. 
6. The agent stops playing, and the movie ends. 
 
In the legitimate reception condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
 
In the non-emotional condition: 
4. The protagonist stays inexpressive. 
5. The agent plays with the ball. 
6. The agent stops playing, and the movie ends. 
                                                
C2-3
 He shows a facial expression of sadness, and a verbal expression of distress. 
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In the emotional condition: 
4. The protagonist starts to cry. 
5. The agent plays with the ball. 
6. The agent stops playing, and the movie ends. 
 
 
 Theft Legitimate reception 
 Non-emotional    /   Emotional 
 
Non-emotional   /   Emotional 
 
 
 
 
1. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
2. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
3. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
4. 
     
 
 
 
 
5. 
    
 
 
 
 
6. 
    
 
Figure C2-8. Images extracted from each of the cartoons in Study 2. Outlined in purple, the step 
being different between both conditions of acquisition. 
 
Mmmm… 
…mmm… 
Mmmm… 
…mmm… 
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As in Study 1a, movements of the characters were matched between both movies seen 
by a participant (either non-emotional or emotional condition). Considering the agent, the 
movie representing theft was exactly the same compared to the movie representing legitimate 
reception, i.e. both agents were executing exactly the same movements at the same time in 
their respective movie throughout the movie. Considering the protagonist, the main difference 
lay in his orientation during the transfer. From the perspective of the child, the protagonist 
was full-face in the theft condition (not looking at the agent who is in profile) and in profile in 
the legitimate reception condition (facing the agent). The overall amount of time the 
protagonist was in each of these various orientations was matched as much as possible 
between both movies. The different movements of the protagonist were also matched overall. 
In both the non-emotional and emotional conditions, the movies ended at the same time. 
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as in Study 1. The experimenter presented and named 
pictures of the four characters on the screen before playing the movies, and asking the 
questions (see Table C2-2). Participant’s social and moral preferences were measured and 
analyzed. Participant’s attributions of property rights to the second possessors were also 
measured. We will not discuss them here but in Chapter 4. Finally, participant’s 
comprehension of the situations was assessed. 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Do you like him? - Is he a good guy? - Is he a bad guy? - Would you like to play with him? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- Show me the one you like 
(adults: Which one do you like?) 
- Show me the good guy 
- Show me the bad guy 
- Show me the one with whom you would like to play 
 
 
- To whom Mr. Red gave the ball? 
- Which one stole the ball from Mr. Red? 
 
+ Qprop (property rights attribution) not analyzed here. 
 
Table C2-2. Measures in Study 2. 
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2.3. Results 
 
Social/moral evaluation 
 
As in Study 1, participants were instructed to make a choice between both characters for 
each question, even if their preference was not so strong. An evaluation index was computed 
from the answers to the comparative questionnaire. Each answer was scored 1 if in favor of 
the legitimate recipient or in disfavor of the thief, -1 if in favor of the thief or in disfavor of 
the legitimate recipient, 0 if other (“both”, “none”) or absent. The four answers were averaged 
into an index between –1 and 1 for each subject. A positive index corresponds to a preference 
for the legitimate recipient over the illegitimate one (thief). Figure C2-9 shows the mean 
evaluation index as a function of Age for both the non-emotional and the emotional 
conditions. 
As preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, we did not include gender in 
further analyses. A 4-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Order (theft first or legitimate 
reception first) x Agent (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue as the thief) x Age x Emotion revealed a main 
effect of Age (F(1,48)=54.99, p<.001), a main effect of Emotion (F(1,48)=4.32, p<.05), and 
an interaction between Age and Emotion (F(1,48)=4.32, p<.05). The interaction comes from 
the fact that there is no effect of emotion for adults (F(1,16)=0), but there is an effect of 
emotion for 3-year-olds (F(1,32)=7.72, p<.01). The 4-way ANOVA revealed also an effect of 
Order (F(1,48)=6.04, p<.05) and a marginally significant effect of Agent (F(1,48)= 3.28, 
p=.076).  
Comparing the evaluation index to a chance score of 0 for each age group revealed that 
adults selected more the legitimate recipient as opposed to the thief than would be expected 
by chance in both conditions of Emotion (non-emotional: F(1,8)=675, p<.001; emotional: 
F(1,8)=675, p <.001). For 3-year-olds, the evaluation index was not different from chance in 
the non-emotional condition (F(1,16)=2.50, p=.13), but was significantly above chance in the 
emotional condition (F(1,16)=5.72, p <.05). 
 
Comprehension 
 
The lack of social and moral evaluation of 3-year-olds in the absence of emotion could 
be due to a lack of understanding of the situations and not to a real absence of evaluation of 
theft and gift-reception. 3-year-olds did not answer above chance to the comprehension 
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questions in the non-emotional condition (F(1,16)=2.21, p=.16), but they did answer above 
chance in the emotional condition (F(1,16)=7.15, p<.02). However, when separating 3-year-
olds in two groups according to their answers to the comprehension questions in the 
emotional condition, these two groups did not respond differently in their social and moral 
evaluations (t(16.40)=1.23, p<.05). The understanding of the situations cannot be fully 
assessed through the answers to the comprehension questions. 
 
 
Figure C2-9. Social/moral evaluation by 3-year-olds and adults of characters involved in 
property transfers as thief or legitimate recipient (Mr. Green and Mr. Blue), without (in white) 
or with (in black) emotion displayed by the first possessor, in Study 2.  Answers were scored 1 if 
in favor of legitimate recipient, -1 if in favor of thief, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the 
means of participants (and standard errors).  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 
 
Overall, Study 2 showed that adults preferred the legitimate recipient as opposed to the 
thief in both the non-emotional and the emotional conditions, whereas 3-year-olds did so only 
in the emotional condition, displaying no preference in the non-emotional condition as found 
in Study 1a. 
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2.4. Discussion 
 
The presence of emotion modulates 3-year-olds’ evaluations 
 
We have shown that in the presence of an emotional reaction of the first possessor after 
a transfer, even 3-year-old children evaluated agents acquiring the transferred object and 
showed a preference for a legitimate recipient as opposed to an illegitimate one. 3-year-olds’ 
social and moral evaluations of agents involved in a property transfer are modulated by the 
affect displayed by the first possessor during the interaction: 
- in the absence of any emotional display, 3-year-olds do not evaluate differently an 
illegitimate and a legitimate acquisition of property; 
- in the presence of a negative emotion displayed by the first possessor (expressing a 
negative consequence to each transfer action, independently of the type of action), 3-year-olds 
prefer a legitimate recipient as opposed to a thief. 
These results show that young children do not evaluate property transfers as adults do. 
They do not base their evaluation on ownership rules, but seem to consider the potential harm 
produced by an action, and are sensitive to its visible emotional consequences. Previous 
findings showed that children do not evaluate a harmful situation only on the basis of its 
emotional consequences. Vaish et al. (2009) presented to 18- and 25-month-old children an 
actor who takes and destroys objects from another person. They measured children’s concern 
looks and subsequent prosocial behavior (sharing) towards the victim. They showed that 
children express more sympathy for a victim of a harmful behavior (both because of harm due 
to taking and destruction of the victim’s property) compared to a character who was not 
harmed (neutral condition). In Vaish’s study, children expressed sympathy and empathy for a 
victim who was not displaying a negative emotion. The authors suggest that children evaluate 
the situation trough affective perspective taking. To compare these results to our studies, we 
would need to measure children’s help towards the victim of theft and compare it to a neutral 
character. It is important to compare a thief with a neutral character instead of a character 
giving an object in order to avoid children’s behavior being driven by indirect reciprocity 
(Olson & Spelke, 2008). We could also analyze whether children look at the protagonist more 
in the illegitimate condition. In our studies, we did not assess children’s concern for the 
victim but their evaluation of the agent of the harmful behavior. Having sympathy for a 
victim may not imply that one has antipathy for the harmful agent. Vaish et al. (2009) showed 
that the emotion of the victim is not needed to elicit sympathy for the victim. Children can 
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understand that a situation is harmful/painful even in the absence of emotional cues. 
However, we do not know whether they would blame the actor responsible of it. Vaish et al. 
(2010) showed that 3-year-olds help less an actor who intentionally harmed someone else 
compared to a neutral actor, but they help equally an actor who helped someone else 
compared to a neutral actor. They also help less an actor who intended but failed to harm 
someone else compared to a neutral actor, but they help equally an actor who performed harm 
accidentally compared a neutral actor. In these studies, in the case of harm, the victim showed 
sadness. Thus, children punished (by withdrawing help) an actor who intentionally harmed 
(or intended to harm) a victim who expressed suffering. However, they did not show 
complete antipathy for the harmful agent as they also helped him if he was the only actor 
needing help (after a first help to the other actor). Moreover, we do not know from these 
studies whether an actor harming a victim who is not expressing suffering would be 
considered as bad. 
Leslie et al. (2006) and Weisberg & Leslie (2009) showed that what matters for 
children’s moral evaluations of different situations is not the emotion expressed by the victim 
but the type of transgression: moral transgression is worse than conventional transgression, 
which is worse than no transgression. In a conventional transgression, there is usually no 
distress displayed. To investigate the role of harm in the evaluation of moral transgressions, 
and show that these evaluations (and the distinction between moral and conventional 
transgressions) do not solely rely on the presence of distress cues, Leslie et al. (2006) 
introduced a new type of situation: the Cry Baby scenario. In this situation there is no 
transgression but one character still cries. As this condition includes distress, it differs from a 
moral transgression only on the type of action and not on the emotional consequences of the 
action. Children (4-year-olds and autistic children) recognized that the actions performed in 
the Cry Baby situations were not bad, and thus these actions were not considered as moral 
transgressions despite the presence of distress. Children even judged the actions of eating 
one’s own cookie and of taking one’s turn on a swing, which represented non-transgressions, 
as being good (“OK”). The Cry Baby scenarios entailed the authorization of the teacher to 
perform the action. But, when compared to a moral transgression following authorization, 
children still made the distinction between both types of behavior, considering the non-
transgression as good and the moral transgression as bad. In the study of Weisberg & Leslie 
(2009), to judge a moral transgression as bad, emotion is not needed. This could be due to the 
fact that the scenarios are typical harm scenarios (hitting and hair pulling), where it is evident 
that the victim is suffering even if she shows no emotion (and even if the experimenter says to 
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the child that she is not suffering). So, emotions do not bring additional cues to the presence 
of harm. To rule out this hypothesis, in a second study, the authors used also “property harm” 
scenarios (stealing a ball and destroying a painting). In this study, the authors introduced four 
characters that are supposed to feel pain or not, and supposed to cry or not. To control if the 
child understood what type of character is involved in a situation, they ask the child if the 
character will feel hurt and cry. At the moment of the tested transgression, the characters are 
not showed crying and it is not said that they feel hurt. The authors merged property harm and 
physical harm in their analyzes claiming that the results showed that children consider 
property harm to be as bad as physical harm. In both situations, children consider that the 
victim suffers and cries as much, even when children were told that the “victim” cannot feel 
pain and does not cry. Children have a bias to consider that the victim suffers, even when this 
suffering is not displayed (and said not to be present). What matters seems to be whether the 
victim would feel a negative emotion according to the child, not if she expresses it or not. 
Nonetheless, the transgression tended to be judged more negatively in the presence of 
emotion (i.e. in the case of victims that are said to cry). The results of this second study 
showed that what matters more for moral evaluation of a situation is harm, but that emotions 
also play a role (contrary to the results of study 1 of Weisberg & Leslie, 2009). 
Our study showed that 3-year-olds are sensitive to the emotional consequences of an 
interaction, but that they consider their legitimacy. Indeed, the emotion displayed by the first 
possessor was the same whether the agent’s behavior was negative or not. Therefore emotion 
alone cannot have acted as a cue to differentiate between the illegitimate and legitimate 
agents. Rather, our results suggest that negative affect acts as a cue to the presence of harm, 
amplifying an action’s negative valence, and triggering social and moral evaluation. 
 
“Harm” and “Causality” models 
 
Moral transgressions imply the presence of harm. This harm can be of different forms: 
physical harm or psychological harm (e.g. harm due to loss of property). In the case of 
physical harm, it may be evident to detect. In the case of property interactions, the detection 
of harm may be less evident. Young children may then need some cues to confirm the 
presence of this harm. We propose that young children’s evaluation of social interactions 
(including property interactions) is based on two mechanisms: 
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- a forward preliminary analysis of the valence of the actions, some actions being 
tagged as supposedly harmful, what can lead to sympathy towards the victim (Vaish et 
al., 2009) 
- and a backward evaluation, from a negative emotional outcome, that confirms the 
presence of harm when it was expected from the preliminary analysis, which amplifies 
the action’s negative valence, what leads to blame the agent of the harmful act. 
 
We hypothesize that the emotional display is used to trigger social and moral 
evaluations by confirming the presence of a harmful act. Importantly, as already highlighted, 
the emotional display being the same in both compared situations, the evaluation cannot rely 
solely on the emotion itself, but has to take into account the intentional structure of the 
actions. The role of emotion is then to trigger social and moral evaluation on the basis of 
preliminary analysis of harm. Figure C2-10 presents a model of young children’s evaluation 
of the situations based on harm recognition. When a questionable action is highlighted during 
the preliminary analysis, a subsequent emotional display is used as a cue to confirm the moral 
transgression. Here, in the theft condition, when the thief (B1) takes the object from the first 
possessor (A1) without permission, his action is tagged as supposedly harmful. Then, the 
negative emotion amplifies the badness of B1’s action (expected harm) leading to a negative 
evaluation of B1, the agent responsible of the harmful act. When there is no questionable 
action, no negative evaluation follows. Here, in the legitimate reception condition, no harmful 
act is detected in the forward preliminary analysis. Thus, there is no negative action to be 
amplified by the negative emotion (no expected harm). The legitimate recipient (B2) is not 
considered negatively. When comparing the thief with the legitimate recipient, this latter is 
preferred. 
Our results could alternatively be interpreted only in terms of causality and not property 
or even harm. Figure C2-11 presents a model of young children’s evaluation of the situations 
based on causality detection. In this view, the person performing the last action that can 
account for the negative emotion would be considered as responsible of it and blamed (see 
Cushman, 2008). In the theft condition, the character, who performed an action just before the 
negative outcome was the agent, so he would be considered as blameworthy. In the legitimate 
reception condition, the protagonist was the last character acting just before the negative 
outcome and the agent was not performing any action that could possibly lead to the negative 
emotion (his action of reception was more passive), so the protagonist should be responsible 
for his emotion and the agent should not be blamed for it. Even if reception would be 
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considered as a causal action, the causality, and thus responsibility, would be shared. 
However, even if 3-year-old children may have performed only a causal analysis here, at 4 
years of age, children do not base their moral evaluations only on causality. Indeed, Leslie et 
al. (2006) and Weisberg & Leslie (2009) showed that 4-year-old children recognize 
unjustified crying, and do not consider the action that caused this crying as wrong. In our 
legitimate reception condition, crying of the first possessor could be considered as unjustified 
because he intended and initiated the transfer of his object. Thus a negative emotion 
contradicts his intentions. Even if it is improbable that children in our study would have based 
their judgments only on causality, our results could nevertheless be interpreted without 
considering young children’s understanding of ownership.  
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Figure C2-10. Hypothetical evaluation mechanism (of theft and legitimate reception) based 
on harm recognition in young children (3-year-olds), before mature understanding of property 
rights. 
 
 
 
Figure C2-11. Hypothetical evaluation mechanism (of theft and legitimate reception) based 
on causality detection in young children (3-year-olds), before mature understanding of 
property rights. 
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3. Summary 
 
Overall, we have found that 5-year-olds (in Study 1) evaluate property transfers 
similarly to adults. As adults, they have the ability to distinguish between illegitimate and 
legitimate transfers of property both through explicit attribution of different property rights to 
second possessors depending on the legitimacy of the transfer, and through a comparative 
evaluation of agents involved in the two types of transfer. Importantly, 5-year-olds were able 
to recognize a theft despite the absence of a negative emotional reaction of the first possessor 
to the transgression. In contrast, 3-year-olds (in Study 1) do not have a mature understanding 
of ownership. They are not able to answer questions about second possessor’s property rights. 
Also they are not able to distinguish illegitimate and legitimate property transfers through 
their social/moral evaluations when the transfers involve no emotions. However, in the 
presence of distress of the first possessor after the transfer, 3-year-olds (in Study 2) do 
distinguish theft from legitimate reception. Young children may be using a different system 
than the system used by older children and adults. This system seems not to be based on 
ownership understanding in the sense that adults mean it, but based on the detection of harm 
and/or a causal analysis of the situations. A negative emotional outcome, that is justified, 
leads to blame the character who caused it. To make this evaluation 3-year-olds do not need 
to apply property rules. To investigate whether 3-year-olds can evaluate agents’ behaviors 
according to property rules, in the next Chapter we study situations addressing the owner’s 
right to have his possession back after a transfer. 
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CHAPTER 3: Evaluation of restitution behaviors in property transfers 
- C3 - 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous studies, we tested children’s and adult’s evaluations of illegitimate and 
legitimate property transfers. We have seen that the comparative social/moral evaluation of 
illegitimate and legitimate recipients of an object is correlated with the explicit understanding 
of property rights, which has been acquired at 5 years. There are different types of property 
rights: the rights concerning the immediate use of the object, and the rights concerning the 
keeping of the object. With a mature understanding of ownership rights, one considers that if 
a person acquires property through a legitimate and definitive transfer of ownership, he 
acquires both kinds of rights. On the contrary, in the case of an illegitimate property transfer, 
the second possessor has not even the right to play with the object and even less the right to 
keep it. But, there is also another configuration of property transfer. Indeed, one may transfer 
an object to someone else through loan. In this case, the recipient should have the right to use 
the object, but not the right to keep it. 
Previous research has shown that even when attempting to present a definitive transfer 
of ownership, children tend to consider the transfer as temporary. Indeed, it seems particularly 
difficult for young children to acknowledge that the owner of an object changes after a gift. 
They exhibit a first possessor bias, considering that the first possessor of an object is its 
owner and that he stays the owner after the object has been transferred (Friedman & Neary, 
2008; Blake & Harris, 2009). Young children have difficulty to consider that the previous 
owner relinquishes his rights to control the object in the case of a definitive transfer of 
ownership (Kim & Kalish, 2009; see also Cram & Ng, 1989). Thus, it seems that young 
children consider by default a legitimate transfer of property to be a loan. It has been shown 
that children lack a mature understanding of ownership before 5 years of age, but this claim 
came from young children’s lack of understanding of definitive transfers of ownership 
(through gift-giving or selling). Children correctly respond to questions about property rights 
in the case of loan (Kim & Kalish, 2009), however this could be due to their first possessor 
bias, as claimed for their responses concerning theft (Blake & Harris, 2009). If children really 
consider a property transfer as a loan, they may be considering that the second possessor 
should return the object to the first possessor at the end of the interaction. Even if young 
children do not consider a property transfer as a loan (in the sense adults mean it), they may 
still consider that the second possessor should return the object to the first possessor because 
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of their first possessor bias. The results of Study 1b (Chapter 2) showed that 3-year-olds could 
consider that the second possessor is not allowed to leave with the object, which suggests that 
the second possessor may have to return the object. In the next three studies, we investigated 
children’s and adult’s evaluation of restitution. In Study 3, we explored 3-year-olds’ 
evaluation of restitution. In Study 4, we investigated 3-year-olds’s evaluation of restitution in 
the presence of emotional cues. Finally, in Study 5, we directly tested the role of emotion in 
5-year-olds’ evaluation of restitution by comparing situations with and without emotional 
cues. 
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2. Study 3: Three-year-olds’ evaluation of restitution 
- S3 - 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In Study 1, we showed that there is a correlation between understanding of property 
rights and evaluation of illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. Before a mature 
understanding of the full concept of ownership (not present at 3 years of age), are children 
evaluating characters acting in concordance with or against expectations raised by their first 
possessor bias? The first possessor bias could lead young children to prefer a character acting 
prosocially towards the first possessor (by returning the object to him) compared to a 
character acting antisocially towards him (by keeping the object). Even in the absence of a 
mature understanding of ownership, young children may show sensitivity to transgressions of 
the first possessor’s rights. Here, we investigated young children’s understanding of the 
transgression of the right to keep one’s property. We measured 3-year-olds (and adult’s) 
preferences between a character keeping a previously acquired object and a character 
restituting the object to its first possessor. We also verified participant’s explicit 
considerations about second possessors’ property rights. 
For the situation where the second possessor keeps the object, we used the movie of 
Study 1a presenting a legitimate transfer. Using the same movie as in Study 1a was done to 
assess whether the absence of 3-year-olds’ comparative evaluation of the two recipients in 
Study 1a could be due to attention focused on the behavior following the transfer rather than 
on the transfer itself. In this movie, after the transfer, the agent keeps the ball. This situation 
represents a transgression of property rights if the transfer is considered as a loan. We 
compared it to a situation where the agent restitutes the ball. 
 
2.2. Method 
 
This study aimed at comparing characters based on their behavior after a property 
transfer: no restitution of an object to the first possessor (keep condition) versus restitution of 
the object (return condition). Children and adults were presented with two non-verbal movie 
cartoons depicting a legitimate transfer of a ball between two characters and then the 
restitution or not of this ball by the second possessor to the first possessor. One movie 
represented an agent keeping a ball previously acquired from another character (the first 
possessor), and leaving with it. In the other movie, the agent was returning the ball to the first 
possessor. 
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Participants 
 
Twenty 3-year-olds (10 girls; mean age: 44 months, 2 days; range: 37 months, 23 days 
to 50 months, 27 days), and twelve adults (6 females) were tested. One additional child was 
tested but excluded due to absence of response to the comparative questionnaire. Participants 
were French speakers. Adults were recruited from a mailing list of people wishing to 
participate to experiments in our laboratory; majority of them were students. 3-year-olds were 
recruited from a database of parents who accepted to participate with their child in our 
studies; they were tested in our laboratory. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the 
four experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions 
(keep first or return first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 in keep 
condition or agent 2 in keep condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The disposition of the participants during testing and the material used to design the 
cartoons were the same as in the previous studies. The same three characters as in Study 1 
were seen: a protagonist corresponding to the first possessor (the same in both cartoons: Mr. 
Red) and two agents corresponding to the second possessors (one in each cartoon: Mr. Green 
and Mr. Blue). The agents were the characters to be evaluated by the participants. The 
sequence of events in each condition (see Figure C3-1) is described bellow, with the 
differences between both conditions in bold. 
 
In the keep condition (the same as the gift-reception condition of Study 1a): 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent tries to return the ball to the protagonist, who refuses to take the ball back 
by moving backward. 
6. The agent does not insist and keeps the ball. 
7. The agent leaves with the ball. 
8. The protagonist leaves without the ball. 
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In the return condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent tries to return the ball to the protagonist, who refuses to take the ball back 
by moving backward. 
6. The agent insists to return the ball by approaching further. The protagonist 
takes the ball. 
7. The agent leaves without the ball. 
8. The protagonist leaves with the ball. 
 
 
 Keep 
 
Return 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   
 
 
 
 
 
2.   
 
 
 
 
 
3.   
 
 
 
 
 
4.   
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5.   
 
 
 
 
 
6. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
  
 
 
Figure C3-1. Images extracted from each of the cartoons in Study 3. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions. 
 
 
The different movements of the agent and of the protagonist were matched as much as 
possible between both movies. The movies were exactly the same at the beginning, only the 
last behavior of the agent differed between both movies. Considering the agent, both movies 
were the same as far as the first transfer was concerned and differed only at the very end with 
more movement of the agent in the return condition. The amount of time the agent was 
present on screen and his orientation throughout the movie was exactly the same in both 
movies. Considering the protagonist, his movements and orientations upon the whole movie 
were matched as much as possible between both movies. 
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Procedure 
 
The procedure was almost the same as in the previous studies. The experimenter 
presented and named pictures of the three characters on the screen before playing the movie 
cartoons, and asking the questions (see Figure C3-2). As in Studies 1 and 2, participants’ 
social and moral preferences were measured and analyzed. Children’s social and moral 
evaluations of restitution behaviors constitute an indirect evaluation of their consideration of 
property rights. We also tested children’s explicit understanding of what the second possessor 
should do as far as returning the ball is concerned. Here, three questions about the second 
possessor’s rights were asked. Contrary to the previous studies, these questions were not 
asked after a full fourth presentation of the movie. In each condition, the movie was not 
displayed entirely but was stopped after the second possessor has played with the ball and 
approached the first possessor, who then moved backwards (step 5 of the sequence of events). 
This was done in order to ask the two questions about the second possessor’s rights to keep 
the ball at the present to facilitate children's understanding. The property rights questions 
were then: “[The second possessor] was he allowed to play with the ball?”, “[The second 
possessor] is he allowed to leave with the ball?”, “[The second possessor] does he have to 
give the ball back to M. Red?”. In this study, we did not systematically ask the participants to 
answer comprehension questions about who returned and who kept the object. 
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 Movie 1 
 
Movie 1 Qi_eval1 Movie 2 Movie 2 Qi_eval2 
 
      
 
 
Movie 1 Movie 2 Qc_eval Movie 1 
(partly) 
Qprop1 Movie 2 
(partly) 
Qprop2 
       
 
Qi_eval (training): - Do you like him? - Is he a good guy? - Is he a bad guy? - Would you like to play with him? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
 
- Show me the one you like 
(adults: Which one do you like?) 
- Show me the good guy 
- Show me the bad guy 
- Show me the one with whom you would like to play 
 
 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he allowed to 
play with the ball? 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] is he allowed to leave 
with the ball? 
   - [The 2
nd
 possessor] does he have to give 
the ball back to Mr. Red? 
 
 
 
Figure C3-2. Procedure and measures in Study 3. 
 (see Appendix AC3-1 for the original version of the questions asked in French) 
 
2.3. Results 
 
Social/moral evaluation 
 
As in Studies 1 & 2, participants were instructed to make a choice between both 
characters for each question, even if their preference was not so strong. An evaluation index 
was computed from the answers to the comparative questionnaire. Each answer was scored 1 
if in favor of the reciprocator (i.e. the agent returning the ball to the first possessor) or in 
disfavor of the keeper (i.e. the agent not returning the ball but keeping it), -1 if in favor of the 
keeper or in disfavor of the reciprocator, 0 if other (“both”, “none”) or absent. The four 
answers were averaged into an index between –1 and 1 for each subject. A positive index 
corresponds to a preference for the reciprocator over the keeper. Figure C3-3 shows the mean 
evaluation index as a function of Age. 
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As preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, we did not include gender in 
further analyses. A 3-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Age x Order (keep first or return 
first) x Agent (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue as the keeper) revealed a main effect of Age 
(F(1,24)=16.85, p<.001). The analysis revealed interactions between Age and Agent 
(F(1,24)=5.10, p<.05) and between Order and Agent (F(1,24)=5.29, p<.05), but no main 
effects of Order or Agent. 
Comparing the evaluation index to a chance score of 0 for each age group revealed that 
3-year-olds' selection of the reciprocator and the keeper did not differ from chance 
(F(1,16)=0.95, p=.34). Adults selected more the reciprocator as opposed to the keeper than 
would be expected by chance (F(1,8)=22.23, p<.01). 
 
 
Figure C3-3. Social/moral evaluation of characters differing in their restitution behavior after 
a property transfer (no restitution vs. restitution) by 3-year-old children and adults, in Study 3.  
Answers were scored 1 if in favor of reciprocator, -1 if in favor of keeper, 0 if other or absent for each question. 
The figure shows the means of participants (and standard errors).  * p<.05 
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Property rights attribution 
 
We analyzed participants’ attributions of property rights in particular to verify that 
restitution is important in considerations of property transfers (or/and to establish the presence 
of a first possessor bias). This was assessed through the answers to the questions about the 
second possessor’s right to leave with the object and his obligation to give it back to the first 
possessor. The answers to the question about the second possessor’s right to play with the ball 
gave us information about participants’ understanding of the legitimacy of the transfer. 
We performed a General Linear Model with Condition (i.e. presence or absence of 
restitution) as within-subject factor, and Age, Order and Agent as between-subjects factors, 
for three measures corresponding to the three questions. The results (see Figure C3-4) 
revealed no effect of Age on the general attribution of property rights (F(3,22)= 1.65, p=.21). 
A marginal effect of Age is present only for the question about the right to play with the ball 
(F(1,24)= 4.33, p<.05). The analyses revealed no effect of Condition either (F(3,22)=1.14, 
p=.36). There were no interactions and no effects of Order or Agent. In the rest of the 
analyses, we separated the results of the two populations (3-year-olds and adults), with Order 
and Agent as between-subjects factors in the GLM. The results revealed a trend towards a 
distinction of the conditions by adults in their attribution of the second possessor’s right to 
leave with the object (F(1,8)= 4.5, p=.067). When analyzing the results for each question, we 
see that both 3-year-olds and adults considered the transfer as legitimate by according the 
right to play with the ball to the second possessor in both conditions (3-year-olds:  keep: 
F(1,16)=6.25, p<.05; return: F(1,16)=7.14, p<.02; adults: they all answered “yes” in both 
conditions). As far as the two rights to keep the object (temporarily by leaving with it, or 
definitively by not giving it back) are concerned, participants were at chance in their 
attribution of the right to leave with the object, except adults in the return condition where 
they answered “no” significantly above chance (F(1,8)=8, p<.05). More importantly, 
participants answered “yes” significantly above chance to the question about the obligation to 
give the object back to the first possessor in all conditions (3-year-olds:  keep: F(1,16)=5.56, 
p<.05; return: F(1,16)=10.29, p<.01; adults: keep: F(1,8)=8, p<.05; return: F(1,8)=8, p<.05) 
Thus, restitution of the ball to the first possessor seems to be expected by the participants. 
 
 
- S3 - 
 131 
 
Figure C3-4. Attribution of property rights to second possessors by 3-year-old children and 
adults, in Study 3. 
Rights attributed to the keeper (in black), and to the reciprocator (in white). Answers were scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if 
“no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the means of participants (and standard errors).  
 ~ p<.1  * p<.05  ** p<.01. 
 
Correlation between loan bias and evaluation? 
 
We looked whether participants answering that the second possessor should return the 
object to the first possessor preferred the reciprocator compared to the keeper. We averaged 
participant’s responses to the question about the second possessor’s obligation to give the 
object back into a mean score, and looked at its correlation with the evaluation index. We did 
not find any correlation (adults: r=.35, t(10)=1.16, p=.27; 3-year-olds: r=.23, t(18)=1.02, 
p=.32). For the mean score indicating the right not to leave with the object (reversed answers 
to the question about the right to leave with the object), we did not find a correlation with the 
evaluation index either (adults: r=.18, t(10)=0.57, p=.58; 3-year-olds: r=.15, t(18)=0.65, 
p=.52). 
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Overall, Study 3 showed that 3-year-olds did not take into account the second 
possessor’s restitution behavior to evaluate him: they had no preference between the agent 
restituting the previously acquired object and the agent keeping the object. However, in their 
attributions of property rights, they did claim that the second possessor of an object should 
return the object to the first possessor. Adults considered the restitution behavior in their 
social and moral evaluations and preferred the agent reciprocating as opposed to the agent 
keeping the object. They also considered that the second possessor should return the object in 
their attributions of property rights (However, these two measures were not correlated). 
 
2.4. Discussion 
 
The results show that young children do not distinguish between different types of 
behaviors occurring after an object transfer, whereas adults do. When presented with a 
character keeping a previously acquired object and a character returning the previously 
acquired object to the first possessor of the object, 3-year-olds have no preference between 
both characters. Adults prefer the reciprocator compared to the keeper. Concerning the 
attribution of property rights to the second possessors, both 3-year-olds and adults consider 
that the recipients are allowed to use the object, but that they have to return it to the first 
possessor afterwards. The authorization to play with the object shows that the transfer is 
considered as legitimate. The obligation to return the object shows that the transfer is 
considered as non-definitive. Participants seem not to take into account the unwillingness of 
the first possessor to take the object back (he stepped back when the agent approached to 
return the object). This is probably due to the fact that the first possessor finally accepts to 
have the object back in one of the conditions, which may lead participants to suppose that his 
movement away from the object was not due to a real renunciation to the object. This result 
shows the difficulty to present an object transfer as a gift (see Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis 
of the interpretations of the transfers). With a mature understanding of property rights, if an 
object transfer is seen as a loan, then a character restituting the object to the first possessor 
should be seen as acting legitimately and a character keeping the object as acting 
illegitimately. Adults do prefer the legitimate agent compared to the illegitimate one.  
The obligation of the second possessor to restitute the object is part of the first 
possessor’s rights of keeping his property (if he is considered as an owner). It has been shown 
that the first possessor of an object is considered as the owner of the object (Friedman & 
Neary, 2008). Thus the attribution of obligation to return the object can be seen as an 
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understanding of property rights, but also as a response to a first possessor bias. The first 
possessor bias leads children not to accept definitive transfers of ownership (e.g. Friedman & 
Neary, 2008; Kim & Kalish, 2009). They seem to see a transfer as a loan. When asked about 
who should keep an object, young children (2- and 3-year-olds) answer in favor of the first 
possessor, even after a gift (Blake & Harris, 2009). 
We investigated whether the presence of the first possessor bias or loan bias (leading to 
consider that the second possessor should restitute the object to the first possessor) triggered 
evaluation of characters acting according or contrary to an expectation of restitution. Our 
results showed that despite a first possessor bias (expressed in their attribution of rights), 3-
year-olds had no preference for a character returning an object to the first possessor in 
comparison to a character keeping the object. So the loan bias is not expressed in young 
children’s evaluations. In contrast, adults exhibit a loan bias in their attribution of property 
rights, and prefer the character returning the object. However, the measure of explicit 
assignment of obligation to return was not correlated with the measure of social/moral 
evaluations. In this study, answers to the questions about property rights lead to the 
identification of the type of transfer being performed; they were indications of a loan bias. 
They did not allow assessing mature understanding of ownership as the transfer was not clear, 
and the same transfer was shown in both conditions. We have seen in Chapter 2 that there is a 
correlation between understanding of property rights and evaluation of transfers, and that 3-
year-olds lack a mature understanding of ownership. The results here suggest that without this 
mature understanding, young children do not evaluate the restitution following a transfer 
either. The first possessor bias may be a precursor to the mature understanding of ownership, 
and also a precursor to the evaluation of ownership transgressions, but in the absence of 
mature understanding of ownership we found that no evaluation is made. 
Our result showing that 3-year-olds did not prefer the reciprocator compared to the 
keeper seems inconsistent with previous findings showing that 5-month-old infants do prefer 
a character returning a previously dropped object to its first possessor compared to a character 
leaving with the object (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). However, several elements differ between 
Hamlin’s study and our study (in addition to the fact that Hamlin & Wynn used an implicit 
non-verbal measure of infant’s preferences instead of a verbal measure). Firstly, in Hamlin’s 
study, the transfer of object between the two protagonists is not made through a gift or a loan 
(that are intentional transfers), but through the accidental drop of the object by the first 
possessor. Secondly, and more importantly, in our study the first possessor did not ask for the 
ball back, but on the contrary he stepped back when the second possessor approached to 
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return the object to him, whereas in Hamlin’s study the first possessor expressed his will to 
recover the lost ball by turning himself several times towards the character who picked the 
ball up. Hook (1993) showed that not returning an object to the first possessor if he asks for it 
is considered as bad from 4 years of age on. Begging seems important, and the non-
fulfillment of a perceived request may elicit negative evaluation at a very young age. In 
addition, the first possessor may be perceived as frustrated after the loss of the object. In the 
other situation, when the second possessor returns the object to the first possessor, it could 
both be seen as a relief of the first possessor’s frustration and as a fulfillment of his 
requirement, potentially leading to positive evaluation. This difference in evaluation could be 
only due to the difference in inferred emotions of the first possessor (frustrated vs. relieved). 
We could also consider the interaction between the two protagonists as social interaction or 
communication, where the protagonist is asking the other character to interact with him and 
not begging particularly to retrieve the ball. Then in one condition the second possessor 
breaks the communication, whereas in the other he responds to it. Thus, Hamlin’s results may 
not have any link with ownership considerations, but with cooperation. Still, reciprocity in 
property transfers is a form of cooperation, and other studies about reciprocity have shown 
that young children do act reciprocally or consider that others should act reciprocally (e.g. 
Olson & Spelke, 2008). 
How can we interpret the dissociation between considerations for reciprocity and 
evaluation of characters acting according to or against these considerations? As we already 
mentioned it, it is possible that evaluations of property transgressions are only present at the 
same time as property rights are learned. Earlier, children may not consider property issues in 
their evaluations. Alternatively, our stimuli may have not been clear enough to engage young 
children in social and moral evaluation. Even if children consider that the second possessor 
should return the object to the first possessor, if the absence of restitution is not contested by 
the first possessor, they may not engage into evaluation. Indeed, the first possessor did not 
react negatively to the absence of restitution, he even refused the restitution at first. In the 
absence of negative emotional consequences, the absence of restitution may have not been 
clearly identified as a property transgression. The next experiment will investigate this 
possibility. 
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3. Study 4: Three-year-olds’ evaluation of restitution in the presence of emotional cues 
- S4 - 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Three-year-old children have a first possessor bias, considering that the first person seen 
in possession of an object is its owner, and expect him to receive his object back after a 
transfer, yet they do not distinguish between a character returning an object to its first 
possessor and a character keeping the object in their social/moral evaluations. This suggests 
that they do not consider the absence of restitution as a transgression of property rights. To be 
evaluated, the transgression has to be clearly identified. Without any reaction (protest or 
negative emotion) of the owner of the object to the behavior of the agent, 3-year-olds may not 
engage in evaluation because no transgression was clearly detected. As for the identification 
and evaluation of transgression in the way of acquiring an object (see Study 2), young 
children may need emotional cues to consider the absence of restitution of an object to its first 
possessor and probable owner as a transgression of property rights. To test this hypothesis, we 
performed an experiment where the agent’s restitution behavior (absence or presence of 
restitution) is followed by a negative emotion of the first possessor (either being distanced 
from the object or retrieving it). We compared two conditions: no restitution/keep and 
restitution/return. In both conditions, the final behavior of the agent (keeping or returning the 
previously acquired object) was followed by the same negative emotion (sadness) of the first 
possessor. Importantly, as we wanted to avoid the judgments being based only on the 
consequences and not on the action in itself, we equalized the outcome of the two presented 
situations: the same emotion of sadness was displayed in both situations. 
As in Study 2, this leads to two different situations: the emotion of the first possessor is 
justified in the case of keeping, but it is unjustified in the case of returning. This latter case 
could be compared to the “Cry Baby” scenarios of Leslie et al. (2006), where a character is 
crying in the absence of a moral transgression. Young children may then judge a character 
who causes an expected and justified negative emotion as being more “bad” than a character 
who is only (coincidentally) present when another character unexpectedly shows a negative 
emotion. As the emotion displayed was the same whether the transfer was followed by 
restitution or not, emotion alone could not act as a cue to differentiate between the two agents. 
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3.2. Method 
 
As Study 3, this study aimed at comparing characters on the basis of their restitution of 
an object to the first possessor: no restitution (keep condition) versus restitution (return 
condition), but with the presence of a negative emotion expressed by the first possessor after 
the restitution behavior of the second possessor in both conditions. Children and adults were 
presented with two non-verbal movie cartoons depicting a legitimate transfer of a ball 
between two characters, followed or not by the restitution of the ball by the second possessor 
to the first possessor, who cried in both situations. One movie represented an agent keeping a 
ball previously acquired from another character. The first possessor cried when the agent 
moved the ball away from him. In the other movie, the agent returned the ball to the first 
possessor, who cried after the restitution. 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-one 3-year-olds (8 girls; mean age: 42 months, 9 days; range: 40 months, 29 
days to 44 months, 20 days), and thirteen adults (9 females) were tested. Participants were 
French speakers. Adults were recruited from a mailing list of people wishing to participate to 
experiments in our laboratory; majority of them were students. 3-year-olds were recruited 
from a database of parents who accepted to participate with their child in our studies; they 
were tested in our laboratory. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the four 
experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions 
(keep first or return first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 in keep 
condition or agent 2 in keep condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The disposition of the participants during testing and the material used to design the 
cartoons were the same as in the previous studies. Two characters were present in each movie. 
At whole, four different characters were seen (as in Study 2): two protagonists corresponding 
to the first possessors (one in each cartoon: Mr. Yellow and Mr. Red) and two agents 
corresponding to the second possessors (one in each cartoon: Mr. Green and Mr. Blue). Mr. 
Yellow was always presented with Mr. Green, and Mr. Red with Mr. Blue. The agents were 
the characters to be evaluated by the participants. Compared to Study 3, Mr. Yellow was 
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introduced because of the display of emotion: the crying of the same protagonist to two 
different actions by the agents could reduce his credibility and thus diminish the legitimacy of 
crying in the keep condition. Compared to Study 3, there was no sign of renunciation to the 
object by the first possessor before the keeping or restitution. We can thus consider here that 
the transfer is a loan and the absence of restitution a transgression. Another difference with 
Study 3 is that the characters are not leaving the scene. In particular the agent is not leaving 
with or without the ball. The sequence of events in each condition (see Figure C3-5) is 
described below, with the differences between both conditions in bold. 
 
In the keep condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent keeps the ball by placing it on a rock behind him. 
6. The protagonist (without the ball) criesC3-1. 
 
In the return condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent returns the ball to the protagonist. 
6. The protagonist (with the ball) cries. 
 
 
                                                
C3-1
 He shows a facial expression of sadness, and a verbal expression of distress. 
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 Keep 
 
Return 
 
 
 
 
1. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
2. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
3. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
4. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
5. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
6. 
                                          
 
 
Figure C3-5. Images extracted from each of the cartoons in Study 4. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions. 
 
 
 
 
Mmmmm
mmm… 
Mmmmm
mmm… 
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The different movements of the agent and of the protagonist were matched as much as 
possible between both movies. The movies were exactly the same at the beginning, only the 
last behavior of the agent differed between both movies. Considering the agent, both movies 
were the same as far as the first transfer was concerned and differed only at the very end 
where both agents did not move in the same direction, but the amount of movement was the 
same. The amount of time the agent was present on screen and his orientation throughout the 
movie was exactly the same in both movies. Considering the protagonist, his movements and 
orientations upon the whole movie were matched as much as possible between both movies. 
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as in Study 3
C3-2
. The experimenter presented and named 
pictures of the four characters on the screen before playing the movies, and asking the 
questions (see Table C3-1). As in previous studies, participants’ social and moral preferences 
were measured and analyzed. After another presentation of each movie individually, the 
participants were also asked questions about property rights of the agent (second possessor), 
and whether the agent did something bad, for each condition. They were also asked a question 
concerning the justification of the first possessor’s emotion: “Did he have a reason to be 
sad?”. Finally, they were asked comprehension questions: between the two agents, “Which 
one returned the ball?” and “Which one kept the ball?”. 
 
                                                
C3-2
 except that the movies were presented less times to some of the adults, and that some of the adults answered 
to the questions about property rights before answering the comparative questionnaire about social/moral 
evaluation. 
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Qi_eval (training): - Do you like him? - Is he a good guy? - Is he a bad guy? - Would you like to play with him? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
 
- Show me the one you like 
(adults: Which one do you like?) 
- Show me the good guy 
- Show me the bad guy 
- Show me the one with whom you would like to play 
 
 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he allowed to 
play with the ball? 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he allowed to 
keep the ball? 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] did he have to 
give the ball back to [the first 
possessor]? 
 
 
Qi_eval_action_emotion 
(evaluation of action and emotion) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] did he do something bad? 
- [The 1
st
 possessor] did he have a reason to be sad? 
 
 
- Which one returned the ball? 
- Which one kept the ball? 
 
Table C3-1. Measures in Study 4. 
(see Appendix AC3-1 for the original version of the questions asked in French) 
 
Compared to Study 3, here participants were asked about the second possessors’ right to 
keep the object and not his right to leave with it, as the agent did not leave with the object but 
only kept it behind him. This question concerning the right to keep the ball corresponds in 
fact to the same one than the question about the second possessor‘s obligation to return the 
ball, but “reversed”. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
Social/moral evaluation 
 
As in the previous studies, participants were instructed to make a choice between both 
characters for each question, even if their preference was not so strong. An evaluation index 
was computed from the answers to the comparative questionnaire. As in Study 3, each answer 
was scored 1 if in favor of the reciprocator (i.e. the agent returning the ball to the first 
possessor) or in disfavor of the keeper (i.e. the agent not returning the ball but keeping it), -1 
if in favor of the keeper or in disfavor of the reciprocator, 0 if other (“both”, “none”) or 
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absent. The four answers were averaged into an index between –1 and 1 for each subject. A 
positive index corresponds to a preference for the reciprocator over the keeper. Figure C3-6 
shows the mean evaluation index as a function of Age. 
As preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, we did not include gender in 
further analyses. A 3-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Age x Order (keep first or return 
first) x Agent (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue as the keeper) revealed a main effect of Age 
(F(1,26)=14.89, p=.001). The analysis revealed no interactions and no main effects of Order 
or Agent. Comparing the evaluation index to a chance score of 0 for each age group revealed 
that 3-year-olds' selection of the reciprocator and the keeper did not differ from chance 
(F(1,17)=1.20, p=.29). Adults selected more the reciprocator as opposed to the keeper than 
would be expected by chance (F(1,9)=118.87, p<.001). When separating younger and older 3-
year-olds, we observe a difference in their evaluation (F(1,14)=5.50, p<.05). The participants 
from the younger group are at chance when comparing their evaluation score against zero 
(F(1,7)=0.36, p=.57). The participants from the older group tend to answer marginally but not 
significantly above chance (F(1,7)=4.87, p=.063). 
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Figure C3-6. Social/moral evaluation by 3-year-olds and adults of characters differing in their 
restitution behavior (no restitution vs. restitution; both followed by a negative emotional 
response of the first possessor), in Study 4. Answers were scored 1 if in favor of reciprocator, -1 if in 
favor of keeper, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the means of participants (and standard 
errors). *** p<.001. 
 
Comprehension 
 
The lack of social and moral evaluation of 3-year-olds seems not to be due to a lack of 
understanding of the situations. 3-year-olds answered above chance to the comprehension 
questions (F(1,17)=5.79, p<.05). Nine 3-year-olds answered correctly to both comprehension 
questions
C3-3
. All adults responded correctly to these questions. 
                                                
C3-3
 When separating 3-year-olds in two groups according to their answers to the comprehension questions (9 
participants responded correctly, and 12 incorrectly), these two groups seem to respond differently to the 
comparative evaluation questionnaire but it is not significant (t(19)=1.63, p=.12); both groups answered at 
chance. The measures for the group responding correctly to the comprehension questions and the older group are 
correlated as 6 of 9 children who answered correctly to the comprehension questions were part of the older 
group. 
- S4 - 
 143 
Property rights attribution 
 
We analyzed participants’ attributions of property rights, in particular the second 
possessor’s right to play with the ball, his right to keep the ball, and his obligation to give it 
back to the first possessor. We performed a General Linear Model with Condition (i.e. 
presence or absence of restitution) as within-subject factor, and Age, Order and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, for three measures corresponding to the three questions. The results 
(see Figure C3-7) revealed an effect of Condition (F(3,24)=5.06, p<.01). There was no effect 
of Age on the general attribution of property rights (F(3,24)= 16.46, p=.12). An effect of Age 
is present only for the question about the right to play with the ball (F(1,26)= 5.29, p<.05). 
However, the analyses revealed an interaction between Condition and Age (F(3,24)=7.02, 
p=.001). There was also an interaction between Condition, Age, and Agent (F(3,24)=3.73, 
p<.05), but no other interactions or effects of Order or Agent. 
In the rest of the analyses, we separated the results of the two populations (3-year-olds 
and adults), with Order and Agent as between-subjects factors in the GLM. The results 
revealed an effect of Condition both for 3-year-olds (F(3,15)=4.85, p<.02) and adults 
(F(2,8)=6.64, p=.02). This distinction between the conditions is present in 3-year-olds 
attribution of the second possessor’s obligation to return the ball (F(1,17)=6.16, p<.05), and 
marginally for his right to play with the ball (F(1,17)= 4.30, p=.054). Adults distinguish 
between both conditions in the second possessor’s right to keep the ball (F(1,9)=13.85, 
p<.01), and his obligation to return the ball (F(1,9)=7.23, p<.05). 
When analyzing the results for each question, adults considered the transfer as 
legitimate by according the right to play with the ball to the second possessor in both 
conditions (they all answered “yes” in both conditions). 3-year-olds considered that the 
second possessor was allowed to play with the ball only in the keep condition (keep: 
F(1,17)=17.03, p=.001; return: F(1,17)=2.10, p=.17). 
As far as the right to keep the object is concerned, participants were at chance, except 
adults in the keep condition where they answered “no” significantly above chance 
(F(1,9)=26.67, p=.001). When the question was asked as an attribution of obligation to give 
the ball back to the first possessor, 3-year-olds were at chance in the keep condition 
(F(1,17)=2.75, p=.12), but considered that the second possessor has to return the object in the 
return condition (F(1,17)=36.22, p<.001). It was the reverse for adults (keep: F(1,9)=26.67, 
p=.001; return: F(1,9)=0.02, p=.89). Thus, participants did not show a loan bias, when the 
restitution or absence of restitution was followed by a negative emotion of the first possessor. 
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Figure C3-7. Attribution of property rights to second possessors by 3-year-olds and adults, in 
Study 4. 
Rights attributed to the keeper (in black), and to the reciprocator (in white). Answers were scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if 
“no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the means of participants (and standard errors).  
 ~ p<.1  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 
 
 
Evaluation of action and emotion 
 
Adults recognized that the emotion of the first possessor was justified in the case of 
theft but unjustified in the case of restitution. In this latter case, adults considered that the 
second possessor did nothing bad (F(1,9)=12.49, p<.01) and that the first possessor had no 
reason to be sad (F(1,9)=132.81, p<.001). For both questions they distinguished this condition 
from the keep condition (something bad: F(1,9)=73.67, p<.001; reason to be sad: 
F(1,9)=580.61, p<.001), for which all adults considered that the second possessor did 
something bad and that the first possessor had a reason to be sad. 3-year-olds made no 
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distinction between both conditions (something bad: F(1,17)=0.95, p>.1; reason to be sad: 
F(1,17)=0.007, p>.1). In the keep condition, they answered at chance to the questions though 
marginally considering that the second possessor did not do something bad (F(1,17)=3.88, 
p=.065) and the first possessor had a reason to be sad (F(1,17)=3.19, p=.092). In the return 
condition, they considered that the second possessor did not do something bad (F(1,17)=7.57, 
p<.02). Since they were at chance to the question “did [the first possessor] have a reason to be 
sad”, but marginally considering that he did have a reason (F(1,17)=3.15, p=.094), it is not 
clear that they could identify an unjustified emotion. This result could also be due to a 
difficulty in understanding the question. 
 
Comparison between Study 3 and Study 4 
 
When comparing the results of Study 3 and Study 4 on the measure of social/moral 
evaluation, a 4-way ANOVA of Age x Study x Order x Agent revealed a main effect of Age 
(F(1,50)=31.69, p<.001) and a marginal effect of Study (F(1,50)=3.31, p=.075). No 
interaction between Age and Study was found. A 3-way ANOVA of Study x Order x Agent 
revealed no main effect of Study for any of the two age groups (3-year-olds: F(1,33)=2.14, 
p=.15; adults: F(1,17)=1.98, p=.18)). 
We also compared the results of Study 3 and Study 4 for the measure of property rights 
attribution concerning the obligation of the second possessor to give the object back to the 
first possessor. We performed a GLM with Condition as within subject factor, and Study, 
Order, and Agent as between subjects factors. The results revealed no effect of Study for any 
of the two age groups (3-year-olds: F(1,33)=0.96, p=.94; adults: F(1,17)=0.36, p=.56). There 
was an interaction between Study and Condition for adults (F(1,17)=6.91, p<.02), but not for 
3-year-olds (F(1,33)=2.25, p=.14). 
 
Overall, Study 4 showed that 3-year-olds did not take into account the second 
possessor’s restitution behavior to evaluate him: they had no preference between the agent 
restituting the previously acquired object and the agent keeping the object. It seems that the 
agent keeping the object was not considered negatively despite the display of a negative 
emotion by the first possessor when the agent moved the object away from him. Adults 
considered the restitution behavior in their social and moral evaluations and preferred the 
agent reciprocating as opposed to the agent keeping the object. They preferred the agent 
restituting the object even if the first possessor displayed a negative emotion when receiving 
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the object back, because this emotion was unjustified. 3-year-olds and adults did not show a 
loan bias here, but attributed to the second possessors different property rights concerning the 
keeping of the object. Comparing Study 3 and Study 4, the results on social/moral evaluation 
are similar. Concerning property rights, in adults, we see that the presence of emotion had an 
effect on attribution of property rights to the agent who returned the object. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
Concerning social/moral evaluation, the results are similar to those obtained in Study 3 
(where there were no emotional cues). The presence of a negative emotion following the 
second possessor’s action of restitution or keeping does not influence participants’ 
evaluations. 3-year-olds have no preference between a character returning a previously 
acquired object to its first possessor and a character keeping the previously acquired object. 
Adults prefer the reciprocator compared to the keeper. Adults are sensitive to the legitimacy 
of the emotion. In the condition where the agent moves the object away from the protagonist, 
the negative emotion of the protagonist is perceived as justified, whereas in the condition 
where the agent returns the object to the protagonist the negative emotion of the protagonist is 
perceived as unjustified. The negative emotion in the return condition is not considered as a 
cue indicating that the transfer was a gift, but as a weird reaction of the protagonist. 
Importantly, the emotion displayed was the same in both conditions, to prevent the 
participants from basing their judgment on the emotional consequences alone, but forcing 
them to consider the presence of a transgression to form their evaluations. Despite the 
negative emotional consequence, 3-year-olds did not evaluate the second possessor’s act of 
keeping the object (apparently belonging to the first possessor) as a property transgression. 
We have seen in Study 2 (Chapter 2) that emotional cues help 3-year-olds to evaluate 
different modes of acquisition (distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate property 
transfers). A negative emotion following an illegitimate transfer helps young children to 
identify the transgression. Here, we observe that emotional cues do not seem to help young 
children to evaluate the absence of restitution after a legitimate transfer as a transgression, 
despite the presentation of the transfer as a loan (rather than a gift). It remains to be tested 
whether restitution behaviors (with or without the presence of emotional cues) can be 
distinguished through social/moral evaluation by 3-year-olds when those behaviors are 
following an illegitimate acquisition. However, our results of Study 1a showed that a 
character leaving with the object that was acquired by theft was not considered as worse than 
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a character leaving after gift-reception. This suggests that some cues may be necessary for 
young children to consider the absence of restitution as a transgression even when it follows 
an illegitimate transfer of property. It would be interesting to investigate what cues could help 
young children to evaluate this behavior as bad. Would begging of the first possessor help? 
According to Hook (1993), not returning an object to a first possessor who asks for it is 
considered as bad by 4-year-olds (the youngest age tested). Hamlin & Wynn (2011) have 
shown that 5-month-olds prefer a character returning a ball to its first possessor compared to a 
character keeping the ball when the first possessor expresses willingness to have it back. Our 
results did not confirm these findings. In Study 1b, we found that young children did not 
consider a thief who left with the ball requested by the first possessor as being worse than a 
character who gave the ball to the second possessor after his request. However, the act of 
begging in our situation was less evident than in the studies performed by Hook (1993) and 
Hamlin & Wynn (2011). Moreover, in Hamlin’s study, an implicit emotion (frustration) may 
have contributed to elicit infant’s evaluations (see discussion of Study 3). Thus begging 
seems to be an important cue when clearly presented, and it may be amplified by the presence 
of a negative emotion. It would be interesting to test whether young children would be able to 
evaluate the absence of restitution of an object to its first possessor as a property transgression 
when presented with both cues: the first possessor clearly asking for the object back, and 
being sad after the absence of restitution. This situation could be compared to a situation 
where the second possessor returns the object after the begging of the first possessor, who is 
then sad (which should be considered as unjustified). Also this former situation could be 
compared to a situation presenting a character that did not possess the object before 
displaying the same action of begging and the same negative emotion after to absence of 
restitution. 
 
Considering ownership, if the second possessor keeps the object definitively, then he is 
acting against property rules, which leads adults to blame him, but not 3-year-olds. How can 
we interpret the absence of 3-year-olds’ evaluation of restitution even in the presence of 
emotional cues? This result can be included in our model of young children’s evaluations 
based on harm detection instead of understanding of ownership (presented in Chapter 2). In 
the case of a legitimate transfer, the first possessor is deprived of the ball voluntarily, which 
could potentially legitimate the subsequent acts of the second possessor. Then the fact that the 
second possessor keeps the object may not be considered as harmful. There would be no 
negative action detected in the forward analysis to be amplified during the backward analysis 
- C3 - 
 148 
triggered by the negative emotional output. So, there would be no negative evaluation. In the 
case of return, there would be no negative evaluation either. So, when comparing both agents, 
there would be no preference (See Figure C3-8). The results of 3-year-olds could also be 
interpreted in terms of causality evaluation triggered by the negative emotion. In that case, 
only a backward evaluation would be performed, where both agents would be considered as 
causally responsible for the negative emotion (without considering whether the emotion is 
justified or not). Thus both agents would be blamed equally and no preference would emerge. 
If going at the beginning of the causal chain, then the protagonist would be blamed in both 
cases (See Figure C3-9). Considering this interpretation of a causal evaluation, our results do 
not allow us to validate our model of young children’s evaluations based on harm detection. 
Also, 3-year-olds may simply not engage in social and moral evaluation of restitution 
behaviors following a legitimate transfer of property, even in the presence of emotional cues. 
However, this hypothesis seems unlikely considering that Hamlin & Wynn (2011) have 
shown that already at 5 months of age infants do evaluate characters based on their restitution 
or absence of restitution of an object to its first possessor. 
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Figure C3-8. Hypothetical evaluation mechanism (of no-restitution and restitution of object to 
first possessor) based on harm recognition in young children (3-year-olds), before mature 
understanding of property rights. 
 
 
 
Figure C3-9. Hypothetical evaluation mechanism (of no-restitution and restitution of object to 
first possessor) based on causality detection in young children (3-year-olds), before mature 
understanding of property rights. 
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In Studies 3 and 4, our results suggest that children do not evaluate restitution behaviors 
before acquiring a mature understanding of property rights. In the next study, we investigate 
whether 5-year-olds, who have been seen to have a mature understanding of property rights 
(see Study 1; Blake & Harris, 2009), are able to evaluate second possessors on the basis of 
their restitution or not of an object to its first possessor. We did not find any effect of emotion 
in the evaluation of restitution in 3-year-olds (lacking comparative social/moral evaluation in 
both the non-emotional (Study 3) and emotional (Study 4) conditions) and adults (being close 
to ceiling already in the non-emotional condition (Study 3)). However, emotion could play a 
role in 5-year-olds evaluations, if they are not at ceiling. To test the role of emotion in 
children’s evaluations of restitution behaviors we performed an experiment where we varied 
(in minimal pairs) the presence of restitution (within subjects): no restitution vs. restitution, 
and the presence of the first possessor’s emotion (between subjects): no emotion vs. emotion. 
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4. Study 5: The role of emotional cues in five-year-olds’ evaluation of restitution 
- S5 - 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
We have seen in Study 1 (Chapter 2) that 5-year-olds have a mature understanding of 
property rights and that they are able to comparatively evaluate illegitimate and legitimate 
transfers. Here, we investigate whether 5-year-olds are also already sensitive to the presence 
or absence of restitution following a transfer that seems to be a loan, and whether their 
evaluations of restitution behaviors is modulated by the presence of emotional cues. 
As Studies 3 & 4, this study aimed at comparing characters on the basis of their 
restitution of an object to the first possessor: no restitution (keep condition) versus restitution 
(return condition). We investigated whether 5-year-olds’ social/moral evaluation of an agent 
restituting or not an object to its first possessor (probable owner) is modulated by the affect 
displayed by the first possessor during the interaction. As Study 2, we performed this study in 
a 2*2 factor design: presence of restitution (within subjects): no restitution (keep condition) 
vs. restitution (return condition), and presence of the first possessor’s emotion (between 
subjects): non-emotional condition vs. emotional condition (minimally adding emotions to the 
non-emotional condition). 
In each interaction, the last action of the second possessor (restitution or keeping of the 
previously acquired object) was immediately followed by either (between subjects) no 
reaction of the first possessor of the object (non-emotional condition) or the same negative 
emotion (sadness) displayed by the first possessor (emotional condition). The non-emotional 
condition and the emotional one only differ by the presence of emotion in the latter case. The 
stimuli of the emotional condition are the same than those used in Study 4; the stimuli of the 
non-emotional condition are minimally different (only removing the emotion), thus they are 
not exactly the same as those used in Study 3. Importantly, as we wanted to avoid the 
judgments being based only on the consequences and not on the action in itself, we equalized 
the outcome of the two presented situations: in the emotional condition, the same emotion of 
sadness was displayed in both situations. As the emotion displayed was the same whether the 
transfer was followed by restitution or not, emotion alone could not act as a cue to 
differentiate between the two agents. 
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4.2. Method 
 
Children and adults were presented with two non-verbal movie cartoons depicting a 
legitimate transfer of a ball between two characters, followed or not by the restitution of the 
ball by the second possessor to the first possessor, who either cried in both situations or did 
not react in both situations. 
 
Participants 
 
Forty 5-year-olds (21 girls; mean age: 70 months, 18 days; range: 63 months, 25 days to 
77 months, 20 days) were tested. Participants were French speakers. They were recruited 
either at their preschool and tested there, or from a database of parents who accepted to 
participate with their child in our studies and tested in our laboratory. Half of the participants 
were assigned to the non-emotional condition and half of them to the emotional condition. For 
each condition, participants were assigned randomly to one of the four experimental groups 
allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions of restitution (keep first 
or return first) and of the characters associated to a condition of restitution (agent 1 in keep 
condition or agent 2 in keep condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The disposition of the participants during testing and the material used to design the 
cartoons were the same as in the previous studies. Two characters were presented in each 
movie. At whole, four different characters were seen (as in Study 2): two protagonists 
corresponding to the first possessors (one in each cartoon: Mr. Yellow and Mr. Red) and two 
agents corresponding to the second possessors (one in each cartoon: Mr. Green and Mr. Blue). 
Mr. Yellow was always presented with Mr. Green, and Mr. Red with Mr. Blue. The agents 
were the characters to be evaluated by the participants. As in Study 4, Mr. Yellow was 
introduced because of the display of emotion in one of the conditions: the crying of the same 
protagonist to two different actions by the agents could reduce his credibility and thus 
diminish the legitimacy of crying in the keep condition. The sequence of events in each 
condition (see Figure C3-10) is described bellow, with the differences between both 
conditions of restitution in bold, and between both conditions of emotion in italic. 
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In the keep condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent keeps the ball by placing it on a rock behind him. 
 
In the non-emotional condition: 
6. The protagonist (without the ball) stays inexpressive. 
 
In the emotional condition (same as Study 4): 
6. The protagonist (without the ball) cries
C3-4
. 
 
In the return condition: 
1. The protagonist (1
st
 possessor) arrives with a ball, and the agent (2
nd
 possessor) 
arrives with empty hands. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
3. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent. 
4. The agent plays with the ball. 
5. The agent returns the ball to the protagonist. 
 
In the non-emotional condition: 
6. The protagonist (with the ball) stays inexpressive. 
 
In the emotional condition (same as Study 4): 
6. The protagonist (with the ball) cries. 
 
 
 
                                                
C3-4
 He shows a facial expression of sadness, and a verbal expression of distress. 
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 Keep Return 
 Non-emotional    /   Emotional 
 
Non-emotional   /   Emotional 
 
 
 
 
1. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
2. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
3. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
4. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
5. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
6. 
    
 
 
Figure C3-10. Images extracted from each of the cartoons in Study 5. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions of restitution. 
 
 
The different movements of the agent and of the protagonist were matched as much as 
possible between both movies. The movies were exactly the same at the beginning, only the 
last behavior of the agent differed between both movies. Considering the agent, both movies 
were the same as far as the first transfer was concerned and differed only at the very end 
Mmmmm
mmm… 
Mmmmm
mmm… 
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where both agents did not move in the same direction, but the amount of movement was the 
same. The amount of time the agent was present on screen and his orientation throughout the 
movie was exactly the same in both movies. Considering the protagonist, his movements and 
orientations upon the whole movie were matched as much as possible between both movies. 
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as in Study 4. The experimenter presented and named the 
four characters on the screen before playing the movies, and asking the questions (see Table 
C3-2). As in previous studies, participants’ social and moral preferences were measured and 
analyzed. Here, the same three questions as in Study 4 about the second possessor’s rights 
were asked: “[The second possessor] was he allowed to play with the ball?”, “[The second 
possessor] was he allowed to keep the ball?”, “[The second possessor] did he have to give the 
ball back to [the first possessor]?”. As the second possessor is not leaving with the ball in this 
study (as in Study 4) but only moving the ball away from the first possessor in one of the 
conditions, there was no question about the right to leave with the ball, but this question was 
replaced by the attribution of the right to keep the ball, which constitutes another formulation 
of the question about the obligation to give the ball back. Participants were also asked for 
each movie: “[The second possessor] did he do something good or something bad?”. In the 
emotional condition, participants were also asked a question concerning the justification of 
the first possessor’s emotion: “Did he have a reason to be sad?”. Finally, 5-year-olds’ 
comprehension of the situations was assessed through the questions: “Which one returned the 
ball?” and “Which one kept the ball?”. 
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Qi_eval (training): - Do you like him? - Is he a good guy? - Is he a bad guy? - Would you like to play with him? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
 
- Which one do you like? 
- Which one is the good guy? 
- Which one is the bad guy? 
- Whom would you like to play with? 
 
 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he allowed to 
play with the ball? 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] was he allowed to 
keep the ball? 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] did he have to give 
the ball back to [the first possessor]? 
 
 
Qi_eval_action_emotion 
(evaluation of action and emotion) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- [The 2
nd
 possessor] did he do something good or  
something bad? 
+ in the emotional condition only: 
     - [The 1
st
 possessor] did he have a reason to be sad? 
 
 
- Which one returned the ball? 
- Which one kept the ball? 
 
Table C3-2. Measures in Study 5. 
(see Appendix AC3-1 for the original version of the questions asked in French) 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Social/moral evaluation 
 
As in the previous studies, participants were instructed to make a choice between both 
characters for each question, even if their preference was not so strong. An evaluation index 
was computed from the answers to the comparative questionnaire. As in Studies 3 & 4, each 
answer was scored 1 if in favor of the reciprocator (i.e. the agent returning the ball to the first 
possessor) or in disfavor of the keeper (i.e. the agent not returning the ball but keeping it), -1 
if in favor of the keeper or in disfavor of the reciprocator, 0 if other (“both”, “none”) or 
absent. The four answers were averaged into an index between –1 and 1 for each subject. A 
positive index corresponds to a preference for the reciprocator over the keeper. Figure C3-11 
shows the mean evaluation index for the non-emotional and the emotional conditions. 
As preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, we did not include gender in 
further analyses. A 3-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Emotion x Order (keep first or 
return first) x Agent (Mr. Green or Mr. Blue as the keeper) revealed no main effect of 
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Emotion (F(1,32)=0.53, p=.47). The analysis revealed no interactions and no main effects of 
Order or Agent. Comparing the evaluation index to a chance score of 0 revealed that 5-year-
olds selected more the reciprocator as opposed to the keeper than would be expected by 
chance in both conditions (non-emotional: F(1,16)=12.93, p<.01; emotional: F(1,16)=21.45, 
p<.001). 
 
Figure C3-11. Social/moral evaluation by 5-year-old children of characters differing in their 
restitution behavior (no restitution vs. restitution), without (in white) or with (in black) 
emotion displayed by the first possessor, in Study 5. Answers were scored 1 if in favor of 
reciprocator, -1 if in favor of keeper, 0 if other or absent for each question. The figure shows the means of 
participants (and standard errors).  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 
 
Comprehension 
 
5-year-olds had a good understanding of the situations: they answered above chance to 
the comprehension questions in both conditions (non-emotional: F(1,16)=112.62, p<.001; 
emotional: F(1,16)=722.00, p<.001). All but six children answered correctly to both 
comprehension questions. 
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Property rights attribution 
 
We analyzed 5-year-olds’ attributions of property rights in particular to verify that 
restitution is important in their considerations of property transfers. This was assessed through 
the answers to the questions about the second possessor’s right to keep the object and his 
obligation to give it back to the first possessor. The answers to the question about the second 
possessor’s right to play with the ball gave us information about 5-year-olds’ understanding 
of the legitimacy of the transfer. We performed a General Linear Model with Restitution (i.e. 
presence or absence of restitution) as within-subject factor, and Emotion, Order and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, for three measures corresponding to the three questions. The results 
(see Figure C3-12) revealed an effect of Restitution (F(3,30)=8.06, p<.001) and of Emotion 
(F(3,30)=4.29, p<.02), and an interaction between Restitution and Emotion (F(3,30)=7.50, 
p=.001). There were no interactions with and no effects of Order or Agent. We then analyzed 
the data separately for the non-emotional and the emotional conditions. In the non-emotional 
condition, the results were similar for both conditions of restitution, i.e. there was no effect of 
Restitution (F(2,15)=1.87, p=.19). In the emotional condition, the results revealed an effect of 
Restitution (F(3,14)=7.28, p<.01). This effect was present for the questions about the second 
possessor’s right to keep the object (F(1,16)=18.38, p=.001) and obligation to give it back 
(F(1,16)=19.06, p<.001). When analyzing the results for each question, we see that 5-year-
olds considered the transfer as legitimate by according the right to play with the ball to the 
second possessor in all conditions (non-emotional: keep: F(1,16)=15.73, p=.001; return: 
F(1,16)=353.63, p<.001; emotional: keep: F(1,16)=10.29, p<.01; return: F(1,16)=4.77, 
p<.05). As far as the rights to keep the object are concerned, in the non-emotional condition, 
5-year-olds considered in both conditions of restitution that the second possessor is not 
allowed to keep the ball (keep: F(1,16)=79.35, p<.001; return: F(1,16)=56.15, p<.001) and 
has to return it to the first possessor (keep: F(1,16)=353.63, p<.001; return: F(1,16)= 353.63, 
p<.001). In the emotional condition, in the keep condition, 5-year-olds still consider that the 
second possessor should not keep the ball (F(1,16)=361.00, p<.001) and should return it to the 
first possessor (all participants answered “yes”). In the return condition, however, they are at 
chance for both questions (right to keep: F(1,16)=0.20, p=.66; obligation to give back: 
F(1,16)=0.24, p=.63). In fact, about half of the participants considered that the second 
possessor should return the ball despite the negative emotional reaction of the first possessor 
to the restitution, and about half the participants considered that the second possessor is not 
obliged to return the ball. In the absence of contradictory cues, restitution of the ball to the 
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first possessor is expected by almost all the participants, and even with contradictory 
emotional cues, still half of the participants considered that the second possessor should 
return the ball, showing a loan bias. The presence of emotion modulates 5-year-olds’ 
attributions of property rights. 
 
 
     5-year-olds 
     (n=20; 20) 
 
Figure C3-12. Attribution of property rights to second possessors by 5-year-old children, in 
Study 5. 
Rights attributed to the keeper (in black), and to the reciprocator (in white), for the non-emotional (left) and the 
emotional (right) conditions. Answers were scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if “no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. 
The figure shows the means of participants (and standard errors). 
* p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 
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Evaluation of action and emotion 
 
5-year-olds made the distinction between both conditions of restitution in their answers 
to the question “did [the second possessor] do something good or something bad” (non-
emotional: F(1,16)=22.17, p<.001; emotional: F(1,16)=38.37, p<.001), and to the question 
“did [the first possessor] have a reason to be sad” asked in the emotional condition 
(F(1,8)=6.78, p<.05; not all children answered to this question). In the case where the second 
possessor returned the ball, 5-year-olds considered that he did something good in both 
conditions of emotion (non-emotional: F(1,16)=31.02, p<.001; emotional: F(1,16)=8.33, 
p<.02). Children were at chance when asked whether the first possessor had a reason to be sad 
when he received the ball back (F(1,8)=1.36, p=.28>.1). There was no correlation between 
their answer to this latter question and their reversed answer to the question about the second 
possessor’s right to keep the ball (r=-.45, t(10)=-1.60, p=.14) and obligation to return the ball 
(r=.17, t(10)=0.55, p=.60). In the case where the second possessor kept the ball, 5-year-olds 
considered that he did something bad only in the emotional condition (non-emotional: 
F(1,16)=2.39, p=.14; emotional: F(1,16)=57.80, p<.001). There was a marginal effect of 
Emotion (F(1,32)=3.94, p=.056). Children also considered that the first possessor had a 
reason to be sad (F(1,8)=8.00, p<.05). There was a correlation between their answer to this 
latter question and their reversed answer to the question about the second possessor’s right to 
keep the ball (r=.67, t(10)=2.89, p<.02).  
Generally, considering both conditions of restitution, the presence of emotion led 
children to consider the action of the second possessor preceding the emotional display as 
more bad than in the absence of emotion (F(1,32)=5.16, p<.05). However, when considering 
each condition separately, this effect was present marginally only in the keep condition. Thus, 
the presence of emotion seems to lead to the amplification of the badness of the non-
restitution, which is considered as bad in the presence of emotion, but not in the absence of 
emotion. 
 
Overall, Study 5 showed that 5-year-olds considered the restitution behavior in their 
social and moral evaluations and preferred the agent reciprocating as opposed to the agent 
keeping the object. They showed this preference both in the non-emotional and the emotional 
conditions. They preferred the agent restituting the object even if the first possessor displayed 
a negative emotion when receiving the object back. Generally, 5-year-olds considered in their 
attributions of property rights that the second possessor should return the object to the first 
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possessor. However, the presence of emotion played a role in the attribution of property 
rights. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
Our results with 5-year-olds are similar to those obtained with adults in Studies 3 & 4. 
5-year-olds distinguish between a character keeping a previously acquired object and a 
character returning the previously acquired object to the first possessor of the object, and 
prefer the reciprocator compared to the keeper. They do so as well in the absence and in the 
presence of a negative emotion following the restitution behavior. Importantly, the emotion 
displayed was the same in both conditions. Thus participants were forced to consider the 
presence of a transgression, instead of basing their judgment on the emotional consequences 
alone. In the emotional condition, if children would rely only on the emotion, they would 
have no preference between both agents as the action of both agents leads to the crying of the 
protagonist. This shows that 5-year-olds are already sensitive to the legitimacy of the 
emotion. In the condition where the agent moves the object away from the protagonist (keep 
condition), the agent’s action is considered as bad, which is congruent with the negative 
emotion of the protagonist, however in the condition where the agent returns the object to the 
protagonist (return condition), the agent’s action is considered as good despite the negative 
emotion of the protagonist (which is not considered as justified). 
The presence of a negative emotion following the second possessor’s action of keeping 
or returning does not influence participants’ evaluations. However, emotion has a role in the 
attributions of property rights. Concerning the character keeping the object, children consider, 
already in the absence of a negative emotion, that he is not allowed to keep the object but has 
to return it to the first possessor, so the negative emotion confirming that the first possessor 
wants the object back does not change children’s attributions of rights. In the return condition, 
children also consider that the second possessor has to restitute the object when there is no 
negative emotion displayed by the first possessor. However, in the presence of a negative 
emotion following the restitution, half of the children consider that the second possessor 
should keep the object and not return it. So, they take into account the negative consequence 
of the restitution behavior to modify their attributions of property rights. However, the 
presence of the negative emotion does not override the default consideration that the second 
possessor should restitute the object to the first possessor as only half of the participants take 
the emotion into account in their attributions of property rights. The fact that the other half of 
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the children still consider that the second possessor should return the object is another 
indication that 5-year-olds do not base their evaluation of the situation on the emotional 
consequences alone but consider the whole situation.  
It is interesting to notice that there are two possible interpretations of the type of 
transfer being performed. Despite the negative emotion following restitution, half of 5-year-
olds still consider that the transfer is a loan. The behavior of the first possessor is probably 
considered as weird, even by those children attributing to the second possessor the right to 
keep the object, but it seems to induce some of them to change their interpretation of the 
transfer and consider it as a gift. 
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5. Summary 
 
In three studies we tested children’s and adult’s evaluation of characters returning or 
keeping a previously acquired object to its first possessor. We showed that 3-year-olds do not 
distinguish between a keeper and a reciprocator in their social/moral evaluation, despite their 
first possessor bias leading them to consider that an object should be returned to its first 
possessor. They also lack a comparative social/moral evaluation of restitution behaviors in the 
presence of emotional cues. 3-year-olds may have performed an evaluation based on harm 
detection or causal analysis, which led to attribute a similar valence to the two agents because 
harm was not detected following a legitimate transfer, or because both agents were causally 
responsible of the first possessor’s distress. In any case, they seem not to consider property 
rights in their social/moral evaluation. 
On the contrary, 5-year-olds evaluate restitution behaviors similarly to adults. They 
judge a character keeping a previously acquired object more negatively compared to a 
character returning the object to its first possessor. Importantly, 5-year-olds were able to 
recognize a transgression when the second possessor did not restitute the object to the first 
possessor even in the absence of a negative emotional reaction of the first possessor to the 
transgression. They also preferred the reciprocator when his action led to negative explicit 
emotional consequences being the same as those following the action of the keeper. This 
shows that children of this age do not base their evaluations on emotions alone. They judge 
the agents on their action in relation to property rights. Moreover, we showed that 5-year-olds 
(as adults) evaluate whether the distress of the first possessor is justified or not. 
We have showed that the presence of emotional cues did not influence children’s and 
adult’s social/moral evaluation. However, the presence of a negative emotion (displayed by 
the first possessor after the action of restitution or keeping performed by the second 
possessor) influenced 5-year-olds’ and adults’ property rights attributions. In particular, in the 
restitution condition, the presence of emotion changed the interpretation of the transfer for 
half of the participants, who considered that the second possessor does not have to return the 
object to the first possessor. Thus half of 5-year-olds and adults seem to consider the transfer 
as a gift in the presence of emotion, whereas they considered it as a loan in majority in the 
absence of emotion. In the next Chapter, we describe the different interpretations that 
participants had of all transfers presented in the previous studies, by analyzing more in detail 
their answers to the questions about property rights. 
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CHAPTER 4: Different interpretations of legitimate transfers deduced from 
attributions of property rights 
- C4 - 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We have already seen in the previous chapters that it is not obvious how a legitimate 
transfer is interpreted: as a gift or as a loan. On the basis of the answers to the questions about 
property rights (more particularly about the second possessor’s right to leave with the object 
and his obligation to give it back to the first possessor), we analyze here the participant’s 
interpretations of each of the legitimate transfers that we presented to them in our previous 
studies. 
 
 
2. Method of analysis 
 
2.1. Description of the situations 
 
We describe in Table C4-1 the details of the actions performed after the legitimate 
transfers presented in our five studies. We then consider the actions in terms of cues of 
attachment and renunciation, such as crying when separated from the object, or leaving 
voluntarily without the object, respectively. In Table C4-2, we describe the actions performed 
after the transfer in each situation highlighting the cues of attachment or renunciation. The 
situations are ordered here on the basis of the presence of these cues, according to the 
potential interpretations suggested by the cues: from loan (with cues of attachment) to gift 
(with cues of renunciation). 
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S1a  2nd possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
1
st
 possessor 
refuses to have 
the ball back 
 2
nd
 possessor 
leaves with the 
ball 
S1b  2nd possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
1
st
 possessor 
leaves 
 2
nd
 possessor 
leaves with the 
ball 
S2_nE 
 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
- - - 
S2_E 1st possessor 
cries 
 
2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
- - - 
S3_k 
(= S1a) 
 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
1
st
 possessor 
refuses to have 
the ball back 
 2
nd
 possessor 
leaves with the 
ball 
S3_r  2nd possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
1
st
 possessor 
refuses to have 
the ball back 
2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
2
nd
 possessor 
leaves without 
the ball 
S4_k 
 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
 2
nd
 possessor 
moves the ball 
away 
1
st
 possessor 
cries 
 
S4_r 
 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
 2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
1
st
 possessor 
cries 
 
S5_nE_k 
(~ S3_k) 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
 2
nd
 possessor 
moves the ball 
away 
- 
S5_nE_r 
(~ S3_r) 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
 2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
- 
S5_E_k 
(= S4_k) 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
 2
nd
 possessor 
moves the ball 
away 
1
st
 possessor 
cries 
 
S5_E_r 
(= S4_r) 
 2
nd
 possessor 
plays with the 
ball 
 2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
1
st
 possessor 
cries 
 
 
Table C4-1. Description of the actions performed after the transfer for each situation. 
S1a: legitimate condition of Study 1a. 
S1b: legitimate condition of Study 1b. 
S2_nE: legitimate condition in the non-emotional condition of Study 2. 
S2_E: legitimate condition in the emotional condition of Study 2. 
S3_k: keep condition of Study 3. 
S3_r: return condition of Study 3. 
S4_k: keep condition of Study 4. 
S4_r: return condition of Study 4. 
S5_nE_k: keep condition in the non-emotional condition of Study 5. 
S5_nE_r: return condition in the non-emotional condition of Study 5. 
S5_E_k: keep condition in the emotional condition of Study 5. 
S5_E_r: return condition in the emotional condition of Study 5. 
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S2_E 
 
Attachment 
of the 1
st
 
possessor to 
the ball, 
expressed 
through 
crying 
 - - - Loan 
S4_k 
/ S5_E_k 
 
 
   2
nd
 possessor 
moves the ball 
away 
Attachment of 
the 1
st
 possessor 
to the ball, 
expressed 
through crying 
baseline 
 
S2_nE 
 
  - - - 
baseline S5_nE_r 
(5yo) 
   2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
- 
baseline S5_nE_k 
(5yo) 
   2
nd
 possessor 
moves the ball 
away 
- 
 S3_r 
(3yo & adults) 
  Renunciation of the 1
st
 
possessor to the ball by 
refusing to have it back 
2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
 
2
nd
 possessor 
leaves without 
the ball 
 S3_k 
(3yo & adults) 
 
  Renunciation of the 1
st
 
possessor to the ball by 
refusing to have it back 
 2
nd
 possessor 
leaves with the 
ball 
S1a   Renunciation of the 1st 
possessor to the ball by 
refusing to have it back 
 2
nd
 possessor 
leaves with the 
ball 
S4_r 
/ S5_E_r 
 
 
   2
nd
 possessor 
returns the ball 
Renunciation of 
the 1
st
 possessor 
to the ball, 
expressed by 
crying when 
receiving it back 
C4-1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gift 
S1b 
(adults) 
  Renunciation of the 1
st
 
possessor to the ball by 
leaving 
- - 
 
 
Table C4-2. Description of the actions performed after the transfer for each situation, with 
their meaning in terms of cues of attachment (leading to a potential interpretation of the 
transfer as a loan) or renunciation to the object (leading to a potential interpretation of the 
transfer as a gift), and ordered accordingly. 
                                                
C4-1
 Can also be seen as second possessor’s inappropriate behavior highlighted by 1st possessor’s crying. 
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Baseline 
 
! From the descriptions of the situations in Table C4-1 and Table C4-2, we can notice 
that S2_nE corresponds to a baseline. There are no cues of “attachment” neither 
“renunciation” of the first possessor to the ball. Thus this situation should give us the 
interpretation by default that participants have from a legitimate transfer. We suppose that it is 
a loan, such as we intended to present the situation when no cues were added. ! S5_nE_r and 
S5_nE_k are also baselines, as they include no cues of attachment or renunciation. The other 
situations can be described in terms of attachment or renunciation, and thus the interpretation 
of the transfer could be shifted respectively either towards a loan or towards a gift. 
 
Shift towards a loan 
 
! In S4_k (/S5_E_k), the first possessor cries when the second possessor moves the ball 
away from him, which could manifest an attachment to the object or a sign that the second 
possessor’s behavior is inappropriate. It could lead people to interpret the transfer as a loan. ! 
In S2_E, the first possessor cries just after the transfer of the ball, which could be considered 
as  an attachment to the object or as a weird behavior, but in any case this act could reinforce 
the interpretation of the transfer as being a loan. 
 
Shift towards a gift 
 
! On the contrary, the other situations present cues of the first possessor’s renunciation 
to the ball, which could shift the default interpretation towards an interpretation of the transfer 
as a gift. In S3_r and S3_k, the first possessor refuses to have the ball back by moving away 
when the second possessor approaches to return it, which suggests that it is wrong to return 
the ball, and that the transfer was a gift. However, in S3_r, the second possessor insists, and 
the first possessor accepts to take the ball back. This could be confusing and participants may 
then disregard the renunciation cue and still consider the transfer to be a loan in this situation, 
as the first possessor is seen retrieving the ball. !  In S3_k, the second possessor does not 
insist and he does not return the ball after the refusal of the first possessor to have it back. 
Thus, here, participants may consider the renunciation cue because the second possessor 
considered it. But as this situation is compared to S3_r, where the second possessor manages 
to return the ball despite the first possessor’s sign of unwillingness to retrieve it, participants 
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may consider that the second possessor in S3_k should have insisted if the transfer was a loan. 
Thus, according to the participants, the transfer could still be seen as a loan. For 5-year-olds, 
the corresponding situations are S5_nE_r and S5_nE_k, but with no cues of renunciation, so, 
as said above, we consider these two situations as baselines. The transfers may be considered 
as loans. ! S1a corresponds to the same situation than S3_k, but was not compared to the 
same condition (S1a was compared to theft and S3_k to restitution). Thus, we present 
separately these two cases. In S1a, participants may consider the renunciation cue more 
strongly as this situation is not compared to a situation where this cue is disregarded. ! In 
S4_r (/S5_E_r), the first possessor cries when the second possessor gives him the ball back. 
This behavior would seem weird if one considers the transfer to be a loan. To be explained, it 
may shift the interpretation towards a gift. ! In the previous situations with a renunciation 
cue, the first possessor nonetheless stays in front of the second possessor. So the second 
possessor still can (and does it in some situations) return the ball to him. The first possessor 
seems to want the second possessor to conserve the ball for the moment, but the second 
possessor might not be allowed to conserve the ball definitively as the first possessor stays 
looking at him and potentially controlling his use of the ball. On the contrary, in S1b, the first 
possessor leaves the place, letting the ball in the second possessor’s hands. So the first 
possessor cannot even intend to return the object. This behavior consisting in leaving could be 
a strong cue of renunciation leading the participants to consider that the transfer was a gift. 
 
2.2. Interpretations of the situations 
 
To determine whether participants considered the transfer as being a loan or a gift, we 
looked at their answers to the questions about the rights to keep the object. Table C4-3 
presents the interpretations attributed to participants depending on their answers to the 
questions. For studies S1a, S1b, S2_nE, S2_E, S3_k and S3_r (first set of studies), these 
questions were: 
- “[The second possessor] was/is he allowed to leave with the ball?” 
- “[The second possessor] did/does he have to give the ball back to [the first possessor]?” 
For studies S4_k, S4_r, S5_nE_k, S5_nE_r, S5_E_k, S5_E_r (second set of studies), the 
questions were: 
- “[The second possessor] was he allowed to keep the ball?” 
- “[The second possessor] did he have to give the ball back to [the first possessor]?” 
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Obligation to Give the ball back  
yes no - 
yes Loan Gift 
 
other 
no Loan 
 
other 
(incoherence) 
other 
 
Right to Leave 
with the ball 
- other other other 
a. 
 
 
Obligation to Give the ball back  
yes no - 
yes other 
(incoherence) 
Gift 
 
other 
no Loan 
 
other 
(incoherence) 
other 
 
Right to Keep 
with the ball 
- other other other 
b. 
 
Table C4-3. Interpretations of the situations presenting a legitimate transfer of property. 
a. In studies 1, 2 & 3, we consider mainly the answers to the question about the second possessor’s obligation 
to give the ball back to the first possessor, but use the question about his right to leave with the ball to 
control for random answers (producing incoherence). 
b. In studies 4 & 5, we used two formulations of the same question (about the second possessor’s right to keep 
the ball, and his obligation to give it back to the first possessor) to better control for random answers 
(producing incoherence). 
 
For the first set of studies, we did not distinguish between various interpretations of loan 
on the basis of the answers to the first question (about the right to leave with the object) (but 
see Appendix C4-1 for more details, with a distinction between short term loan and long term 
loan). Nevertheless, we used the answers to the first question in order to take into account 
possible noise in the responses and particularly incoherent answers (see Table C4-3a). Indeed, 
answering “no” to the question about the obligation to give the ball back was not sufficient to 
consider the transfer as a gift. To consider that a participant sees the transfer as a gift, he has 
also to answer that the second possessor is allowed to leave with the ball. For the second set 
of studies, the two questions correspond in fact to two formulations of the same question. 
Thus, we considered as coherent only the answers that correspond to the same attribution of 
rights/duties in both questions (see Table C4-3b). If we would consider only the answers to 
the question about the obligation to give the ball back, we would integrate a proportion of 
noise in our results. 
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To summarize (see Table C4-3), adults’ answers were distributed in three categories 
depicting the two different interpretations of the situations (loan and gift) and the case of an 
incoherent or incomplete response. For the first set of studies, if a subject answered “yes the 
second possessor had/has to give the ball back to the first possessor”, and answered “yes” or 
“no” to the question about the second possessor’s right to leave with the ball, his 
interpretation of the situation was coded as a “loan”. If a subject answered “no the second 
possessor did/does not have to give the ball back” and previously answered “yes he could/can 
leave with the ball”, his interpretation was coded as “gift”. Finally, if a subject answered “no 
he did/does not have to give the ball back” but previously answered “no he could not/cannot 
leave with the ball”, or if he did not answer “yes” or “no” to one of the questions, his response 
was coded as “other”. For the second set of studies, if a subject answered “yes the second 
possessor had to give the ball back to the first possessor”, and “no he was not allowed to keep 
the ball”, his interpretation of the situation was coded as a “loan”. If a subject answered “no 
the second possessor did not have to give the ball back to the first possessor ” and “yes he was 
allowed to keep the ball”, his interpretation was coded as “gift”. All other combinations of 
answers were coded as “other”. 
 
We present now the results of the interpretations of the transfers for each age group and 
each situation (see Figure C4-1). For adults, in Appendix C4-2, we also present the results of 
their answers to the explicit question “Did [the first possessor] give or lend the ball to [the 
second possessor]?”. 
 
- C4 - 
 172 
3. Results and discussions 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Figure C4-1. Proportion of participants of each age answering according to each interpretation 
of the transfer (gift, other, loan) for each situation (each legitimate condition of our previous 
studies). 
          Loan 
(attachment cues) 
Gift 
(restitution cues) 
baseline 
Loan Gift baseline 
Loan Gift baseline 
Adults 
5-year-olds 
3-year-olds 
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3.1. Adults 
 
! In the default situation with no cues of attachment or renunciation (S2_nE), 
representing the baseline, all participants interpreted the transfer as a loan. When there are no 
cues about the type of transfer being performed, the transfer is considered by default to be a 
loan. As participants are at ceiling interpreting the transfer as a loan in the baseline, we cannot 
see the effects of cues hypothesized to shift the interpretation towards a clear loan. 
! We had such “loan cues” in two situations. The first possessor manifested a sign of 
attachment to the object by displaying a negative emotion when the second possessor moved 
the object far from him (S4_k), the majority of participants considered the transfer to be a 
loan (92%), only 1 participant (8%) considered it to be a gift. ! When adding cues of 
attachment of the first possessor towards the object by displaying a negative emotional 
reaction of the first possessor right after the transfer  (S2_E), the only coherent interpretation 
of the situation corresponds to a loan (92% loan, 8% other). In these two situations, the 
interpretation of the transfer as a loan is the only significant interpretation, as in the default 
situation. 
! We also presented to the participants several situations with cues intended to shift the 
interpretation towards a gift. When adding cues showing that the first possessor abandon the 
object, the proportion of participants interpreting the transfer as a loan decreased and the 
proportion of participants interpreting the transfer as a gift increased. A cue of renunciation 
that was presented in our stimuli was the refusal of the first possessor to have the object back 
when the second possessor approached to return it. In one situation (S3_r), the second 
possessor nevertheless managed to restitute the object by insisting to return it. Then the 
participants may not be sure if the refusal of the first possessor to retrieve the object was 
really a renunciation to the object, this may be ambiguous. The majority of participants still 
considered the transfer to be a loan (83%). The remaining participants (17%) considered the 
transfer to be a gift despite the restitution. These latter participants probably took into account 
the sign of renunciation to the object by the first possessor. ! In the compared situation, 
where the second possessor kept the object without insistence after the refusal of the first 
possessor to have the object back (S3_k), the same proportion of participants considered the 
transfer to be a loan (83%). Despite the absence of restitution (and the cue of renunciation), 
the transfer was considered to be a gift only by a minority of participants (17%). This could 
be due to the fact that in the compared condition (S3_r) the second possessor managed to 
return the object, and thus participants may consider that the second possessor in the 
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condition here (S3_k) should have insisted to return the object because the transfer was a loan 
according to them. ! When this same transfer was compared to theft (S1a), the proportion of 
participants considering the transfer as a loan decreased (67%). Still the majority of 
participants considered the transfer to be a loan, but the number of participants considering 
that it was a gift increased (25%). Comparing these two latter situations (S1a & S3_k) we can 
notice the importance of context (i.e. of the contrasted situation). ! Another way to signify 
renunciation of the first possessor to the object was to display negative emotion when the 
second possessor wanted to return the object (S4_r). This sign of renunciation was perceived 
more strongly than the refusal to have the object back, maybe because of the emotional 
content of this cue. Half of the participants giving a coherent response considered the transfer 
to be a gift (46%), and half of them considered it to be a loan (46%). ! In the most obvious 
case of renunciation to an object, the first possessor left the place of interaction letting the 
object to the second possessor (S1b). Indeed, in the other situations of non emotional signs of 
renunciation, i.e. when renunciation was shown by refusal to have the object back, the first 
possessor was seen as wanting the second possessor to keep the ball for the moment, but one 
does not know if the second possessor could keep it definitively as the first possessor stayed 
there to potentially control the second possessor’s use of the object. Here, the second 
possessor had no option to restitute the object. In this situation, half of the participants (50%) 
interpreted the transfer as a gift, the other half (50%) interpreted it as a loan. This corresponds 
to the situation with the most interpretations of the transfer as a gift. We can notice however 
that only 50% of the participants considered the transfer to be a gift when presented with the 
departure of the first possessor abandoning the second possessor with the object. This shows 
the difficulty to present a transfer as a gift. It seems unnatural to consider a property transfer 
to be a gift. 
 
3.2. Five-year-olds 
 
! To 5-year-olds we did not present the same baseline situation as to 3-year-olds and 
adults (S2_nE). The baseline situations for this age group are the non-emotional situations of 
Study 5 comparing keeping and restitution (S5_nE_r and S5_nE_k), as they did not include 
cues of attachment or renunciation of the first possessor to the object. Alternatively, in 
S5_nE_r, the restitution could be seen as a cue showing that the transfer was a loan. In 
S5_nE_k, the absence of reaction of the first possessor to the second possessor’s keeping of 
the ball could be seen as a cue showing that the transfer was a gift. However, as the transfer 
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was the same in both situations, and in the absence of other cues allowing the identification of 
its nature, it seems improbable that participants would give two distinct interpretations to it. 
The results show that the majority of children considered the transfer to be a loan in both 
situations (90% of participants in S5_nE_r, 95% in S5_nE_k). This interpretation was the 
only coherent or complete response. 
! In the situation showing that the first possessor was attached to the object because he 
was sad when the second possessor kept it (S5_E_k), 5-year-olds correctly interpreted the 
transfer to be a loan (95% of the participants had this interpretation). 
! In the situation where the first possessor manifested renunciation to the object by 
refusing the restitution (S1a), the majority of children still considered the transfer to be a loan 
(70 %). However, similarly to adults, an important proportion of 5-year-olds (25%) 
considered the situation to be a gift. ! In the other situation with cues of renunciation 
presented to 5-year-olds, where the first possessor cried after the restitution (S5_E_r), 
similarly to adults, about half of the participants who gave a complete or coherent answer 
considered the transfer to be a loan (40%) and about half of them considered it to be a gift 
(35%). 
 
Generally, 5-year-olds have similar results than adults. For both adults and 5-year-olds, 
the proportion of participants considering the transfer to be a gift reaches 25% in a situation 
with “non-ambiguous” cues of renunciation (S1a), and corresponds to half of the participants 
giving coherent or complete answers in a situation showing a negative consequence to the 
restitution (S4_r/S5_E_r). 
 
3.3. Three-year-olds 
 
In the baseline situation (S2_nE), 3-year-olds, as adults, seemed to consider as a 
majority that the transfer was a loan (80%). However, a great number of 3-year-olds answered 
randomly (20%). In all situations, part of the young children gave random answers. With the 
exception of two situations (S4_k and S4_r), 3-year-olds seemed to consider as a majority the 
transfer to be a loan (75% in S2_E, 80% in S3_r, 75% in S3_k, 68% in S1a). In the situations 
with a display of emotion following the absence of restitution (S4_k) or the restitution (S4_r), 
a great percentage of children gave random answers, which suggests that 3-year-olds did not 
understand well these situations. Answers corresponding to an interpretation of the transfer as 
a loan were nonetheless more important (48% in S4_k and 57% in S4_r) than answers 
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corresponding to an interpretation of the transfer as a gift (14% in S4_k and 5% in S4_r). In 
almost all situations, some children seemed to consider the transfer as a gift, but this response 
was always under 25% and in most of the situations below the percentage of random answers. 
So we cannot consider that 3-year-olds have a notion of gift. Generally, irrespective of the 
presence of cues of renunciation to the object by the first possessor, 3-year-olds seemed to 
consider a transfer to be a loan. In fact, this consideration may arise from their first possessor 
bias (which was discussed in Study 3). Thus 3-year-olds may not really have an 
understanding of what is a loan. 
 
 
4. General discussion 
 
Our analyses showed that people consider by default a property transfer to be a loan. 
This interpretation was present in the responses of 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds and adults. We 
need to be careful when saying that all participants answering that the second possessor 
should return the ball to the first possessor considered the transfer to be a loan. Indeed, 
considering that the first possessor should retrieve the ball could come from a first possessor 
bias, and not from a mature understanding of different types of transfers. Blake & Harris 
(2009), comparing attributions of property rights to recipients of legitimate and illegitimate 
transfers, distinguished between a first possessor bias and a loan bias. They considered that 
children had a loan bias if they said, for both recipients, that the second possessor could take 
the object home but should return it to the first possessor. We can say that this interpretation 
consists in a long term bias. Blake & Harris (2009) considered that children had a first 
possessor bias if they answered in favor of the first possessor to five of the six asked 
questions (combining the questions about the legitimate and illegitimate recipients). In their 
attribution of biases to children, Blake & Harris considered both conditions of transfer; they 
did not analyze the situations separately. Thus, we cannot directly compare our results to 
theirs. 
We investigated the effects of various cues on the interpretation of a property transfer. 
The effect of cues of attachment of the first possessor to the object, which should lead to 
consider the transfer as a loan, could not be seen because the default interpretation of a 
property transfer is already a loan and this interpretation is shared by almost all the 
participants (in particular by all the adults). Participants consider the transfer to be a loan even 
if the first possessor does not assess his rights over the object. Indeed, when the first 
possessor lets the second possessor leave with the ball without any reaction (S5_nE_k), 
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participants nevertheless consider the transfer to be a loan. Moreover, this interpretation 
persists even in the presence of contradictory cues. When the first possessor is refusing to 
retrieve the object, participants seem reluctant to take into account this behavior, and still 
consider as a majority that the transfer was a loan. The cues of renunciation seem not very 
convincing. Only when the first possessor’s refusal to retrieve the object was manifested more 
strongly, by crying after restitution, or by leaving and abandoning the object in the hands of 
the second possessor, the percentage of 5-year-olds or/and adults considering the transfer to 
be a gift reached the level of participants considering it as a loan. It has been shown that it is 
difficult for young children to accept that a first possessor relinquishes rights over the object 
(Kim & Kalish, 2009). Our results suggest that adults also consider that the first possessor 
keeps rights over the object. There may be an exception when an abandoned object is of a 
natural kind (Beggan & Brown, 1994). 
Generally, it seems difficult to conceive that a person abandons an object. Previous 
research has shown that it is difficult to present a situation to children that will be interpreted 
as a gift. Even 5-year-olds do not accept a complete transfer of ownership without being 
presented with a particular situation with strong cues indicating that the transfer is a gift: the 
object being said to be “given”, presented as a wrapped gift, in the context of a birthday party 
(Blake & Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008). The analyses of our studies show that it is 
difficult to represent a gift in a visual way even for adults. We wanted to indicate that a 
transfer was a gift with some cues presented after the transfer. We tried to represent the fact 
that the first possessor did not want the object back, and thus that the transfer was a gift, with 
cues such as moving away from the object or crying when receiving the object back, but a 
great proportion of adults still considered the transfer to be a loan in these situations. One can 
wonder what could be a clear (but non-verbal) sign of renunciation to the object. Another 
possible cue to test would be a positive emotion (happiness) of the first possessor when the 
second possessor leaves with the object. A strong contrast would be to present to participants 
a first possessor who is sad when receiving the object back and happy when seeing the other 
leaving with the object. This could lead participants to interpret the transfer as a gift a 
posteriori. However, the question of how to signify a gift at the very moment of the transfer 
(and not afterwards) remains. We avoided using cues such as a wrapped gift or a context of a 
birthday party because of their cultural dependence. Is there another way to show a gift? The 
characteristics of the transferred object, of the giver, and the context of transfer should be 
explored. Table C4-4 presents a summary of cues potentially influencing the interpretation of 
the nature of a property transfer. 
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 Loan Gift 
clear (?) begging for the 
object back 
clear (?) refusal to have 
the object back 
Cues after transfer 
1
st
 possessor happy if 
receives object back, 
sad if other keeps it 
1
st
 possessor sad if 
receives object back, 
happy if other keeps it 
previously used 
 
wrapped 
 
Type of transferred object 
artifact natural kind 
(special case for food?) 
Total number of objects available 
when one object is transferred 
one many 
Hierarchy between participants of 
transfer 
same level different level 
Context play ceremony 
(birthday, marriage) 
 
but which non-culturally-
dependent context? 
Presence or absence of reception 
of another object in return for the 
transferred object 
no reciprocity 
(unidirectional transfer) 
reciprocity (exchange) 
 
Table C4-4. Hypothetical cues indicating that the transfer of an object is a loan or a gift. 
 
As already discussed for a wrapped object, the kind of object being transferred may 
change the interpretation of the type of transfer being performed. For example, the transfer of 
a natural kind of object, such as a piece of wood or a stone, and the transfer of food, could be 
more easily seen as definitive transfers (see Neary et al., 2012, on inferences whether artifacts 
and natural kinds are owned). Also, we suggest that the transfer of an object of which the 
giver has several exemplars (compared to only one) could be considered as a definitive 
transfer. This latter characteristic of the object (as being part of a larger set of objects) could 
be seen as a characteristic of the giver as being wealthy. It would be interesting to investigate 
whether people consider more easily as a gift a transfer from a rich character to a poor one, or 
the contrary (see Rochat, 2009b, on attribution of ownership to wealthy and poor characters in 
different cultures). Moreover, we could investigate transfers between characters at a different 
level in a hierarchy. We hypothesize that a transfer to someone higher in the hierarchy would 
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be considered as a gift. It may also be the case for a transfer to someone lower in the 
hierarchy. Thus the only difference in hierarchy would lead to consider a transfer between 
two characters as definitive irrespective of the direction of the transfer. Furthermore, as 
already said, a transfer could be seen as definitive when it appears in a particular context. We 
should explore which non-culturally-dependent context would allow considering a transfer as 
a gift. To conclude, it is interesting to investigate when a transfer is seen as a gift, but we 
should first wonder why it seems so difficult to show giving in the absence of linguistic cues. 
The loan bias expressed by our participants may be coming from our stimuli that lack typical 
features of gifts, or facial expressions or specific gestures characteristic of gift-giving, but it 
may also be a real bias indicating that giving is not a “natural” situation and that there is 
expectation of some kind of reciprocity. To test this hypothesis, we could finally present to 
participants the transfer of an object in the context of an exchange, with reception of another 
object in return for the transferred object. Indeed, in some cultures, reciprocity (sooner or 
later) after an object transfer is very important and controlled (Mauss, 1952/1967; 
Malinowski, 1932). 
 
 
5. Summary 
 
The analysis of the responses to property questions revealed that across our eight 
situations with a legitimate transfer, adults and both 3- and 5-year-old children predominantly 
consider that when a character gives an object to another, this latter should then return the 
object to the first possessor. This response is modulated in adults and 5-year-olds by cues 
indicating that the first possessor does not want to have his possession back. Such a 
modulation is not clearly present in 3-year-olds. This suggests the interpretation that adults 
and 5-year-olds consider by default the object transfer in our movie cartoons as a form of 
temporary “loan”, whereas in 3-year-olds the responses may be driven by a more rudimentary 
form of first possessor bias (without a clear understanding of the distinction between loan and 
permanent transfer). To conclude, we discussed several cues that could possibly lead the 
interpretation of a property transfer towards a gift (in comparison to cues leading to consider 
the transfer as being a loan). Without using these cues to show gifts, we nonetheless tried to 
present clearer transfers in our next studies. In the next chapter, we investigate the 
understanding of the previous studied contrasts (illegitimate vs. legitimate acquisition, and 
restitution vs. absence of restitution) by younger toddlers and infants, using an implicit 
measure.
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CHAPTER 5: Toddlers’ and infant’s evaluations of property transfers – Methodological 
issues in toddlers’ and infants’ testing 
- C5 - 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters we investigated children’s explicit understanding of property 
transfers in terms of rights, and through their evaluation of agents involved in the transfers. 
However, children’s evaluations were measured through a verbal response. A non-verbal 
measure of children’s preferences would be more indicative of their implicit evaluation and 
understanding of the situations. Also, it would enable to study the development of evaluation 
of property transfers in preverbal infants. In Chapter 1 we have seen that children seem to 
have an earlier understanding of ownership transgressions when their evaluations are 
measured implicitly. Here we test children’s evaluations of property transfers with a novel 
methodology assessing better their implicit processing of the situations. We also test younger 
children than in our previous studies: 24-, 18-, and 5-month-olds. 
 
 
- C5 - 
 182 
2. Toddlers’ social evaluations of illegitimate and legitimate property acquirers 
 
2.1. Study 6: Two-year-olds’ social preferences between a thief and a legitimate 
recipient in the absence of emotional cues 
- S6 - 
 
As Study 1a, this study aimed at comparing characters based on their mode of 
acquisition of an object: illegitimate (theft) versus legitimate (legitimate reception). In this 
study, we used more dynamic stimuli, measured a more implicit response and tested younger 
children than in the studies presented in the previous chapters. Children were presented with 
two non-verbal movies depicting the transfer of a ball between two puppets. One movie 
represented an agent stealing a ball from another character. In the other movie, the agent was 
receiving the ball from the other character. 
 
2.1.1. Method 
 
Participants 
 
Nineteen 2-year-olds (10 girls; mean age 25 months, 5 days; range: 24;1 to 26;9) were 
tested. Three additional children were tested but excluded due to absence of response (2 
children) or of clarity of choice (1 child). Children were French speakers. They were recruited 
from a database of parents who accepted to participate with their child in our studies; they 
were tested in our laboratory. Children were assigned randomly to one of the four 
experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions 
(theft first or legitimate reception first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 
in theft or agent 2 in theft). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
Children sat on their parent’s lap at a table in front of a large screen on which were 
projected the movies. The dimension of the screen was such that the characters seen on the 
screen had almost the same dimension than the real puppets (22 cm) used to make the movies, 
and presented to the child before and after the movies. 
As in all our previous studies, children were presented with movies depicting various 
interactions between two characters. Contrary to our previous studies, the movies used with  
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2-year-olds were not animated cartoons constructed with a computer software, but movies of 
puppet shows performed by hand by the experimenter. The use of hand puppets allowed us to 
perform biological motions, which were more realistic than the movements in the previously 
used animations. The movements were more natural, respecting the dynamics of the actions 
(e.g. quick movements during fight between the thief and the protagonist; a slow movement 
when the protagonist is approaching the agent to initiate contact), although trying to minimize 
the differences between the two compared actions. The new movies were also shorter than the 
previous animated cartoons in order to avoid loosing children’s attention during the movie. 
They lasted 21 seconds. 
In this study, three different characters were seen: a protagonist (the same in both 
cartoons: Pig) and two agents (one in each cartoon). The agents were a wolf and a hedgehog, 
but were not named at any time during the study. Only the protagonist was named: “Pig”. The 
protagonist was the character first possessing the object. The agents were the characters 
acquiring the object either by theft or by legitimate reception, so they also corresponded to the 
second possessors. These two characters were those to be evaluated by the participants. The 
sequence of events in each condition (see Figure C5-1) is described bellow, with the 
differences between both conditions in bold. 
At the beginning of each movie, two characters are present on the screen, the 
protagonist with a ball and one agent without any ball, both facing forward to the child. 
 
In the theft condition: 
1. The protagonist plays with the ball
C5-1
, and then keeps it in his hands. 
2. The agent steals the ball from the protagonist’s hands 
(The agent comes close to the protagonist, fights with him, takes the ball, and comes back to his 
initial location). 
3. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent. 
4. The agent leaves with the ball. 
5. The protagonist stays without the ball (and then vanishes). 
 
                                                
C5-1
 The way the protagonist plays with the ball is identical to the play presented to infants by Hamlin & Wynn, 
2011. The protagonist jumps up and down twice, and on his third jump he drops and retrieves the ball. This 
behavior is repeated three times. 
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In the legitimate reception condition: 
1. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
2. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent 
(The protagonist steps towards the agent, pats on his shoulder, gives the ball to him, and comes 
back to his initial location). 
3. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent. 
4. The agent leaves with the ball. 
5. The protagonist stays without the ball (and then vanishes). 
 
We can notice that contrary to the previous studies, here the agent does not play with 
the ball after the transfer. The total amount of time each agent was present on the screen was 
matched between the two movies. The orientations of the characters were matched as much as 
possible between the movies. However, the actions were not totally matched in intensity to be 
more realistic. 
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 Theft Legitimate reception 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
  
   
Figure C5-1. Images extracted from each of the movies in Study 6. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions. 
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Procedure 
 
On the table, at a distance, the experimenter (being between the table and the screen) 
first presented in real to the child the puppets representing the two agents, and said, “Look, 
these are two little animals”. Then the experimenter presented closer to the child the 
protagonist puppet Pig and asked the child to grab it. This was done to train the child to grab a 
real puppet, as this behavior is necessary for our measure. Pig and then together the two 
animals representing the agents were presented on the screen, and the experimenter pointed 
out to the child that these are the same characters than the real puppets. Then, the 
experimenter asked the parent to close his eyes, he hid below the table, and the movies began. 
The parent and the experimenter did not see the movies, not knowing in which experimental 
group was the child (but had opened eyes during the test). Compared to the previous studies 
with 3- and 5-year-olds, the movies were each presented three times in alternation before test. 
So, 2-year-olds saw the movies once more than 3- and 5-year-olds before giving their 
preference between the two agents. After the three presentations of the movies, both agents 
appeared on the screen and then for real in front of the child who was asked to choose one of 
them
C5-2
. The choice of a puppet represents a measure of the child’s social preference between 
the two agents. Figure C5-2 presents a summary of the procedure. 
 
• Real - Presentation of the 3 puppets + Training to grab 
• Screen - Presentation of the puppets 
• Screen - Playing of the movies  
o the two agents 
o movie 1 - movie 2 - movie 1 - movie 2 - movie 1 - movie 2 
o the two agents 
• Real - Test: choice between the two agent puppets 
 
Figure C5-2. Procedure in Study 6. 
 
 
 
                                                
C5-2
 At the end, the child was given a ball and asked to give it to one of the agents as a gift. We do not present 
the results of this measure; the analyses revealed no significant results. 
- S6 - 
 187 
2.1.2. Results & Discussion 
 
Measures 
 
We measured children’s attitudes towards the agents. Children were asked to choose 
between the two puppets. However, their choice was not always straightforward. Thus, we 
examined different measures. We coded child’s choice (i.e. the first puppet actually grabbed). 
If the child’s first reaching behavior led to the taking of the puppet, we considered that he 
made a clear choice. We also coded the delay between the presentation of the puppets close to 
the child and the initiation of the reach leading to grab a puppet. We deduced measures of 
choice initiated in less than 10 seconds (including choice initiated before the presentation of 
the puppets close to the child) and of choice initiated between 0 and 10 seconds (i.e. choice 
initiated after the presentation of the puppets close to the child but within 10 seconds), and 
measures of clear choice initiated in less than 10 seconds and of clear choice initiated 
between 0 and 10 seconds. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
Number and percentage of children who 
• chose slowly (i.e. chose in more than 10 sec) 1/19 5% 
• anticipated 5 26% 
• intended to take both puppets at the same time 1   5% 
• intended to take both puppets one after the other 6 32% 
• (first intended to take both puppets at the same time, and 
then also intended to take both puppets one after the other) 
(1) (5%) 
 
Table C5-1. Number and percentage of 2-year-olds performing different behaviors in Study 6. 
 
Table C5-1 describes the choice behaviors of children. Children were generally willing 
to take a puppet. Only one child took more than 10 seconds to make his choice (so eighteen 
children remained for the measure of choice in less than 10 seconds). Five children were very 
fast at grabbing a puppet, anticipating their choice (so thirteen children remained for the 
measure of choice between 0 and 10 seconds). Children also generally were clear in their 
choice (17 of 19): only two children did not make a clear choice (one child first intended to 
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grab both puppets, and one child first reached for the opposite puppet of his final choice. In 
addition, we can notice that six children attempted to grab the other puppet once they grabbed 
one. 
 
For the measure of choice, a General Linear Model with Gender, Order and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, considering a binomial distribution of responses, revealed no effects 
of Gender, Order or Agent (see Table C5-2). 
 
Intercept z = 0.25 
 
p = .81 
Gender z = -1.10 
 
p = .27 
Order z = -0.96 
 
p = .34 
Agent z = -0.96 
 
p = .34 
 
Table C5-2. Logistic regression for the measure of 2-year-olds’ choice between the two 
agents in Study 6. 
 
 
Figure C5-3 shows the number of children choosing each of the agents for each 
measure. For the measure of choice, children’s selection of the legitimate recipient and thief 
did not differ from chance (10 of 19 participants chose the legitimate recipient, binomial 
probability test, two-tailed, p=1). For all other measures, children did not either choose 
preferentially any of the puppets (see details in Table C5-3). 
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Figure C5-3. Number of 2-year-olds choosing each agent (in white, the legitimate recipient; in 
black, the thief) for different measures of choice in Study 6. 
 
choice choice in less 
than 10 sec 
choice between 
0 and 10 sec 
clear choice clear choice 
in less than 
10 sec 
clear choice 
between 0 
and 10 sec 
 
10; 9 
p = 1 
10; 8 
p = .82 
8; 5 
p = .58 
9; 8 
p = 1 
9; 7 
p = .80 
8; 4 
p = .39 
 
 
Table C5-3. For different measures of choice in Study 6, the first number represents the 
number of 2-year-olds choosing the legitimate recipient; the second number, the number of 2-
year-olds choosing the thief; and the p-value the result of the two-tailed binomial probability 
test for these responses. 
 
When seeing legitimate and illegitimate transfers of a ball between two puppets, 2-year-
old children did not have any preference between a puppet receiving a ball legitimately and a 
puppet stealing a ball from another character. This result replicates previous findings with 
older children. Indeed, in Study 1 (Chapter 2), 3-year-old children did not evaluate differently 
a legitimate recipient and a thief. Despite the measure of a more implicit and non-verbal 
response, young children do not seem to evaluate property transfers. As in Study 1, after the 
transfers, the first possessor did not express any emotion. We have seen in Study 2 that 
emotional cues help to elicit social/moral evaluation in 3-year-old children. In the next study, 
we investigated whether the presence of emotion would help 2-year-olds to evaluate 
characters involved in legitimate and illegitimate property transfers. 
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2.2. Study 7: Two-year-olds’ social preferences between a thief and a legitimate 
recipient in the presence of emotional cues 
- S7 - 
 
 
As Study 2, this study aimed at comparing characters based on their mode of acquisition 
of an object, illegitimate (theft) versus legitimate (legitimate reception), in the presence of an 
emotional distress of the first possessor after the transfer. As in Study 6, we used more 
dynamic stimuli, measured a more implicit response and tested younger children than in the 
studies presented in the previous chapters. Children were presented with two non-verbal 
movies depicting the transfer of a ball between two puppets. One movie represented an agent 
stealing a ball from another character, who cried after the transfer. In the other movie, the 
agent was receiving the ball from the other character, who also cried after the transfer. 
 
2.2.1. Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-nine 2-year-olds (18 girls; mean age 24 months, 27 days; range: 23;14 to 25;23) 
were tested. Six additional children were tested but excluded due to technical failure (1 child), 
inattentiveness (1 child), parental interference (2 children), and absence of clarity of choice (2 
children). Children were French speakers. They were recruited from a database of parents 
who accepted to participate with their child in our studies; they were tested in our laboratory. 
Children were assigned randomly to one of the four experimental groups allowing 
counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions (theft first or legitimate reception 
first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 in theft or agent 2 in theft). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The general materials and setting were the same as in Study 6: 
- children saw the movies on a big screen, 
- the movies represented hand puppet shows, 
- each movie lasted 21 seconds, 
- the agents (a wolf and a hedgehog) were not named during the study. 
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In this study, four different characters were seen: two protagonists (one in each cartoon: 
Pig or Duck) and two agents (one in each cartoon). The protagonist was the character first 
possessing the object, and crying after the transfer of the object. The agents were the 
characters acquiring the object either by theft or by legitimate reception, so they also 
corresponded to the second possessors. These two characters were those to be evaluated by 
the participants. The sequence of events in each condition (see Figure C5-3) is described 
bellow, with the differences between both conditions in bold. 
At the beginning of each movie, two characters are present on the screen, one 
protagonist with a ball and one agent without any ball, both facing forward to the child. 
 
In the theft condition: 
1. The protagonist plays with the ball
C5-3
, and then keeps it in his hands. 
2. The agent steals the ball from the protagonist’s hands 
(The agent comes close to the protagonist, fights with him, takes the ball, and comes back to his 
initial location). 
3. The protagonist starts to cry
C5-4
. 
4. The protagonist turns himself back to face the child (then both characters vanish). 
 
In the legitimate reception condition: 
1. The protagonist plays with the ball. 
2. The protagonist gives the ball to the agent 
(The protagonist steps towards the agent, pats on his shoulder, gives the ball to him, and comes 
back to his initial location). 
3. The protagonist starts to cry. 
4. The protagonist turns himself back to face the child (then both characters vanish). 
 
The total amount of time each agent was present on the screen was matched between the 
two movies. The orientations of the characters were matched as much as possible between the 
movies. However, the actions were not totally matched in intensity to be more realistic. 
 
 
 
                                                
C5-3
 see supra note C5-1 (i.e. as in Hamlin & Wynn, 2011, the protagonist jumps up and down twice, and on his 
third jump he drops and retrieves the ball. This behavior is repeated three times). 
C5-4
 The protagonist puts his hands on his eyes, and shows verbal expression of distress. 
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 Theft 
 
Legitimate reception 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
  
 
Figure C5-3. Images extracted from each of the movies in Study 7. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions. 
Mmmmm
… 
…mmm… 
Mmmmm
… 
…mmm… 
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Procedure 
 
As in Study 6, the child first participated to a training phase where the different 
characters were presented to him for real. Here, two protagonists were presented to the child, 
Pig and then Duck, and the child was encouraged to grab each of them. Then, the different 
characters, Pig, then Duck, and then together the two animals representing the agents were 
presented on the screen, and the experimenter pointed out to the child that these are the same 
characters than the real puppets. Then the two movies were shown to the child. As in Study 6, 
the parent and experimenter were blind to condition (they closed their eyes during the display 
of the movies, but opened their eyes during the measure of choice). The movies were each 
presented three times in alternation. At the end both agents appeared on the screen and then 
for real in front of the child who was asked to choose one of them
C5-5
. The choice of a puppet 
represents a measure of the child’s social preference between the two agents. Figure C5-4 
presents a summary of the procedure. 
 
• Real - Presentation of the 4 puppets + Training to grab 
• Screen - Presentation of the puppets 
• Screen - Playing of the movies  
o the two agents 
o movie 1 - movie 2 - movie 1 - movie 2 - movie 1 - movie 2 
o the two agents 
• Real - Test: choice between the two agent puppets 
 
Figure C5-4. Procedure in Study 7. 
 
                                                
C5-5
 We also had a measure of gift-giving, where the experimenter asked the child to give a ball to one of the 
puppets. Furthermore, we also assessed children’s social preferences between the protagonist puppets by asking 
them to choose one of them (choice of protagonist). We do not present the results of these measures; the 
analyses revealed no significant results. 
- C5 - 
 194 
2.2.2. Results & Discussion 
 
Measures 
 
As in Study 6, we examined different measures of children’s attitudes towards the 
agents. We coded child’s choice (i.e. the first puppet actually grabbed). If the child’s first 
reaching behavior led to the taking of the puppet, we considered that he made a clear choice. 
We also coded the delay between the presentation of the puppets close to the child and the 
initiation of the reach leading to grab a puppet. We deduced measures of choice initiated in 
less than 10 seconds and of choice initiated between 0 and 10 seconds (i.e. choice not 
initiated before the presentation of the puppets close to the child but within 10 seconds), and 
measures of clear choice initiated in less than 10 seconds and of clear choice initiated 
between 0 and 10 seconds. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
Number and percentage of children who 
• chose slowly (i.e. chose in more than 10 sec) 8/29 28% 
• anticipated 6 21% 
• intended to take both puppets at the same time 9   31% 
• intended to take both puppets one after the other 11 38% 
• (first intended to take both puppets at the same time, and 
then also intended to take both puppets one after the other) 
(5) (17%) 
 
Table C5-4. Number and percentage of 2-year-olds performing different behaviors in Study 7. 
 
Table C5-4 describes the choice behaviors of children. Children were generally willing 
to take a puppet. Eight children took more than 10 seconds to make their choice (so twenty-
one children remained for the measure of choice in less than 10 seconds). Six children were 
very fast at grabbing a puppet, anticipating their choice (so fifteen children remain for the 
measure of choice between 0 and 10 seconds). In this study, the number of children making a 
clear choice was low (17 of 29). A lot of children were not clear in their choice due to the fact 
that they first tried to take both puppets (nine children); also two children first reached for the 
opposite puppet of their final choice and one child alternated reach toward the puppets two 
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times before choosing. In addition, we can notice that eleven children attempted to grab the 
other puppet once they grabbed one. 
 
For the measure of choice, a General Linear Model with Gender, Order, and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, considering a binomial distribution of responses, revealed an effect 
of Gender (and a marginal effect of Agent). There was no effect of Order (see Table C5-5). 
 
Intercept z = 1.60 
 
p = .11 
Gender z = -2.38 
 
p = .017  * 
Order z = 0.91 
 
p = .36 
Agent z = 1.72 
 
p = .086  ~ 
 
Table C5-5. Logistic regression for the measure of 2-year-olds’ choice between the two 
agents in Study 7. 
 
Figure C5-5 shows the number of children choosing each of the agents for each 
measure. For the measure of choice, children’s selection of the legitimate recipient and thief 
did not differ from chance (18 of 29 participants chose the legitimate recipient, binomial 
probability test, two-tailed, p=.27). However, when considering only children who answered 
quickly, they preferred (or tended to prefer) the legitimate recipient (choice in less than 10 
sec: 15 of 21, p=.078; choice between 0 and 10 sec: 12 of 15, p=.035). For the three measures 
of clear choice, children did not choose preferentially either puppet (see Table C5-6). For the 
measure of choice, boys preferred the legitimate recipient (10 of 11 boys chose the legitimate 
recipient, p=.012); girls did not prefer one character compared to the other (8 of 18 girls chose 
the legitimate recipient, p=.82; see Table C5-6 for details of the other measures). No effect of 
gender was expected, and we do not have enough data to discuss this effect further. 
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Figure C5-5. Number of 2-year-olds choosing each agent (in white, the legitimate recipient; in 
black, the thief) for different measures of choice in Study 7.   ~ p<.1  * p<.05 
 
 choice choice in 
less than 
10 sec 
choice 
between 0 
and 10 sec 
clear 
choice 
clear choice 
in less than 
10 sec 
clear choice 
between 0 
and 10 sec 
 
all 
children 
18; 11 
p=.27 
 
15; 6 
p=.078  ~ 
12; 3 
p=.035  * 
10; 7 
p=.63 
8; 4 
p=.39 
6; 2 
p=.29 
boys 10; 1 
p=.012   * 
 
9; 0 
p=.004  ** 
7; 0 
p=.016   * 
5; 0 
p=.063  ~ 
4; 0 
p=.13 
2; 0 
p=.5 
girls 8; 10 
p=.82 
6; 6 
p=1 
5; 3 
p=.73 
5; 7 
p=.77 
4; 4 
p=1 
4; 2 
p=.69 
 
Table C5-6. For different measures of choice in Study 7, the first number represents the 
number of 2-year-olds choosing the legitimate recipient; the second number, the number of 2-
year-olds choosing the thief; and the p-value the result of the two-tailed binomial probability 
test for these responses. 
 
 
We presented to 2-year-old children illegitimate and legitimate transfers of a ball 
between two puppets, followed by a negative emotion displayed by the first possessor. 
Children, who chose quickly between the two puppets, preferred the legitimate recipient 
compared to the thief. This result partially replicates previous findings with older children. 
Indeed, in Study 2 (Chapter 2), 3-year-old children evaluated more positively a legitimate 
~ 
* 
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recipient compared to a thief, when the property transfers were followed by a negative 
emotion of the first possessor. The willingness of 2-year-olds to interact with both puppets 
may have interfered with their choice (52% of participants wanted to grab both puppets, 
simultaneously and/or sequentially). However, our results suggest that children as young as 2-
year-old do make some evaluation of property transfers, at least in presence of emotional 
cues, and when asked to give an implicit and non-verbal response. 
- S6 & 7 -   
 
 
2.3. Summary & Conclusion 
 
In Studies 6 and 7, we tested 2-year-olds social evaluation of characters acquiring an 
object illegitimately (by theft) or legitimately (by legitimate reception), in the absence or 
presence of distress of the first possessor after the transfer. We noticed that a lot of children 
(particularly in Study 7) wanted to take both puppets before making a choice (5% in Study 6 
and 31% in Study 7) or after their first grasp (32% and 38%). The results partially replicated 
what we have found with 3-year-olds (in Studies 1a and 2). In the absence of an emotional 
reaction of the first possessor to the transfer (Study 6), 2-year-olds did not choose 
preferentially one agent compared to the other; despite the use of an implicit measure, young 
children did not show comparative evaluation. In the presence of distress expressed by the 
first possessor after the transfer (Study 7), a sub-group of 2-year-olds (those who chose 
quickly) preferred the legitimate recipient compared to the thief. This preference was 
significant only when considering toddlers who responded in less than 10 seconds and 
without anticipation. Their ability to distinguish between the illegitimate and legitimate 
recipients could not be based on the emotion alone, as the emotion was the same in both 
conditions of legitimacy. However, emotion was necessary to elicit comparative evaluation of 
illegitimate and legitimate agents. It seems that young children need this cue to evaluate 
agents involved in property transfers. In the next studies, we were interested in 2-year-olds’ 
evaluation of restitution, in the presence of another type of cue: begging of the first possessor 
to have the ball back. 
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3. Toddlers’ and infants’ social evaluations of restitution behaviors following a 
property transfer 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It is important to understand that non-definitive transfers of property need to be 
followed by restitution. In our previous studies exploring young children’s evaluation of 
restitution behaviors (Studies 3 and 4) we found that 3-year-olds have no preference between 
a reciprocator and a keeper. However, Hamlin & Wynn (2011) have found that 5-month-olds 
do show a preference for a reciprocator. Hamlin & Wynn used a measure of infant’s social 
preference. In the studies presented here, we used this same measure to assess toddlers’ and 
infants’ evaluations of restitution. We also optimized the stimuli and procedure to be closer to 
the one used by Hamlin & Wynn. As Study 3, the studies presented here (Studies 8 and 9) 
aimed at comparing characters based on their restitution of an object to the first possessor: no 
restitution (keep condition) versus restitution (return condition). In contrast to Study 3, in 
these studies, we used more dynamic stimuli, measured a more implicit response and tested 
younger children: 24-, 18-, and 5-month-olds. 
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3.2. Study 8: Eighteen- and twenty-four-month-old toddlers’ social preferences 
between a reciprocator and a keeper 
- S8 - 
 
 
Children were presented with two non-verbal movies depicting the transfer of a ball 
between two puppets (a first possessor dropped a ball that was picked up by a second 
possessor) and then the restitution or not of this ball by the second possessor to the first 
possessor. One movie represented an agent keeping the ball and leaving with it. In the other 
movie, the agent was returning the ball to the other character. 
 
3.2.1. Method 
 
Participants 
 
Sixteen 18-month-olds (9 girls; mean age 17 months, 21 days; range: 17;2 to 18;8) and  
twenty-one 24-month-olds (13 girls; mean age 24 months, 12 days; range: 23;1 to 25;3) were 
tested. Ten additional children were tested but excluded due to technical failure (two 24-
month-olds), inattentiveness (one 24-month-old and three 18-month-olds), and absence of 
choice (two 24-month-olds and two 18-month-olds). Children were French speakers. They 
were recruited from a database of parents who accepted to participate with their child in our 
studies; they were tested in our laboratory. Children were assigned randomly to one of the 
four experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation of conditions 
(keep first or return first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 in keep 
condition or agent 2 in keep condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
The general materials and setting were the same as in Study 6: 
- children saw the movies on a big screen, 
- the movies represented hand puppet shows, 
- the agents (a wolf and a hedgehog) were not named during the study. 
Here, each movie lasted 30 seconds. 
In this study, three different characters were seen: a protagonist (the same in both 
cartoons: Pig) and two agents (one in each cartoon). The protagonist was the character first 
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possessing the object. The agents were the second possessors of the object, picking up the ball 
when the protagonist dropped it, and then returning it or not to the protagonist after his 
request. These two characters were those to be evaluated by the participants. The sequence of 
events in each condition (see Figure C5-6) is described bellow, with the differences between 
both conditions in bold. The beginning of each movie is the same. 
 
1. The protagonist enters and grabs a ball already present on the ground. 
The agent arrives. 
2. The protagonist plays with the ball
C5-6
.  
3. The protagonist drops the ball towards the agent. 
The agent picks the ball up. 
4. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent
C5-7
. (This happens two times). 
 
In the keep condition: 
5. On the third turn of the protagonist, the agent leaves with the ball. 
6. The protagonist turns himself back and faces forward without the ball. 
 
In the return condition: 
5. On the third turn of the protagonist, the agent returns the ball to the 
protagonist (by rolling it to him) and leaves the scene. 
6. The protagonist faces forward with the ball. 
 
The total amount of time each agent was present on the screen was matched between the 
two movies, as well as the orientations of the characters. 
 
 
 
                                                
C5-6
 see supra note C5-1 (i.e. as in Hamlin & Wynn, 2011, the protagonist jumps up and down twice, and on his 
third jump he drops and retrieves the ball. This behavior is repeated three times). 
C5-7
 The protagonist turns himself towards the agent and opens his arms as if “asking” for the ball back. The 
agent turns himself towards the protagonist, and then both puppets turn to face forward again (as in Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011). 
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5. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
6. 
  
 
Figure C5-6. Images extracted from each of the movies in Study 8. Outlined in purple, the steps 
being different between both conditions. 
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Procedure 
 
The general procedure was the same as in Study 6. 
- children were trained to grab a puppet, 
- the puppets were presented to the children for real and then on the screen, 
- the parent and experimenter were blind to condition (they closed their eyes during the 
display of the movies, but opened their eyes during the measure of choice) 
- the movies were each presented three times in alternation. 
After the display of the movies, both agents appeared on the screen and then for real in 
front of the child who was asked to choose one of them
C5-8
. The choice of a puppet represents 
a measure of the child’s social preference between the two agents. Figure C5-7 presents a 
summary of the procedure. 
 
• Real - Presentation of the 3 puppets + Training to grab 
• Screen - Presentation of the puppets 
• Screen - Playing of the movies  
o the two agents 
o movie 1 - movie 2 - movie 1 - movie 2 - movie 1 - movie 2 
o the two agents 
• Real - Test: choice between the two agent puppets 
 
Figure C5-7. Procedure in Study 8. 
 
Similarities and differences with the study of Hamlin & Wynn (2011) 
 
Compared to Studies 3, 4, and 5, the stimuli used here were closer to those used by 
Hamlin & Wynn (2011). We notably included the requesting behavior of the first possessor 
that was lacking in our previous studies of children’s evaluations of restitution behaviors. 
Also, compared to our previous studies, the movements of the characters were here more 
natural, and the characters (hand puppets) were similar to those used by Hamlin.  
                                                
C5-8
 At the end, the child (only 24-month-olds) was given a ball and asked to give it to one of the agents as a 
gift. We do not present the results of this measure; the analyses revealed no significant results. We did not 
measure gift-giving with 18-month-olds because when testing this measure on a few children it appeared that 
they were not willing to give a gift to any character but rather play with it themselves or launch it to the 
experimenter. 
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However, some differences in the stimuli remained between our study and the study 
performed by Hamlin. Our agents were a grey wolf and a brown hedgehog. They were not 
bright colored puppets as in Hamlin’s study. In our study, only one of the agents was present 
in each condition, whereas in Hamlin’s study, both agents were seen in both conditions. An 
important difference in the materials between our study and the study performed by Hamlin is 
that we presented the events as movies on a screen, whereas Hamlin presented the events in 
real puppet shows. 
Also differences in the procedure between our study and Hamlin’s study remained. We 
identified a possible bias in Hamlin’s study. In her study, parents were looking at the events 
with their infant, and only closing their eyes during the test phase, i.e. the measure of choice. 
Even if parents were instructed not to react to the scenes, they could have had uncontrolled 
slight movements of pressure of their infant or changes in their heart rate, that could have 
been perceived by the infant, allowing him to associate positive and negative feelings with 
each agent. The infant could then have used these associations for his choice of one puppet. 
We wanted to avoid this possible bias, and thus asked the parents to close their eyes during 
the display of the events. Thus the parents and experimenter were blind to the condition 
presented to the infant. Finally, another difference with Hamlin’s study relies on the number 
of trials given to the children. Contrary to Hamlin, we presented a fixed number of trials (6 
trials) to all children and did not use a habituation criterion. As the population tested here 
consisted in older children than those tested by Hamlin & Wynn (2011) (i.e. we tested 2-year-
olds instead of 5-month-olds), we considered that a habituation procedure was not necessary 
to ensure that the child has seen the events enough times before test. 
 
3.2.2. Results & Discussion 
 
Measures 
 
As in Studies 6 & 7, we examined different measures of children’s attitudes towards the 
agents. We coded child’s choice (i.e. the first puppet actually grabbed). If the child’s first 
reaching behavior led to the taking of the puppet, we considered that he made a clear choice. 
We also coded the delay between the presentation of the puppets close to the child and the 
initiation of the reach leading to grab a puppet. We deduced measures of choice initiated in 
less than 10 seconds and of choice initiated between 0 and 10 seconds (i.e. choice not 
initiated before the presentation of the puppets close to the child but within 10 seconds), and 
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measures of clear choice initiated in less than 10 seconds and of clear choice initiated 
between 0 and 10 seconds. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
24-month-olds 
 
Number and percentage of children who 
• chose slowly (i.e. chose in more than 10 sec) 2/21 9.5% 
• anticipated 6 29% 
• intended to take both puppets at the same time 2   9.5% 
• intended to take both puppets one after the other 8 38% 
• (first intended to take both puppets at the same time, and 
then also intended to take both puppets one after the other) 
(1) (5%) 
 
Table C5-7. Number and percentage of 24-month-olds performing different behaviors in 
Study 8. 
 
Table C5-7 describes the choice behaviors of 24-month-old children. Children were 
generally willing to take a puppet. Two children took more than 10 seconds to make their 
choice (so nineteen children remained for the measure of choice in less than 10 seconds). Six 
children were very fast at grabbing a puppet, anticipating their choice (so thirteen children 
remained for the measure of choice between 0 and 10 seconds). Five children were not clear 
in their first choice: two children first tried to take both puppets, two children first reached for 
the opposite puppet of their final choice and one child alternated reach between the puppets 
two times before choosing. In addition, we can notice that eight children attempted to grab the 
other puppet once they grabbed one. 
For the measure of choice, a General Linear Model with Gender, Order, and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, and considering a binomial distribution of responses, revealed a 
marginal effect of Gender and Order. There was no effect of Agent. There was a significant 
effect for the Intercept term (see Table C5-9). 
Figure C5-8 shows the number of children choosing each of the agents for each 
measure. For the measure of choice, 24-month-old children tended to prefer the reciprocator 
compared to the keeper (15 of 21 participants chose the reciprocator, binomial probability 
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test, two-tailed, p=.078). The same result is obtained when considering only children who 
answered quickly (choice in less than 10 sec: 14 of 19 participants chose the reciprocator, 
p=.064). For the measure of choice between 0 and 10 sec and the three measures of clear 
choice, children did not choose preferentially either puppet (see Table C5-10). For the 
measure of choice, 24-month-old boys did not prefer one character compared to the other (4 
of 8 boys chose the reciprocator, p=1); girls preferred the reciprocator (11 of 13 girls chose 
him, p=.023; see Table C5-10 for details of the other measures). No effect of gender was 
expected, and we do not have enough data to discuss this effect further. 
 
18-month-olds 
 
Number and percentage of children who 
• chose slowly (i.e. chose in more than 10 sec) 4/16 25% 
• anticipated 8 50% 
• intended to take both puppets at the same time 7   44% 
• intended to take both puppets one after the other 11 69% 
• (first intended to take both puppets at the same time, and 
then also intended to take both puppets one after the other) 
(6) (37.5%) 
 
Table C5-8. Number and percentage of 18-month-olds performing different behaviors in 
Study 8. 
 
Table C5-8 describes the choice behaviors of 18-month-old children. Children were 
generally willing to take a puppet. Four children took more than 10 seconds to make their 
choice (so twelve children remained for the measure of choice in less than 10 seconds), but 
for three of them it was due to the fact that they wanted to grab both puppets and took a long 
time to choose one of them. Eight children were very fast at grabbing a puppet, anticipating 
their choice (so only four children remained for the measure of choice between 0 and 10 
seconds). Eight children were not clear in their first choice: seven children first tried to take 
both puppets, and one child looked at the opposite puppet at the beginning of his reaching. In 
addition, we can notice that eleven children attempted to grab the other puppet once they 
grabbed one. 
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For the measure of choice, a General Linear Model with Gender, Order, and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, and considering a binomial distribution of responses, revealed no 
effects of Gender, Order or Agent (see Table C5-9). 
For the measure of choice, 18-month-old children’s selection of the reciprocator and 
keeper did not differ from chance (8 of 16 participants chose the reciprocator, binomial 
probability test, two-tailed, p=1). For all other measures, children did not either choose 
preferentially any of the puppets (see Figure C5-8 and Table C5-10). 
 
18- and 24-month-olds 
 
For the measure of choice, a General Linear Model with Gender, Order, and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, and considering a binomial distribution of responses, revealed no 
effects of Gender, Order or Agent (see Table C5-9). 
For the measure of choice, children’s selection of the reciprocator and keeper did not 
differ from chance (23 of 37 participants chose the reciprocator, binomial probability test, 
two-tailed, p=.19). When considering only children who answered quickly (choice in less 
than 10 sec), children preferred the reciprocator compared to the keeper (22 of 31 participants 
chose the reciprocator, p=.029). For the other measures, children did not choose preferentially 
either puppet (see Figure C5-8 and Table C5-10). 
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 24-month-olds 18-month-olds 18- and 24-month-olds 
 
 
Intercept 
 
z = 1.99 
 
 
p = .047  * 
 
z = -0.007 
 
 
p = .99 
 
z = 1.52 
 
 
p = .13 
 
Gender z = 1.71 
 
p = .087  ~ z = 0.001 
 
p = 1 z = 1.65 
 
p = .10 
 
Order z = -1.14 
 
p = .25 z = 1.18 
 
p = .24 z = -0.52 
 
p = .60 
 
Agent z = -1.94 
 
p = .053  ~ z = .93 
 
p = .35 z = -1.15 
 
p = .25 
 
Table C5-9. Logistic regressions for the measures of 24-month-olds’ and 18-month-olds’ 
choice between the two agents in Study 8. 
 
 
a. 24-month-olds 
 
b. 18-month-olds 
~ ~ 
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c. 18- and 24-month-olds together 
 
Figure C5-8. Number of children choosing each agent (in white, the reciprocator; in black, the 
keeper) for different measures of choice in Study 8. (a) 24-month-olds, (b) 18-month-olds, (c) 18- and 
24-month-olds together.  ~ p<.1  * p<.05 
 
 
 choice choice in 
less than 
10 sec 
choice 
between 0 
and 10 sec 
clear 
choice 
clear choice 
in less than 
10 sec 
clear choice 
between 0 
and 10 sec 
 
 
all 24mo 
 
15; 6 
p=.078  ~ 
 
14; 5 
p=.065  ~ 
 
9; 4 
p=.27 
 
11; 5 
p=.21 
 
10; 5 
p=.30 
 
6; 4 
p=.75 
 
24mo boys 4; 4 
p=1 
4; 4 
p=1 
2; 3 
p=1 
3; 4 
p=1 
3; 4 
p=1 
2; 3 
p=1 
24mo girls 11; 2 
p=.023  * 
10; 1 
p=.012  * 
7; 1 
p=.070  ~ 
8; 1 
p=.039  * 
7; 1 
p=.070  ~ 
4; 1 
p=.38 
all 18mo 8; 8 
p=1 
8; 4 
p=.39 
1; 3 
p=.63 
5; 3 
p=.73 
5; 2 
p=.45 
0; 1 
p=1 
all 
18+24mo 
23; 14 
p=.19 
22; 9 
p=.029  * 
10; 7 
p=.63 
16; 8 
p=.15 
15; 7 
p=.13 
6; 5 
p=1 
 
 
Table C5-10. For different measures of choice in Study 8, the first number represents the 
number of children choosing the reciprocator; the second number, the number of children 
choosing the keeper; and the p-value the result of the two-tailed binomial probability test for 
these responses. 
* 
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When presented with transfers of a ball between two puppets, where one puppet 
restitutes the ball to the first possessor, whereas the other keeps it, 18-month-old children did 
not have any preference for one of the second possessor puppets. However, 24-month-olds 
did show a tendency to prefer the reciprocator. In a previous study with older children (Study 
3 in Chapter 3), we found that 3-year-olds did not evaluate differently a reciprocator and a 
keeper. Here, by measuring children’s social preferences through an implicit and non-verbal 
response, it seems that 2-year-olds do perform some evaluation of a reciprocator and a keeper. 
In addition, Hamlin & Wynn (2011) have shown that 5-month-olds do prefer a “giver” (i.e. 
reciprocator) compared to a “taker” (i.e. keeper). So young children may be evaluating 
restitution in property transfers, but our experimental procedure may not be optimized to elicit 
clear preferences. 
In the next study we optimized the procedure to test infants’ preferences between a 
puppet restituting a ball to the first possessor and a puppet keeping the ball. The stimuli were 
made even closer to those used by Hamlin & Wynn (2011). In Study 8, only one of the agents 
was seen at a time during the movies. This could potentially have led children to confuse 
them. In the next study, all three characters (both agents and the protagonist) were present in 
each movie, thus allowing a better distinction between the agents. The procedure was also 
optimized to keep and follow infant’s attention. We used a habituation procedure to ensure 
that infants see the movies enough times before test to be able to understand what is 
happening. We tested infants of the same age than in Hamlin & Wynn’s study (2011): 5-
month-olds. 
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3.3. Study 9: Five-month-old infants’ social preferences between a reciprocator 
and a keeper 
- S9 - 
 
 
As in Study 8, infants were presented with two non-verbal movies depicting the transfer 
of a ball between two puppets (a first possessor dropped a ball that was picked up by a second 
possessor) and then the restitution or not of this ball by the second possessor to the first 
possessor. One movie represented an agent keeping the ball and leaving with it. In the other 
movie, the agent was returning the ball to the other character. 
 
3.3.1. Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty 5-month-olds (10 girls; mean age 5 months, 3 days; range: 4;23 to 5;14) were 
tested. Eight additional infants were tested but excluded due to technical failure (3), 
inattentiveness (1), and absence of choice or clarity of choice (4). Infants were French 
speakers. They were recruited from a database of parents who accepted to participate with 
their infant in our studies; they were tested in our laboratory. Infants were assigned randomly 
to one of the four experimental groups allowing counterbalancing of the order of presentation 
of conditions (keep first or return first) and of the characters associated to a condition (agent 1 
in keep condition or agent 2 in keep condition). 
 
Materials and setting 
 
As for 18- and 24-month-olds, 5-month-olds saw movies representing hand puppets’ 
interactions. Again, the use of hand puppets allowed us to perform biological motions, which 
were more realistic than in animations. The movements were more natural, respecting the 
dynamics of the actions, although we tried to minimize the differences between the two 
compared actions. The movies used with 5-month-olds were even shorter than the movies 
used for this contrast with toddlers (and the animated cartoons used with older children) in 
order to keep infants’ attention during the whole movie. They lasted 21 seconds. Also, to 
attract the infant’s attention back between movies, we optimized the attractiveness of what is 
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happening in front of him: a curtain raised and lowered with the display of a sound between 
each movie. 
Furthermore, we improved the experimental setup to prevent the infant from being 
distracted by his environment (besides the screen): the infant was placed in a kind of small 
“booth”. He was sitting on his parent’s lap before a table surrounded by curtains, only with a 
large screen in front of him. Above the screen, there was space to present the puppets for real. 
The movies were displayed on the screen. 
In each movie and at whole, three different characters were seen: a protagonist (Pig) and 
two agents (both agents were present in each movie, but only one agent was acting per 
movie). In each movie, one of the agents was interacting with the protagonist and the other 
one stayed still during the whole movie. In the second movie the previously still agent was 
interacting with the protagonist, and now the other agent stayed still. All characters were 
present in each movie to avoid possible confusion between the agents. As in Study 8, the 
agents were a wolf and a hedgehog, but were not named at any time during the study. Only 
the protagonist was named: Pig. The protagonist was the character first possessing the object. 
The agents were the characters picking up the ball when the protagonist dropped it, and then 
returning it or not to the protagonist after his request. These two characters were those to be 
evaluated by the participants. 
 
The situations presented here were the same than those presented to 18- and 24-month-
olds in Study 8 except that both agents were present in each movie, and that they were on the 
scene before the arrival of the protagonist. Also, here, a sound and the raising and lowering of 
a blue curtain indicated the beginning and end of a scenario. Additionally, the duration of a 
trial was not fixed (contrary to the trials with 18- and 24-month-old toddlers) but depended on 
the infants’ attention to the screen. The sequence of events in each condition is described 
bellow, with the differences between both conditions in bold. 
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At the beginning of each movie, a blue curtain is down. A sound indicates the beginning 
of the event and the curtain rises. 
 
1. On the screen are present the two agents, one on each side, and a ball in the middle. 
2. The protagonist enters, grabs the ball and starts to play with it
C5-9
.  
3. The protagonist drops the ball towards one agent. 
The agent picks the ball up. 
4. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent
C5-10
. (This happens two times). 
 
In the keep condition: 
5. On the third turn of the protagonist, the agent leaves with the ball. 
6. The protagonist turns himself back and faces forward without the ball. 
 
In the return condition: 
5. On the third turn of the protagonist, the agent returns the ball to the 
protagonist (by rolling it to him) and leaves the scene. 
6. The protagonist faces forward with the ball. 
 
At the end of each movie, action pauses, infant’s looking time is recorded and the last 
image stays on the screen until the infant looks away for 2 consecutive seconds or after 30 
seconds have elapsed. Then, a sound indicates the end of the event and the curtain lowers. 
 
The total amount of time each agent was present on the screen was matched between the 
two movies, as well as the orientations of the three characters. 
 
                                                
C5-9
 see supra note C5-1 (i.e. as in Hamlin & Wynn, 2011, the protagonist jumps up and down twice, and on his 
third jump he drops and retrieves the ball. This behavior is repeated three times). 
C5-10
 see supra note C5-7 (i.e. The protagonist turns himself towards the agent and opens his arms as if “asking” 
for the ball back. The agent turns himself towards the protagonist, and then both puppets turn to face forward 
again (as in Hamlin & Wynn, 2011)). 
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Procedure 
 
The infant first participated in a training phase. Parents were sitting on a chair, turned 
90° away from the screen. The infant was encouraged to grab Pig in order to train him to grab 
a real puppet. Then the two agents were also presented to the infant but at a distance. The 
parents were asked to turn their chair towards the screen, on which was displayed a blue 
curtain (they did not close their eyes). The experimenter pulled a curtain on their side to close 
the booth, and went behind the screen. The two agents were presented once more for real 
above the screen, and then disappeared behind it as if they were disappearing behind the blue 
curtain. Figure C5-9 presents the following procedure. 
First, a presentation movie was displayed. Then followed the habituation phase. The 
first movie began with the raising of the blue curtain letting appear the two agents on the 
scene. The two movies were shown to the infant several times in alternation. Instead of being 
fixed as in the previous studies, the number of presentations of the movies depended on the 
reaction of the infant. The movies were displayed continuously and in alternation until the 
infant reached a habituation criterion. The habituation criterion was reached when the 
summed looking time (during the pause at the end of each movie) for 3 consecutive trials was 
less than or equal to 50% of the sum of the looking time on the first 3 trials. This criterion was 
the same than the one used by Kuhlmeier et al. (2003) and Hamlin et al. (2007; Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011).  Then both agents were presented on the screen. For the test phase, the parent 
was asked to turn his chair away from the screen and to close his eyes. The experimenter 
(who did not see the movies) then pulled the curtain, and appeared with the two puppets 
representing the agents on his hands. The infant was encouraged to choose one of the puppets. 
Following this first measure of choice, the movies were presented once more with reversed 
positions of the agents on the screen, and with a fixed amount of time for the pause on the last 
image (3 seconds). After the presentation of the movies, both agents appeared on the screen, 
and infant’s looking time to each agent was recorded until the infant looked away for 4 
seconds (after the 6 first seconds) or until 30 seconds had elapsed. The agents were then 
presented for real to the infant for another measure of choice. This sequence of “presentation 
of movies – measure of preferential looking – measure of choice” was repeated two more 
times. In total, as a maximum, we had four measures of choice and three measures of 
preferential looking for each infant. The experiment ended earlier if the infant got too 
agitated. The choices of a character and the preferential looking to a character represent 
measures of the infant’s social preference between the two agents. 
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Presentation 
 
 
the two agents greet 
the infant 
 
 
  
Keep 
 
Return 
Habituation 
 
beginning of the 
movie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
movie 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
last image of the 
movie, stays on 
screen until the infant 
looks away for 2 
consecutive sec (or 
after 30 seconds have 
elapsed)   
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end of the movie 
  
  
 
The two movies are played alternatively until the habituation 
criterion is met 
 
 
End of the 
habituation 
 
 
presentation of both 
agents 
 
 
 
 
 
Test 
 
 
measure of looking 
time at the agents on 
the screen 
(except for 1
st
 test) 
 
 
measure of choice 
between the two 
puppets presented 
for real 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure C5-9. Procedure following the Presentation of the 3 puppets for real and the Training 
to grab, in Study 9. Presentation (on screen), Habituation (on screen: movie1 – movie2 – movie1 – movie2 – 
movie1 – movie2 – etc, until habituation criterion is met; outlined in purple, the images being different between 
both conditions), Test (for real). Repeated 4 times at whole. 
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Similarities and differences with the study of Hamlin & Wynn (2011) 
 
The stimuli used here are even closer to those used by Hamlin & Wynn (2011) than 
those used for 18- and 24-month-olds. As in Study 8, we included the requesting behavior that 
was lacking in our previous studies. Also, the movements of the characters were more natural 
and the characters (hand puppets) were similar to those used by Hamlin. Moreover, here, all 
characters were present in each movie to avoid possible confusion between the agents. Also a 
curtain raising and lowering and a sound were present to attract the infant’s attention back for 
each new presentation. The general setup (“booth”) was close to the puppet stage used by 
Hamlin. The procedure was also closer to the one used by Hamlin. The end of each trial, and 
the number of presentations depended on the infant’s attention (with the same criteria as those 
used by Hamlin et al., 2007; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). The habituation criterion used implied 
that a participant might not see both movies an equal number of times. We would have 
preferred to present both situations an equal number of times, but to be closer to a replication 
of the study by Hamlin & Wynn (2011) we used their criterion
C5-11
. Also, in this study, to be 
closer to a replication of Hamlin’s study, we let the parents look at the events with the infants 
(thus they were not blind to condition, closing only their eyes during test; only the 
experimenter was blind to condition). As highlighted in Study 8, this implied a possible bias 
in the interpretation of infant’s preferences. 
Despite trying to maximize the similarities between our study and Hamlin’s one, two 
differences still remained. As in Study 8, our agents were a grey wolf and a brown hedgehog; 
they were not bright colored puppets as in Hamlin’s study. More importantly, we still 
presented the events to the participants as movies and not as live puppet shows. 
 
                                                
C5-11
 However, in some cases the experimenter had to end manually the habituation phase because the infant got 
agitated without reaching the habituation criterion. In that case, the experimenter tried to end the habituation 
phase after an equal number of presentations of both movies. 
- C5 - 
 218 
3.3.2. Results & Discussion 
 
Measures 
 
Infants were encouraged to reach for one of the puppets. We coded infant’s choice of a 
puppet (i.e. the first puppet actually grabbed). Here, infant’s clear choice was defined as the 
choice of a puppet if that choice was the same as the first lateralized intention (without 
considering intention to grab both puppets or potential alternations between the puppets 
before the first grasp). We also coded the delay between the presentation of the puppets close 
to the infant and the moment when the infant touched the chosen puppet. We thus determined 
measures of choice made in less than 10 seconds, and clear choice made in less than 10 
seconds. No infant intended to grab one of the puppets before they were approached, i.e. no 
infant anticipated his choice. We had up to four measures of each kind for an infant. After the 
first choice, we also had three measures of infant’s preferential looking time, one before each 
of the subsequent choices. Concerning the various measures of choice, we present here only 
the analyses of the first test. The analyses of tests 2, 3, 4 are presented in Appendix AC5-1. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
Choice 
 
Number and percentage of infants who 
• chose slowly (i.e. chose in more than 10 sec) 4/17 23.5% 
• anticipated 0 0% 
• intended to take both puppets at the same time 2   12% 
• intended to take both puppets one after the other 8 47% 
• (first intended to take both puppets at the same time, and 
then also intended to take both puppets one after the other) 
(0) (0%) 
 
Table C5-11. Number and percentage of 5-month-olds performing different behaviors in 
Study 9. 
 
Table C5-11 describes infant’s behaviors. Infants were generally willing to take a 
puppet. Two infants did not want to grab any puppet during the first test and one infant 
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grabbed both almost simultaneously, so seventeen infants made a choice during this test. Four 
infants took more than 10 seconds to make their choice (so thirteen infants remained for the 
measure of choice in less than 10 seconds). We can notice that only two infants first reached 
for both puppets before making a choice, but it was not considered here in the definition of a 
clear choice. All infants were clear in their choice. Also, we can notice that eight infants 
attempted to grab the other puppet once they grabbed one. 
 
For the measure of choice, a General Linear Model with Gender, Order, and Agent as 
between-subjects factors, and considering a binomial distribution of responses, revealed no 
effects of Gender, Order or Agent (see Table C5-12). 
 
   Intercept z = 0.003 
 
p = 1 
   Gender z = 0.003 
 
p = 1 
   Order z = 0.004 
 
p = 1 
   Agent z = 0.004 
 
p = 1 
 
Table C5-12. Logistic regression for the measure of 5-month-olds’ choice between the two 
agents in Study 9. 
 
 
Figure C5-10 shows the number of infants choosing each of the agents for each measure 
of choice. Infant’s selection of the reciprocator and keeper did not differ from chance (choice 
and clear choice: 11 of 17 participants chose the reciprocator, binomial probability test, two-
tailed, p=.33). However, when considering only infants who answered quickly, they tended to 
prefer the reciprocator (choice in less than 10 sec and clear choice in less than 10 sec: 10 of 
13 chose the reciprocator, p=.092; see Table C5-13). 
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Figure C5-10. Number of 5-month-olds choosing each agent (in white, the reciprocator; in 
black, the keeper) for different measures of choice in Study 9.  ~ p<.1  
 
 
choice choice in less than 
10 sec 
clear choice clear choice in less 
than 10 sec 
 
11; 6 
p=.33 
10; 3 
p=.092  ~ 
11; 6 
p=.33 
10; 3 
p=.092  ~ 
 
Table C5-13. For different measures of choice in Study 9, the first number represents the 
number of 5-month-olds choosing the reciprocator; the second number, the number of 5-
month-olds choosing the keeper; and the p-value the result of the two-tailed binomial 
probability test for these responses. 
 
 
Looking time 
 
The two agents were presented up to 30 seconds to the infant for the measure of his 
looking time to each agent. A lot of infants were not looking enough to the agents, so that the 
phase of presentation of the agents ended earlier. We had 54 measures of looking time with a 
presentation of the agents between 8 and 30 seconds (8 measures only were obtained with a 
presentation time of 30 seconds). Because of this difference in total duration of the 
presentation, we considered the percentage of time the infant looked at each agent. Analyzing 
the results of all three tests together revealed that generally infants looked longer to the 
~  ~ 
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reciprocator (4.78s (SE=0.67), 24.43% (SE=2.17)) than to the keeper (3.46s (SE=0.45), 
18.55% (SE=1.72)) (t(53)=2.05, p=.045). Considering the results of each test separately, 
infants tended to look longer to the reciprocator than to the keeper during the first test 
(27.53% (SE=3.42) vs. 19.22% (SE=2.83), t(19)=1.74, p=.099), but not during the second 
(27.53% (SE=3.42) vs. 19.74% (SE=2.74), t(17)=.63, p=.53) and third (22.76% (SE=4.68) vs. 
16.37% (SE=2.54), t(15)=1.05, p=.31) tests (see Figure C5-11). 
When analyzing infants’ individual responses, we did not find any preference. For the 
first test 13 of 19 infants looked longer at the reciprocator (binomial probability test, two-
tailed, p=.17), for the second test 8 of 17 infants looked longer at the reciprocator (p=1), and 
for the third test 9 of 16 infants looked longer at the reciprocator (p=.80); in total there were 
30 of 52 instances of longer looks to the reciprocator (p=.33). 
 
 
 
 
Figure C5-11. Percentage of 5-month-olds’ looking time towards each agent (in white, the 
reciprocator; in black, the keeper) in different tests in Study 9 (and standard error).  
~ p<.1  * p<.05 
 
 
In this study, we tested infants’ preferences between a puppet returning a ball to a first 
possessor who requested it and a puppet who kept the ball. Compared to our previous studies, 
the setup and experimental procedure were modified to be closer to the experimental 
conditions of Hamlin & Wynn (2011). The modifications allowed optimizing infants’ 
attention to the presented situations. In particular, we used a habituation criterion to ensure 
that infants recognized the actions of the different scenarios. However, some differences with 
Hamlin’s study remained. The major one is the use of movies instead of real puppet shows. 
* ~ 
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When considering all participants, our results showed that 5-month-olds did not prefer 
to take a reciprocator compared to a keeper. However, when considering only infants who 
chose quickly between the two puppets, 5-month-olds tended to show preference for the 
reciprocator. For the first measure of looking time, infants tended to look longer at the 
reciprocator, but there was no difference between looking time to each agent for subsequent 
measures. The effect of the condition of restitution on looking time was significant only when 
considering all measures together. Hamlin & Wynn (2011) found a much larger effect with 
one measure with 3-month-olds. Considering 5-month-olds’ choices, they found a large 
preference for the reciprocator (10 of 12 infants preferred the reciprocator in their study). 
Only considering a sub-group of infants (those who chose quickly) we managed to approach 
their results (10 of 13 infants preferred the reciprocator in this case), but without being able to 
replicate their effect. This suggests that the experimental setup, materials and procedure are 
important in eliciting infants’ preferences. 
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3.4. Summary & Conclusion 
 - S8 & 9 - 
 
 
Children’s responses 
 
We tested toddlers’ and infants’ preferences between a reciprocator and a keeper. 18-
month-old children showed no preference between both puppets. They do not seem to 
evaluate restitution after property transfers. 24-month-old children showed a trend towards a 
preference for the reciprocator. 5-month-old infants also showed this tendency but only under 
certain conditions (when considering only fast responses).  
 
 Age 
 24mo 
 
18mo 
 
5mo 
(1
st
 test) 
Number of children excluded due to    
• (technical failure) (2) (0) (3) 
• inattentiveness 1 3 1 
• absence of choice or clarity of choice 2 2 7 
Number of children remaining for the analyses 21 16 17 
Percentage of children who    
• intended to take both puppets at the same time 9.5% 44% 12% 
• intended to take both puppets one after the other 38% 69% 47% 
• (first intended to take both puppets at the same time, 
and then also intended to take both puppets one after 
the other) 
 
(5%) 
 
(37.5%) 
 
(0%) 
• anticipated 29% 50% 0% 
• chose slowly (i.e. chose in more than 10 sec) 9.5% 25% 23.5% 
 
Table C5-14. Number of 5-, 18- and 24-month-olds excluded from the analyses, and 
percentage of children of each age performing different behaviors in Studies 8 and 9. 
 
We observed great variability in children’s behaviors when asked to choose between 
both agents (see Table C5-14). At 18 months, children did not prefer to take one puppet rather 
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than the other. A lot of children wanted to take both puppets (44% of children first tried to 
reach for both puppets when they were presented to them, and 31.5% of additional children 
tried to take both puppets one after the other). Moreover, a lot of 18-month-olds immediately 
reached for the puppets before they were approached (i.e. 50% of children anticipated their 
choice). This suggests that 18-month-olds are more interested in social interaction than in 
selective evaluation. At that age children are generally willing to provide help and interact 
with others (e.g. Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; 2009; Warneken et al., 2006). Our 
experimental procedure may not be adapted to test 18-month-old children. 
24-month-old children showed a tendency to prefer the reciprocator, but this preference 
did not reach significance. Compared to 18-month-olds, the great majority of 24-month-olds 
first reached towards one of the puppets and not both (90.5%), but a lot of them (38%) wanted 
to take the other puppet right afterwards, which could also be due to a general willingness to 
be involved in social interactions (also, 29% of 24-month-olds anticipated their choice). Only 
when analyzing the answers of 18- and 24-month-olds together we found a significant 
preference for the reciprocator, but restricted to children who chose quickly. 
We optimized the procedure and stimuli and tested 5-month-old infants. At 5 months of 
age, infants tended to prefer the reciprocator, but this preference was marginally significant 
only when considering infants who chose a character in less than 10 seconds. We had to 
restrict the population to find a (marginal) preference in participants’ choices. These results 
are far from those obtained by Hamlin & Wynn (2011) presenting the same situations in a 
very similar experimental procedure. We can notice that an important proportion of 5-month-
olds (47%), as older children, also attempted to grab the other puppet once they grabbed one. 
When considering all tested toddlers and infants together, we found a tendency to prefer 
the reciprocator with the measure of choice. This preference was only significant for children 
who chose quickly (with a choice/clear choice in less than 10sec, see Figure C5-12). Without 
considering 18-month-olds because of their apparent unwillingness to perform the task (as 
discussed above), and analyzing only 5- and 24-month-olds together, we found a significant 
preference for the reciprocator with the measure of choice (see Figure C5-13). It is the only 
analysis showing a significant preference with this measure (without restriction on delay of 
choice). It involves 38 children, instead of 12 in Hamlin & Wynn (2011). Evidently, our 
results are less powerful than those obtained by Hamlin & Wynn. 
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Figure C5-12. Number of children choosing each agent (in white, the reciprocator; in black, 
the keeper) for different measures of choice in Studies 8 and 9, considering all 5-, 18-, and 
24-month-olds together. The p-value is given for a two-tailed binomial probability test for 
these responses. 
(1) 18- and 24-month-olds: choice and clear choice initiated in less than 10 seconds. 5-month-olds: choice and 
clear choice made in less than 10 seconds. (2) See materials of Studies 8 and 9 for the definitions of clear choice. 
~ p<.1  * p<.05  ** p<.01 
 
 
Figure C5-13. Number of children choosing each agent (in white, the reciprocator; in black, 
the keeper) for different measures of choice in Studies 8 and 9, considering 5-, and 24-month-
olds together. The p-value is given for a two-tailed binomial probability test for these 
responses. 
(1) 24-month-olds: choice and clear choice initiated in less than 10 seconds. 5-month-olds: choice and clear 
choice made in less than 10 seconds. (2) See materials of Studies 8 and 9 for the definitions of clear choice. 
 ~ p<.1  * p<.05  ** p<.01 
** p=.004 
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Methodology 
 
Two differences remained between the stimuli and procedure that we used to test 5-
month-olds in Study 9 and those used by Hamlin & Wynn (2011). These differences were 
also present for our study of the same contrast with 18- and 24-month-olds (Study 8). 
Concerning the stimuli, our agents were a grey wolf and a brown hedgehog. They were not 
bright colored puppets. We selected two unfamiliar animals as agents in order to avoid a clear 
preference for one of them by default. Despite the fact that the two characters were different 
animals, they may not  be enough distinguishable and some children may have confused 
them. However, Hamlin’s puppets, despite wearing bright colored shirts, were only 
distinguishable by the color of their shirt and not other features as they were the same animal. 
It seems improbable that our puppets were less distinguishable as they differed not only by 
color but also by aspect. One difficulty leading to possible confusion for children could be 
that the agents were not named. As they were probably unfamiliar animals for young children, 
the children may not distinctively label them. This absence of label could prevent children 
from recognizing the animals. However, the puppets were not named in Hamlin’s study 
either. Furthermore, in the test phase we presented the puppets for choice on the same side as 
their side on the screen during the movies, which should give to children help for the 
localization of each agent. 
A more important difference between our experimental procedure and the procedure 
used by Hamlin & Wynn (2011) is that we presented the two puppet interactions on a screen 
as movies and not for real as live puppet shows. Live puppet shows may be more attractive 
and thus infants may pay more attention to the different actions taking place. However, in our 
studies infants did not seem uninterested by what happened on the screen; they quietly 
watched both movies at least three times before loosing attention. The difficulty that could 
remain for infants is to map the puppets seen in the movies with the real puppets presented to 
them before and after the movies, and particularly for the test. However other studies used a 
similar procedure with success (Kinzler et al., 2007; Buon et al., 2008; Buon et al., in 
revision). In these studies, infants or toddlers were also watching situations on a screen. Then 
the agents in the movies offered each a toy to the infant, and the real version of the toys 
appeared on a table in front of the infant, who could grasp one of them. 
It would be important to test again infants’ preferences between a reciprocator and a 
keeper (“giver” and “taker” in Hamlin & Wynn, 2011) with the best experimental conditions 
to ensure the reliability of results. Also, it would be important to perform this investigation 
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avoiding the possible bias that we identified in Hamlin’s study. As discussed previously, 
parents should be prevented from watching the situations with their infant, as they could 
potentially influence the infants’ feelings about the situations. 
  
 
 
4. General Conclusion 
 
We conducted four studies with 18- and 24-month-old toddlers and 5-month-old infants. 
Study 6 and Study 7 looked at 24-month-olds social evaluations of illegitimate and legitimate 
recipients of an object. We showed that some children (those answering quickly) tended to 
prefer the legitimate recipient when the transfer was followed by a negative emotion of the 
first possessor, but not in absence of an emotion. Study 8 and Study 9 tested toddlers’ and 
infants’ evaluations of characters returning or not an object to the first possessor. We showed 
that 18-month-olds had no preference between a reciprocator and a keeper. 24-month-olds 
and some 5-month-olds tended to chose the reciprocator. Concerning 5-month-olds this 
tendency was only present with infants choosing quickly. Only when considering two or three 
age groups together (18- and 24-month-olds; 5-, 18- and 24-month-olds; or 5- and 24-month-
olds) we obtained significant preferences for the reciprocator. This preference was obtained 
for the measure of choice without restriction on the delay of choice only when analyzing 5- 
and 24-month-olds together. 
In our four studies we observed a large variability in children’s behaviors. Globally, a 
lot of children wanted to take both puppets, simultaneously or/and sequentially (5% to 69% 
depending on the Study). Some children (except 5-month-olds) “anticipated their choice”, by 
reaching towards the puppets before they were approached (21% to 50%). Other children, on 
the contrary, were slow to make a choice (5% to 28%). Some of them did not really want to 
choose, either wanting both puppets as reported above, or none of them. These latter children 
(with those lacking clarity in choice) were excluded from the analyses (5.5% to 25% of the 
total of tested children in each Study). In particular, 25% of 5-month-olds that had been tested 
had to be excluded for this reason. In comparison, in Hamlin & Wynn (2011), only 4% of 5-
month-olds tested are reported not to reach for one puppet, and the paper did not report any 
difficulty in coding for a proper reaching response (choice anticipation, simultaneous or 
sequential choice). In brief, the variability that we observe in children’s responses in our 
studies does not seem to us unreasonable given the general behavior of children at this age, 
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but is not found in other published studies such as Hamlin & Wynn (2011). It is possible that 
these studies either did not report some of this variability, or found a particularly efficient 
way to channel the children's behavior such that they only perform one clear choice. Informal 
discussion with some of the authors did not enable us to clarify further this issue.  
Even ignoring these differences in behavior there seems to be a difference in effect size 
between the studies. In Hamlin & Wynn (2011), 83.5% of infants chose the giver 
(reciprocator) and 16.5% chose the taker (keeper), whereas in our Study 9, we found between 
64.5% and 77% of choices for the reciprocator (i.e. 35.5% and 23% of choices for the keeper, 
respectively, depending on the measure). This is a much smaller effect, which requires testing 
many more infants to become significant. As already mentioned, we found significant results 
only when considering several age groups together to include more children in the analyses. It 
is only when considering 38 children (5- and 24-month-olds together) that we found a 
significant effect for the measure of choice, compared to 12 infants in Hamlin & Wynn 
(2011). 
It is unclear what differences in experimental setups yield such a difference in behaviors 
between our studies and other studies of the literature, in particular between Study 9 and the 
study of Hamlin & Wynn (2011), as we tried in Study 9 to replicate the setup used by this 
latter study. As in Hamlin & Wynn (2011), we used puppet interactions as stimuli, a 
procedure of habituation (with the same habituation criterion), a measure of choice between 
the two puppets. The only remaining differences, as discussed in the previous section, 
concern the color of the puppets, and the use of movies instead of live puppet shows. 
However, it is unclear how these differences could have such an important influence on 
children’s behaviors. It may be that other factors, not reported and thus not identified, are 
important, such as the way of making the infant enter into the experiment, or the way of 
presenting the choice. Another hypothesis is that the differences between studies could be due 
to the population tested: French infants (with French parents) in our study and American 
infants (with American parents) in Hamlin’s study. The potential role of the parent in infant’s 
preferences that we discussed in the previous section as a possible bias could have different 
influences in each of these cultures. Further studies are needed with an optimized 
experimental setup to obtain less noisy data and replicate the findings of Hamlin & Wynn 
(2011). 
 
To conclude, the use of implicit measures in principle allows testing very young 
children and infants. These implicit measures of social preferences could also be used with 
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older children to assess their implicit understanding of ownership, and compare it directly to 
their explicit understanding of property rights. This should be done systematically with 
different situations involving ownership. We tested toddlers’ and infants’ evaluation of 
illegitimate and legitimate acquisition, and restitution. Infants’ understanding of gift-giving as 
compared to lending still needs to be explored. Infants’ evaluation of restitution also needs 
more investigation. Our results together with those of Hamlin & Wynn (2011) suggest that 
infants may be evaluating restitution in property transfers. But they may also be evaluating 
the situations without any consideration for ownership. Hamlin & Wynn propose that infants 
are evaluating a helper and a hinderer with respect to a protagonist’s goal. We suggest that 
infants in the presented situations may also be evaluating a cooperator and a non-cooperator, 
or an agent responding to a request of communication compared to an agent breaking 
communication. Further studies should be performed to shed light on these various 
interpretations. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion and future directions 
- C6 - 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to study the early development of the concept of 
ownership in children. In nine studies, we presented children from 5 months to 5 years of age 
with illegitimate and legitimate actions regarding a transfer of object through movie clips. We 
investigated their explicit understanding of ownership as a set of property rights, and their 
more indirect understanding of this concept through their social and moral evaluations of 
property transfers. Our studies are the first to directly investigate the relation between explicit 
understanding of ownership/property rights, and social/moral evaluations in children. They 
are also the first studies to use similar stimuli across a large age range (5, 18 and 24 months, 3 
and 5 years), while testing for implicit social preferences in the young age group and explicit 
evaluation in the older one. Furthermore, we tested two types of transgressions that have not 
been extensively explored previously: theft, and absence of restitution to an owner. 
 
1. Summary of results 
 
The first transgression was studied through the comparison between illegitimate 
acquisition (theft) and legitimate acquisition (gift-reception). The second transgression 
opposed restitution and non-restitution (after a voluntary or an accidental transfer).  
As far as the comparison between theft and legitimate acquisition is concerned, we 
found a correlation between social/moral evaluation and attribution of property rights. Both 
are present at 5 years, but not at 3 years of age (Study 1). However, when the first possessor 
expressed a negative emotion after both kinds of transfer, the distinction between theft and 
legitimate reception (as measured through social/moral evaluation) emerged  in 3-year-olds 
(Study 2). Using an implicit measure of social evaluation with 2-year-olds, we partially 
replicated this effect. Without emotions, they did not prefer any of the recipients (Study 6); 
with the presence of emotion, some 2-year-olds (those choosing quickly) preferred the 
legitimate recipient compared to the thief (Study 7). Thus the presence of an emotional cue 
helps young children to evaluate ownership transgressions, even though these cues were 
applied to both the legitimate and illegitimate transfers. 
In addition, across our studies, we evidenced the presence of a first possessor bias or 
loan bias, which is present from 3 years of age to adulthood. This bias led the participants to 
interpret a voluntary transfer as being a loan (temporary) and not a gift (definitive) (see 
Chapter 4). Indeed, they claimed that the second possessor cannot leave with the object and 
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has to return it to the first possessor (Studies 3, 4, 5). However, only 5-year-olds and adults 
evaluated negatively the character that does not restitute the object to the first possessor 
(compared to the character that returns the object). The first possessor bias therefore did not 
lead 3-year-olds to evaluate the characters as a function of whether they keep or return the 
object. This suggests that 3-year-olds do not really have an understanding of what is a loan, 
and do not really consider the first possessor’s right to retrieve the object. This null result at 3 
years stays unchanged even in the presence of emotional cues. However, using a different 
methodology with younger children and infants, and introducing cooperation cues between 
the two characters, we partially replicated a result found by Hamlin & Wynn (2011), showing 
a tendency in toddler’s and infant’s choices to prefer the agent who returns the object to the 
first possessor (Studies 8 and 9). It is therefore possible that, as emotions can boost the 
social/moral evaluation of the stealing/giving contrast (enhancing the harmful consequence of 
the illegitimate transfer), cooperation can boost the social/moral evaluation of the 
returning/not returning of an object to the first possessor (enhancing the social link between 
the two agents).  
 
2. Conclusion about methodology 
 
In our review of the literature on children’s understanding of ownership transgressions, 
one of the outcomes is the lack of consensus regarding the techniques and methods used 
across research questions and age groups. Some of these methodological differences introduce 
large differences in the age at which sensitivity to aspects of ownership can be measured. 
Generally speaking, we found that when explicit protocols or sophisticated questions are 
used, the concept of ownership seems to emerge relatively late (5 years or more), whereas 
implicit protocols (social preferences measured through prosocial/antisocial behavior, choice 
or preferential looking time) may yield responses in younger children (at 2 years of age or 
earlier). In addition, we found that ownership is not a unitary concept, but is constituted of 
several components. We distinguished a normative component (an owner has a distinct set of 
rights) and an evaluative component (transgressions of some of these rights are judged 
immoral). 
Regarding rights, in our studies we tested the right to use and the right to keep an 
object. Other property rights have been investigated (such as the right to alter, or destroy an 
object, the right to interfere with owner’s use or with non-owner’s use) and others still need to 
be investigated, such as the right of a new acquirer to transfer the object. It is not the case that 
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the understanding of these rights necessarily emerges at the same age. In our review, we 
suggested in particular that the destruction or alteration of an object may elicit an earlier 
response in children than some of the other, less violent, actions. 
Concerning social/moral evaluations, we used simple concrete questions rather than 
abstract ones regarding responsibility or permissibility. In our studies with 3- and 5-year-olds, 
we combined measures of social preference (“show me the one you like”; “show me with 
whom you would like to play”) and moral evaluation (“show me which one is the good guy”; 
“show me which one is the bad guy”) in order to obtain a statistically more robust measure. In 
the research on early moral development, it is usually considered that children’s social 
preferences and prosocial behaviors are at the basis of their later moral judgments. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that these two types of evaluations give different results. 
Furthermore, Cushman (2008) argued that within moral evaluations in adults, one can observe 
different results between assignment of blame and assessment of wrongness. 
In younger toddlers and preverbal infants, social preferences were assessed implicitly 
through their choice of a puppet, and/or their preferential looking time. We found that these 
measures give very variable results, necessitating to increase the number of participants in 
order to reach sufficient statistical power. Other possible measures could be done through a 
habituation-dishabituation paradigm (e.g. Premack & Premack, 1997) in order to test for the 
infant’s expectations regarding an interaction involving property. 
Although our measures were different, they gave overall consistent results. However, 
the use of implicit methods in preverbal infants raised an important concern regarding the 
replicability of the measures themselves. We were surprised to find that some of apparently 
well-established results of the literature are so difficult to replicate. We found much larger 
variability in the dependant measure (infant’s choice) than reported in published studies. 
Indeed, the proportion of children showing a “clear choice” was much lower than has been 
reported in the study we attempted to replicate. The reasons for these differences were not 
uncovered, despite trying to mimic the setup of the study as closely as possible and 
communication with some of the authors of these studies. In addition, the effect size that we 
reported was much lower than in these studies. The result being that instead of having a 
significant result with 12 infants, we had to combine the results of two age groups (a total of 
38 children) to obtain a significant effect with a similar measure. Replicability being one of 
standards of scientific investigation, the use of such implicit social preference measures in the 
context of the study of the developmental basis of ownership remains, for us, an open 
question. Only further attempts at replication will settle this issue. 
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One variable, whose effect was tested in several studies, is the presence of emotion. 
Below we discuss two different roles of emotional cues for social/moral evaluation of and 
property rights attribution to agents involved in property transfers. 
 
3. The role of emotional cues 
 
Transgressions of property rights are typically not pleasant situations for the legitimate 
owner, who may, as a result of losing his or her property, display negative emotions. We 
tested the role of the first possessor’s emotional distress on participant’s answers, and 
observed two different effects of the presence of emotion on our measures depending on 
measure and age. The first effect of emotion appeared on children’s social/moral evaluation, 
particularly for young children but was not homogeneous across situations. The second effect 
of emotion concerned the interpretation of the transfers deduced from the attribution of 
property rights by older children and adults. These different effects may be due to the fact that 
negative emotions can be a cue of the presence of harm, but also a cue of the presence of a 
norm transgression. We examine these two possibilities in turn. 
 
The role of first possessor’s emotion for social/moral evaluation 
 
In the comparison between theft and legitimate reception (Studies 2 and 7), we showed 
that young children (2- and 3-year-olds) are sensitive to the presence of an emotional cue to 
make social and moral evaluations, despite the fact that this cue is not informative by itself. 
Indeed, the emotional cue (negative emotion representing sadness) was also present in the 
case of a voluntary transfer, where this emotion seems unjustified (it is not due to a harmful 
action). This indicates that children can activate or not a social and/or moral evaluation 
depending on the presence of harm. In contrast, in the comparison between restitution and 
absence of restitution, the presence of emotion did not change children’s and adults’ 
social/moral evaluations. 3-year-olds had no preference between the agent returning the object 
to the first possessor and the agent keeping it, independently of the presence or not of a 
negative emotion after the restitution or absence of restitution. The first result could be 
interpreted by saying that without an emotional cue, young children simply do not engage in 
social/moral evaluation. However, this would not explain why the manipulation of emotion 
did not work in the second case. We discussed an alternative explanation in which emotions 
are interpreted as evidence that a harmful action has been accomplished, and trigger the 
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research for a responsible agent. In the first case, the responsible agent could be identified as 
the agent performing the last action before the first possessor displays distress cues. This 
would give rise to the observed preference for the legitimate recipient against the thief. In the 
second case, the last action is always performed by the same agent (the borrower), who either 
moves the object away from the first possessor or returns that object to him, giving rise to no 
preference. Under both interpretations, the sense of ownership in 2- and 3-year-olds, if it 
exists, functions differently than in older children. Indeed, in both 5-year-olds and adults, the 
dispreference for the thief and the keeper was found with and without emotion, indicating that 
the presence of visible distress reactions is not necessary to trigger social/moral evaluation in 
these age groups. 
Note that there was however a more subtle effect of emotion on evaluations of older 
children: its presence amplified the badness of the non-restitution for 5-year-olds. When not 
making a comparison between both agents, but asking whether the second possessor did 
something bad or something good individually for each condition of restitution, 5-year-old 
children considered that he did not do something bad in the absence of emotion but yes in the 
presence of emotion. Thus without a negative emotion of the first possessor in reaction to the 
keeping, they did not evaluate the keeper negatively by itself but only in comparison to the 
reciprocator, whereas in the presence of emotion, they evaluated the action of the keeper as 
bad. Apart from these effects of emotion on social/moral evaluation, emotional cues played 
another role. As said above, the second effect of emotion was observed on property rights 
attributions. 
 
The role of first possessor’s emotion for property rights attribution 
 
In the comparison between restitution and no restitution, the presence of emotional cues 
modulated the attribution of property rights in 5-year-olds and adults. We have seen (in 
Chapter 4) that when the second possessor was seen to keep the object, the participants 
considered the transfer to be a loan independently of the presence of the first possessor’s 
negative emotion or not. However, the presence of emotion changed 5-year-olds’ and adults’ 
interpretation of the transfer when the second possessor was seen returning the object to the 
first possessor. In the absence of emotion, they considered the transfer to be a loan (i.e. the 
second possessor has to give the object back to the first possessor), but in the presence of 
emotion, half of them considered it to be a gift (i.e. the second possessor does not have to give 
the object back to the first possessor), thus taking into account the negative emotion displayed 
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by the first possessor after receiving the object back for their attribution of property rights. 
They probably revised their interpretation of the transfer as a gift instead of a loan at this 
moment. Emotion had an effect on the interpretation of the transfer, where other cues such as 
renunciation of the first possessor to the object by moving away from it had not (i.e. this latter 
cue did not lead adults to interpret the transfer as a gift). 
We have observed differences between young children’s and older ones’ use of 
emotional cues in their evaluation and understanding of property transfers. The evaluation of 
characters involved in property transfers and the attribution of property rights to them was 
different between 3- and 5-year-olds in general, showing a development in the explicit 
understanding of ownership between 3 and 5 years. 
 
4. Development of the notion of ownership 
 
If the ability of 5-year-olds to use the concept of ownership seems well established, the 
existence of this concept in children of 3 years of age and younger stays uncertain. Indeed, as 
discussed above, the results found with 2- and 3-year-olds for the contrast between theft and 
legitimate reception with emotional cues can be explained as children’s understanding of the 
notion of illegitimate/legitimate transfers (i.e. ownership), but also in terms of a causal 
analysis and a sensibility to emotions as cues of harm. The results found with 5-, 18- and 24-
month-olds in the contrast between restitution and absence of restitution (if they are 
replicated), can be explained without involving the concept of ownership, but through other 
concepts such as cooperation, attachment, or help. If these alternative explanations were 
validated with future studies, this would indicate that the notion of ownership, if present 
before 5 years, is very incomplete and different from the adult concept. 
As we have seen in the introduction of this dissertation (Chapter 1), the notion of 
ownership is not an elementary notion, but is composed of simpler concepts. The notions of 
theft, gift, loan, restitution, may not be conceptually “primitive”, but be based on a 
combination of simpler elements such as those identified in the Introduction: possession, 
control (and self), attachment, exclusivity, and reciprocity. Even though these notions can be 
viewed as components of or preconditions for the notion of ownership, they are not in and of 
themselves about ownership. Indeed, we have argued that at least some of these components 
exist in non-human animals that, arguably, do not have a high-level concept of ownership. A 
possible extension of our work would therefore be to investigate individually infants’ 
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understanding of these components, as well as the way in which these components give rise to 
the full-blown concept of ownership. 
In the introduction we have seen that several of these components are present in infants 
when these latter have an interest in the interaction. However, infant’s understanding of some 
of these potential components of ownership remain to be investigated when applied to others. 
For example, to our knowledge, the understanding of the relation of attachment between a 
third-party and an object has only been studied in older children but not in infants. In Chapter 
1 we hypothesized that attachment to objects may derive from attachment to people, on the 
basis of the argument of Winnicott (1953) that attachment to “transitional objects” comes 
from attachment to parent. It remains to be tested whether toddlers and infants can understand 
a relation of attachment between a person and an object, in the same way as they understand 
attachment between people (Johnson et al., 2007; 2010). We propose here an example of 
experiment to test the presence of the concept of attachment to objects in infants observing 
the interaction between a third-party and an object. A group of infants would be habituated to 
a condition where a character shows attachment to an object by expressing positive emotion 
when holding the object, and then the character is separated from the object. During test, 
infants would be presented either with the character crying, or not crying. If infants 
understand attachment to objects in others, we expect them to be more surprised if the 
character does not cry, revealing that they expect the attached character to be sad if separated 
from his object of attachment. On the contrary, another group of infants, habituated to see a 
character not attached to the object (showing negligence, or even dislike), and then separated 
from object, would be supposed to show more surprise if the character cries after separation 
from the object, revealing that they expect the non-attached character not to be sad if 
separated from the object. Another possible measure to investigate the concept of attachment 
to objects in older toddlers is the measure of sympathy for a person separated from an object. 
We expect children to show more concern, and more prosocial behavior for a person 
separated from an object when that person was attached to the object compared to when she 
was not attached to the object. If this concept of third-party object-attachment is present since 
infancy, we could expect that young children may be able to evaluate agents who either help 
or hinder attachment. Thus after presenting infants with an attachment relationship between 
an agent and an object, we may find a more potent evaluation of theft and absence of 
restitution at a younger age than what we reported here. However, it would not mean that 
children understand the concepts of theft and restitution as they could be evaluating only 
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transgressions of a component of ownership (here, attachment) and not transgressions of 
property rights. 
Similar investigations should be done for the other potential components of ownership: 
possession, control (and self), exclusivity, and reciprocity. Finally, the combination of several 
components should be investigated. For example, we hypothesized in Chapter 1 that control 
of possessed objects might lead to attachment to these objects. Do infants understand this 
link? If presented with a character, who controls an object (manipulates it, moves it), do 
infants expect him to show later attachment to this object (i.e. are they more surprised if the 
character shows absence of emotional attachment to or dislike for the object rather than 
attachment)? Such combinations of the potential components of ownership should be tested to 
explore how children construct the full concept of ownership. 
It is possible that, prior to 5 years of age, young children are solely reacting through the 
above mentioned components, and that the concept of ownership as such only emerges in 5-
year-olds. Other high-level concepts have also been reported to emerge around this age. 
Below, we discuss the possible link between ownership and another concept emerging after 4 
years of age: explicit theory of mind (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman, 2002). 
  
5. Possible links between ownership and other concepts 
 
We found a development in the evaluation and understanding of property transfers 
occurring between 3 and 5 years of age. A similar development is seen for another concept: 
explicit theory of mind, notably the ability to attribute false beliefs in verbal tasks (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983), with a development between 3 and 5 years across cultures (Callaghan et al., 
2005). Could there be a link between the emergences of these two concepts?  
At a superficial level, both concepts require the representation of invisible properties: 
ownership is an invisible characteristic of objects (or rather of an object and an agent); mental 
representations and intentions are invisible characteristics of agents. Furthermore, intentions 
play an important role in the definition of property transfer.  To differentiate between 
illegitimate and legitimate transfers, one needs to understand the intention of transfer of the 
first possessor. Without this distinction, theft and legitimate reception would look similar. The 
intention of the owner not to be separated from his object is one aspect of the definition of 
theft. In addition, intentions could also matter regarding the action of the thief. Can we 
consider that an agent is a thief if he does not know that he is performing a theft (for example 
if he does not know that the object belongs to someone)? Does the notion of theft include the 
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thief’s intention to harm? An intentional thief and an “accidental thief” are both transgressing 
the same property rights. Rossano et al. (2011) presented to children an “accidental theft”, 
with a puppet taking an object while being ignorant of the fact that the object was owned and 
not abandoned (even if it might seem temporarily abandoned). Young children protested 
against the action of the puppet, thus considering it as a transgression. However, if asked to 
evaluate the puppet, they may not consider him as being as bad as a puppet intentionally 
stealing someone else’s property. Indeed, Vaish et al. (2010) have shown that the intention is 
important in the evaluation of another property transgression: destroying the object belonging 
to another. In their study, children helped less a person who intentionally destroyed or who 
intended to destroy someone else’s property, but not a person who accidentally destroyed 
someone else’s property, compared to a neutral person.  
Returning to the owner, intentions matter not only during the transfer but also after the 
transfer. They distinguish between a gift and a loan (as we have seen in Chapter 4), as the 
intention of the owner to retrieve the object is crucial to determine whether the transfer was 
definitive or not, and thus whether the absence of restitution of the object to the previous 
possessor is a transgression or not. Hook (1993) showed that children as young as 4-year-olds 
considered someone refusing to return an object to the first possessor requesting it as being 
very bad, but they had difficulties taking into account the intentions of the owner. Indeed they 
also considered that a gift-recipient was bad if he refused to return the object to the previous 
owner. 
Given the importance of intention understanding for ownership understanding, it would 
be interesting to investigate simultaneously children’s development of theory of mind and 
ownership as a set of property rights (see Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008, for a discussion 
about the parallel development of theory of mind and negotiation). Also, intention 
understanding is important in moral judgments. To make explicit verbal evaluations of moral 
transgressions, children take into account the intention of the transgressor at 5 but not at 3 
years of age (e.g. Wellman et al., 1979; Zelazo et al., 1996). More generally children also 
develop an “ethical stance”, or explicit sense of justice and fairness, between 3 and 5 years of 
age (Rochat, 2009b; Robbins & Rochat, 2011). Rochat relates the development of this ethical 
stance, parallel to the development of explicit theory of mind, to the development of “ethical 
property” (2011a), and “moral self-awareness” (2011b). Further experimental research is 
needed to explore the parallel development of these different concepts. 
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6. Ownership and beyond… 
 
To conclude, we discussed the study of the developmental bases of ownership in 
infancy. We sketched some theoretical directions, introducing potential conceptual 
components of ownership, and a possible developmental trajectory. Testing these ideas, 
however, will require further research, taking into account potential variations in the concept 
of ownership across different kinds of objects, such as territory, songs, ideas (see Olson & 
Shaw (2011) for a recent study on children’s understanding of intellectual property). Further 
research should also consider potential cultural variations in the acquisition of ownership and 
the rights attached to it. Rochat (2009b) showed that there is some variability across cultures 
in children’s attribution of ownership, when it involves notions of ethics and fairness. Finally, 
beyond understanding of a simple transfer, understanding of ownership is related to 
reciprocity, sharing, and cooperation. Furthermore, Friedman & Ross (2011) propose how the 
study of ownership in general can bring understanding in several other domains. More 
research is needed to bridge the gap between the studies of ownership and of other potentially 
related concepts. 
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APPENDIX AC2 
 
Appendix AC2-1. Detailed description of the stimuli used in Study 1 
 
Study 1a. Theft vs. Gift-reception. 
In the theft condition, the protagonist arrives first with a ball, and the agent arrives with 
empty hands (1). The protagonist plays with the ball not looking at the agent (2). Then he 
keeps the ball under his arm and the agent steals it from him while he is not looking (3). The 
protagonist turns himself towards the agent and makes two steps forward (until a barrier 
separating the two characters) but the agent turns away and plays with the ball (4). When he 
has finished, the agent turns himself towards the protagonist and makes two steps forward, 
and the protagonist puts his hands forward to receive the ball (5). However, the agent leaves 
with the ball (6). Finally the protagonist leaves without the ball (7). In the gift-reception 
condition, the protagonist arrives first with a ball, and the agent arrives with empty hands (1). 
The protagonist plays with the ball not looking at the agent (2). Then he turns himself towards 
the agent, makes two steps forward and gives him the ball (3). The agent plays with the ball 
while the protagonist is looking (4). When he has finished, the agent turns himself towards the 
protagonist and makes two steps forward, but the protagonist makes two steps backward (as if 
indicating that he does not want the ball back) (5). The agent leaves with the ball (6). Finally 
the protagonist leaves without the ball (7). In both conditions, the agent's body motions are 
exactly the same, frame by frame. The actions of the protagonist differ, but only in steps 3 
and 5.  These steps differ in protagonist’s body orientation, and timing of the steps forward or 
backward and movements of raising the hands. 
 
Study 1b. Theft vs. Giving. 
In the theft condition, the protagonist arrives first with a ball, and the agent arrives with 
empty hands (1).  The protagonist plays with the ball not looking at the agent (2). Then he 
keeps the ball under his arm and the agent steals it from him while he is not looking (3). The 
protagonist turns himself towards the agent and puts his hands forward to reclaim the ball (4). 
However, the agent turns away and plays with the ball (5). When he has finished, the agent 
leaves with the ball (6). Finally the protagonist leaves without the ball (7). In the giving 
condition, the protagonist arrives first with empty hands, and the agent arrives with a ball (1). 
The agent plays with the ball not looking at the protagonist (2).. The protagonist turns himself 
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towards the agent and puts his hands forward to ask for the ball (3). The agent turns himself 
towards the protagonist and gives him the ball (4). The protagonist plays with the ball not 
looking at the agent (5). When the protagonist has finished to play, the agent leaves without 
the ball (6). Finally the protagonist leaves with the ball (7). Comparing both conditions, the 
agent's body motions are exactly the same, but in inverse order. The actions of the protagonist 
are also reversed.  Moreover, the transfers (step 3 or 4) differ in the protagonist’s body 
orientation. 
 
Appendix AC2-2. Original version of the questions asked in French in Studies 1 & 2 
 
Study 1a (and Study 2) 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Est-ce que tu l’aimes bien ? – Est-ce qu’il est gentil ? – Est-ce qu’il est méchant ? – Est-ce 
que tu voudrais jouer avec lui ? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- Tu me montres celui que tu aimes 
bien 
(adults : C’est lequel que tu aimes 
bien ?) 
- Tu me montres le gentil 
- Tu me montres le méchant 
- Tu me montres celui avec lequel 
tu voudrais jouer 
 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il 
avait le droit de jouer avec le 
ballon ? 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il 
avait le droit de partir avec le 
ballon ? 
 
 
- M. Rouge il a donné le ballon à 
qui ? 
- C’est lequel qui a volé le ballon 
à M. Rouge ? 
 
 
Study 1b 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Est-ce que tu l’aimes bien ? – Est-ce qu’il est gentil ? – Est-ce qu’il est méchant ? – Est-ce 
que tu voudrais jouer avec lui ? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- Tu me montres celui que tu aimes 
bien 
(adults : C’est lequel que tu aimes 
bien ?) 
- Tu me montres le gentil 
- Tu me montres le méchant 
- Tu me montres celui avec lequel 
tu voudrais jouer 
 
   - M. Vert/Bleu/Rouge, est-ce 
qu’il avait le droit de jouer 
avec le ballon ? 
   - M. Vert/Bleu/Rouge, est-ce 
qu’il avait le droit de partir 
avec le ballon ? 
 
 
- C’est lequel qui a donné le 
ballon à M. Rouge ? 
- C’est lequel qui a volé le ballon 
à M. Rouge ? 
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Appendix AC2-3. Detailed results concerning attributions of property rights in Study 1 
 
Study 1a 
For both questions, 3-year-olds made no distinction between the illegitimate and 
legitimate conditions (play: F(1,24)=3.45, p<.1; leave: F(1,24)=0.57, p>.1) and were 
answering at chance to both questions in both conditions (play: theft: F(1,24)=2.37, p>.1; gift-
reception: F(1,24)=0.33, p>.1; leave: theft: F(1,24)=1.29, p>.1; gift-reception: F(1,24)=3.95, 
p<.1). 3-year-olds seem not to consider any property right. 5-year-olds’ answers about the 
right of the second possessor to play with the ball were significantly different between both 
conditions (F(1,16)=12.38, p<.01). In the theft condition, 5-year-olds tended to answer “no” 
but it was not significantly more than predicted by chance (F(1,16)=2.42, p>.1). In the gift-
reception condition, 5-year-olds answered “yes” significantly above chance (F(1,16)=15.68, 
p=.001). Considering the right of the second possessor to leave with the ball, 5-year-olds’ 
answers were not significantly different between the two conditions (F(1,16)=1.05, p>.1). In 
the theft condition, 5-year-olds answered “no” significantly above chance (F(1,16)=5.61, 
p<.05). In the gift reception condition, 5-year-olds were at chance (F(1,16)=0.95, p>.1). As 
for 5-year-olds, adults’ answers about the right of the second possessor to play with the ball 
were significantly different between both conditions (F(1,8)=40.50, p<.001). In the theft 
condition, they tended to answer “no” but it was not significantly more than predicted by 
chance (F(1,8)=4.50, p<.1). In the gift-reception condition all adults answered “yes”. In 
addition, adults’ answers were also significantly different between both conditions as far as 
the right of the second possessor to leave with the ball is concerned (F(1,8)=529.00, p<.001). 
In the theft condition, they all answered “no”. In the gift reception condition, they answered 
“yes” significantly above chance (F(1,8)=121.00, p<.001). (see Table AC2-3). 
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 3-year-olds 5-year-olds adults 
Comprehension Questions 
 
I=0.04 (0.09) 
F(1,24)=0.17 ns 
I=0.45 (0.17) 
F(1,16)=6.54 * 
I=1.00 (0.00) 
n/a 
Property rights Questions 
 Right to play with ball 
thief 
 
I=0.25 (0.18) 
F(1,24)=2.37 ns 
I=-0.35 (0.21) 
F(1,16)=2.42 ns 
I=-0.50 (0.26) 
F(1,8)=4.50 ~ 
gift recipient 
 
I=-0.11 (0.19) 
F(1,24)=0.33 ns 
I=0.65 (0.17) 
F(1,16)=15.68 ** 
I=1.00 (0.00) 
n/a 
difference F(1,24)=3.45 ~ F(1,16)=12.38 ** F(1,8)=40.50 *** 
 Right to leave with ball 
thief 
 
I=-0.21 (0.18) 
F(1,24)=1.29 ns 
I=-0.50 (0.20) 
F(1,16)=5.61 * 
I=-1.00 (0.00) 
n/a 
gift recipient 
 
I=-0.36 (0.18) 
F(1,24)=3.95 ~ 
I=-0.25 (0.22) 
F(1,16)=0.95 ns 
I=0.92 (0.08) 
F(1,8)=121.00 *** 
difference F(1,24)=0.57  ns F(1,16)=1.05 ns F(1,8)=529.00  *** 
 
Table AC2-1. Understanding of property transfers in Study 1a. 
Comprehension questions: answers are scored 1 if correct, -1 if incorrect, 0 in absence of choice, and averaged 
into an index between -1 and 1 for each subject. Property rights questions: answers are scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if 
“no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. The table shows the means of participants (and standard errors). 
 
Study 1b 
For both questions, 3-year-olds made no distinction between the illegitimate and 
legitimate conditions (play: F(1,8)=2.00, p>.1; leave: F(1,8)=0.17, p>.1). Concerning the right 
of the second possessor to play with the ball, 3-year-olds were at chance in the theft condition 
(F(1,8)=3.00, p>.1), and answered “yes” significantly above chance in the gift-reception 
condition (F(1,8)=25.00, p=.001). Considering the right of the second possessor to leave with 
the ball, 3-year-olds answered “no” significantly above chance in the theft condition 
(F(1,8)=8.00, p<.05), and were at chance in the gift reception condition (F(1,8)=3.00, p>.1). 
The results of 5-year-olds and adults were similar. Both 5-year-olds and adults’ distinguished 
the two conditions in both questions (5-year-olds: play: F(1,6)=30.00, p<.01; leave: 
F(1,6)=14.40, p<.01; adults: play: F(1,8)=50.00, p<.001; leave: F(1,8)=27.00, p=.001). 
Concerning the right of the second possessor to play with the ball, they answered significantly 
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above chance “no” in the theft condition (5-year-olds: F(1,6)=15.00, p<.01; adults: 
F(1,8)=25.00, p<.01), and “yes” in the gift-reception condition (5-year-olds: F(1,6)=15.00, 
p<.01; adults: F(1,8)=25.00, p<.01). Considering the right of the second possessor to leave 
with the ball, they answered “no” significantly above chance in the theft condition (5-year-
olds: F(1,6)=16.20, p<.01; adults: all answered “no”), and were at chance in the gift-reception 
condition (5-year-olds: F(1,6)=1.80, p>.01; adults: F(1,8)=3.00, p>.01). (see Table AC2-4). 
 
 3-year-olds 5-year-olds adults 
Comprehension Questions 
 
I=0.45 (0.18) 
F(1,16)=7.20 * 
I=0.50 (0.23) 
F(1,8)=4.50 ~ 
I=1.00 (0.00) 
n/a 
Property rights Questions 
 Right to play with ball 
thief 
 
I=0.50 (0.26) 
F(1,8)=3.00  ns 
I=-0.80 (0.20) 
F(1,6)=15.00 ** 
I=-0.83 (0.17) 
F(1,8)=25.00 ** 
gift recipient 
 
I=0.83 (0.17) 
F(1,8)=25.00 ** 
I=0.80 (0.20) 
F(1,6)=15.00 ** 
I=0.83 (0.17) 
F(1,8)=25.00 ** 
difference F(1,8)=2.00 ns F(1,6)=30.00 ** F(1,8)=50.00 *** 
 Right to leave with ball 
thief 
 
I=-0.67 (0.22) 
F(1,8)=8.00 * 
I=-0.80 (0.20) 
F(1,6)=16.20 ** 
I=-1.00 (0.00) 
n/a 
gift recipient 
 
I=-0.50 (0.26) 
F(1,8)=3.00 ns 
I=0.10 (0.31) 
F(1,6)=1.80 ns 
I=0.50 (0.27) 
F(1,8)=3.00 ns 
difference F(1,8)=0.17  ns F(1,6)=14.40 ** F(1,8)=27.00  *** 
 
Table AC2-2. Understanding of property transfers in Study 1b. 
Comprehension questions: answers are scored 1 if correct, -1 if incorrect, 0 in absence of choice, and averaged 
into an index between -1 and 1 for each subject. Property rights questions: answers are scored 1 if “yes”, -1 if 
“no”, 0 if other or absent for each question. The table shows the means of participants (and standard errors). 
 
In Study 1a, 5-year-olds considered that only the legitimate recipient was allowed to 
play with the ball, and the illegitimate recipient was not allowed to leave with the ball. In 
Study 1b 2, this pattern of results was found at 3 years of age. 
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In Study 1b, with the attribution of the right to keep the object, we observed a 
development in the understanding of the gift-reception condition: 3-year-olds tend to answer 
“no”, 5-year-olds are at chance, and adults tend to answer “yes”. 
 
 
Appendix AC2-4. Correlation between measures of social/moral evaluation and of 
property rights attribution in Study 1 
 
We analyzed whether there is a correlation between participant’s evaluation and 
comprehension and property rights attribution in Studies 1a and 1b. The answers concerning 
the attributions of property rights were scored 1 if “correct”, -1 if “incorrect”, 0 if other or 
absent (see Table AC2-3), and averaged into an index between -1 and 1 for each subject. 
 
Thief Gift recipient  
correct incorrect correct incorrect 
Was he allowed to play with the ball? No Yes Yes No 
Was he allowed to leave with the ball? No Yes Yes No 
 
Table AC2-3. Answers considered as “correct” and “incorrect” for each question and each 
condition in Studies 1a and 1b. 
 
Considering the answers of all children for both studies together, we found that the 
measures of social and moral evaluation, and of property rights attribution are correlated 
(r=.40, t(68)= 3.56, p<.001; see Figure AC2-1 for a graphical representation of the 
distribution of answers). We also found a correlation between evaluation and comprehension 
(r=.47, , t(68)= 4.35, p<.001), and between comprehension and property rights attribution 
(r=.37, t(68)= 4.32, p<.01; see Table AC2-4 for more detailed analyses). 
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Figure AC2-1. Representation of the correlation between the evaluation index and the 
property rights index. In red, 3-year-olds; in green, 5-year-olds. 
 
  3-year-olds 5-year-olds 3- & 5-year-olds 
Evaluation  
-  
Property rights  
r = 0.52 
t (26) = 3.14 
p = 0.004 
[0.19;  0.75] 
r = 0.31 
t (18) = 1.38 
p = 0.18 
[-0.15;  0.66] 
r = 0.50 
t (46) = 3.91 
p = 0.0003 
[0.25;  0.69] 
Study 1a 
Evaluation  
-  
Comprehension 
r = 0.10 
t (26) = 0.53 
p = 0.60 
[-0.28;  0.46] 
r = 0.67 
t (18) = 3.84 
p = 0.001 
[0.33;  0.86] 
r = 0.49 
t (46) = 3.77 
p = 0.0005 
[0.23;  0.67] 
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 Property rights  
-  
Comprehension 
r = 0.40 
t (26) = 2.19 
p = 0.037 
[0.03;  0.67] 
r = 0.47 
t (18) = 2.27 
p = 0.036 
[0.04;  0.76] 
r = 0.51 
t (46) = 4.05 
p = 0.0002 
[0.27;  0.70] 
Evaluation  
-  
Property rights  
r = -0.31 
t (10) = -1.01 
p = 0.33 
[-0.75;  0.33] 
r = 0.29 
t (8) = 0.87 
p = 0.41 
[-0.41;  0.78] 
r = 0.24 
t (20) = 1.09 
p = 0.29 
[-0.21;  0.60] 
Evaluation 
-  
Comprehension 
r = 0.43 
t (10) = 1.49 
p = 0.17 
[-0.20;  0.80] 
r = 0.65 
t (8) = 2.42 
p = 0.042 
[0.03;  0.91] 
r = 0.49 
t (20) = 2.49 
p = 0.022 
[0.08;  0.75] 
Study 1b 
Property rights  
-  
Comprehension 
r = -0.03 
t (10) = -0.09 
p = 0.93 
[-0.59;  0.56] 
r = 0.21 
t (8) = 0.60 
p = 0.57 
[-0.49;  0.74] 
r = 0.08 
t (20) = 0.37 
p = 0.72 
[-0.35;  0.49] 
Evaluation  
-  
Property rights  
r = 0.25 
t (38) = 1.57 
p = 0.12 
[-0.07; 0.52] 
r = 0.30 
t (28) = 1.65 
p = 0.11 
[-0.07;  0.59] 
r = 0.40 
t (68) = 3.56 
p = 0.00069 
[0.17; 0.58] 
Evaluation  
-  
Comprehension 
r = 0.17 
t (38) = 1.04 
p = 0.30 
[-0.15; 0.45] 
r = 0.66 
t (28) = 4.67 
p = 0.00007 
[0.40;  0.83] 
r = 0.47 
t (68) = 4.35 
p = 0.00005 
[0.26; 0.63] 
Studies 1a & 1b 
Property rights  
-  
Comprehension 
r = 0.25 
t (38) = 1.57 
p = 0.12 
[-0.07; 0.52] 
r = 0.38 
t (28) = 2.17 
p = 0.039 
[0.02;  0.65] 
r = 0.37 
t (68) = 3.32 
p = 0.0015 
[0.15; 0.56] 
 
Table AC2-4. Correlation analyses between the various measures: evaluation, comprehension, 
and property rights attribution, in Studies 1a and 1b. 
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We divided the social/moral evaluation in two indexes (Eval1 and Eval2), and found a 
correlation between them (see Table AC2-5); we also found a correlation between two 
indexes of property rights attribution. Thus, we can consider that our measures of evaluation 
and of attribution of property rights are reliable. 
 
  3-year-olds 5-year-olds 3- & 5-year-olds 
Eval1 (like+nice) – 
Eval2 (bad+play) 
r = 0.73 
t (26) = 5.38 
p = 1.2 e-5 
[0.48;  0.86] 
r = 0.72 
t (18) = 4.42 
p = 0.0003 
[0.41;  0.88]] 
r = 0.74 
t (46) = 7.49 
p = 1.7 e-9 
[0.58;  0.85] 
Study 1a 
Prop1 (play+play) – 
Prop2 (leave+leave) 
r = 0.45 
t (26) = 2.54 
p = 0.017 
[0.09;  0.70] 
r = 0.50 
t (18) = 2.48 
p = 0.023 
[0.08;  0.77] 
r = 0.49 
t (46) = 3.86 
p = 0.0003 
[0.25;  0.68] 
Eval1 (like+nice) – 
Eval2 (bad+play) 
r = 0.58 
t (18) = 3.03 
p = 0.007 
[0.19;  0.81] 
r = 0.79 
t (10) = 4.03 
p = 0.002 
[0.39;  0.94] 
r = 0.72 
t (30) = 5.74 
p = 2.9 e-6 
[0.50;  0.86] 
Study 1b 
Prop1 (play+play) – 
Prop2 (leave+leave) 
r = 0.64 
t (10) = 2.64 
p = 0.025 
[0.11;  0.89] 
r = 0.48 
t (8) = 1.54 
p = 0.16 
[-0.22;  0.85] 
r = 0.61 
t (20) = 3.45 
p = 0.003 
[0.25;  0.82] 
Eval1 (like+nice) – 
Eval2 (bad+play) 
r = 0.66 
t (46) = 5.97 
p = 3.3 e-7 
[0.46;  0.80] 
r = 0.72 
t (30) = 5.75 
p = 2.8 e-6 
[0.50;  0.86] 
r = 0.72 
t (78) = 9.27 
p = 3.2 e-14 
[0.60;  0.81] 
Studies 1a 
& 1b 
Prop1 (play+play) – 
Prop2 (leave+leave) 
r = 0.50 
t (38) = 3.57 
p = 0.001 
[0.60;  0.81] 
r = 0.53 
t (28) = 3.32 
p = 0.003 
[0.21;  0.75] 
r = 0.55 
t (68) = 5.37 
p = 1.0 e-6 
[0.36;  0.69] 
 
Table AC2-5. Correlation analyses between pairs of questions to assess reliability of measures 
in Studies 1a and 1b. 
  267 
APPENDIX AC3 
 
Appendix AC3-1. Original version of the questions asked in French in Studies 3, 4, & 5 
 
Study 3 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Est-ce que tu l’aimes bien ? – Est-ce qu’il est gentil ? – Est-ce qu’il est méchant ? – Est-ce 
que tu voudrais jouer avec lui ? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
 
- Tu me montres celui que tu aimes bien 
(adults : C’est lequel que tu aimes bien ?) 
- Tu me montres le gentil 
- Tu me montres le méchant 
- Tu me montres celui avec lequel tu voudrais jouer 
 
 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il avait le droit 
de jouer avec le ballon ? 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il a le droit de 
partir avec le ballon ? 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il doit rendre le 
ballon à M. Rouge ? 
 
 
 
Study 4 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Est-ce que tu l’aimes bien ? – Est-ce qu’il est gentil ? – Est-ce qu’il est méchant ? – Est-ce 
que tu voudrais jouer avec lui ? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
   Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
 
- Tu me montres celui que tu aimes bien 
(adults : C’est lequel que tu aimes bien ?) 
- Tu me montres le gentil 
- Tu me montres le méchant 
- Tu me montres celui avec lequel tu voudrais jouer 
 
 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il avait le 
droit de jouer avec le ballon ? 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il avait le 
droit de garder avec le ballon ? 
   - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il devait 
rendre le ballon à M. Jaune/Rouge ? 
 
 
Qi_eval_action_emotion 
(evaluation of action and emotion) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- M. Vert/ Bleu, est-ce qu’il a fait quelque chose de mal ? 
- M. Jaune/Rouge, est-ce qu’il avait raison d’être triste ? 
 
 
- C’est lequel qui a rendu le ballon ? 
- C’est lequel qui a gardé le ballon ? 
 
 
  268 
Study 5 
 
Qi_eval (training): - Est-ce que tu l’aimes bien ? – Est-ce qu’il est gentil ? – Est-ce qu’il est méchant ? – Est-ce 
que tu voudrais jouer avec lui ? 
 
Qc_eval 
(social and moral evaluation) 
Qprop  
   (property rights attribution) 
 
 
- C’est lequel que tu aimes bien ? 
- C’est lequel le gentil ? 
- C’est lequel le méchant ? 
- Avec lequel tu voudrais jouer ? 
 
 
- M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il avait le droit 
de jouer avec le ballon ? 
 - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il avait le droit 
de garder avec le ballon ? 
 - M. Vert/Bleu, est-ce qu’il devait rendre 
le ballon à M. Jaune/Rouge ? 
 
 
Qi_eval_action_emotion 
(evaluation of action and emotion) 
 
Qcomp 
(comprehension) 
 
- M. Vert/ Bleu, est-ce qu’il a fait quelque chose de bien 
ou quelque chose de mal ? 
+ in the emotional condition only: 
       - M. Jaune/Rouge, est-ce qu’il avait raison d’être triste ? 
 
 
- C’est lequel qui a rendu le ballon ? 
- C’est lequel qui a gardé le ballon ? 
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APPENDIX AC4 
 
 
Appendix AC4-1.  Coding of interpretations of the type of legitimate transfer in Studies 
1, 2, 3, with a distinction between short term loan and long term loan 
 
For studies 1, 2, and 3, in Table AC4-1, adults’ answers were distributed in four 
categories depicting the three different interpretations of the situations and the case of an 
incoherent or incomplete response. If a subject answered “no the second possessor could 
not/cannot leave with the ball” and “yes the second possessor had/has to give the ball back to 
the first possessor”, his interpretation of the situation was coded as “Short Term Loan” (STL). 
If a subject answered “yes the second possessor could/can leave with the ball” and “yes he 
had/has to give the ball back”, his interpretation was coded as “Long Term Loan” (LTL). If a 
subject answered “yes the second possessor could/can leave with the ball” and “no he 
did/does not have to give the ball back”, his interpretation was coded as “Gift”. Finally, if a 
subject answered “no the second possessor could not/cannot leave with the ball” and “no he 
did/does not have to give the ball back”, or if he did not answer “yes” or “no” to one of the 
questions, his response was coded as “other”. The results are presented in Figure AC4-1. 
 
 
Obligation to Give the ball back  
yes no - 
yes Long Term Loan Gift 
 
other 
no Short Term Loan 
 
other 
(incoherence) 
other 
 
Right to Leave 
with the ball 
- other other other 
 
Table AC4-1. Interpretations of the situations presenting a legitimate transfer of property in 
Studies 1, 2 and 3, by considering the answers to both questions: “[The second possessor] 
was/is he allowed to leave with the ball?”, and “[The second possessor] did/does he have to 
give the ball back to [the first possessor]?”. 
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Figure AC4-1. Proportion of participants of each age answering according to each 
interpretation of the transfer (gift, other, long term loan (LTL), short term loan (STL), loan 
(no possible distinction between LTL & STL)) for each situation (each legitimate condition 
through all studies of Chapters 2 and 3). 
Loan Gift  baseline 
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Appendix AC4-2. Results of adult’s answers to the explicit question “did [the first 
possessor] give or lend the ball to [the second possessor]?” in Studies 1 to 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure AC4-2. Proportion of adults answering “gave”, other (i.e. “lent; maybe gave”; ”lent 
then gave”; “lent but in fact gave”), no answer (because question not asked), and “lent”, to the 
explicit question “Did [the first possessor] give or lend the ball to [the second possessor]?”, 
for each situation. 
Loan Gift baseline 
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APPENDIX AC5 
 
 
Appendix AC5-1. Results for tests of choice 2 to 4 in Study 9 
 
 
 choice choice in less 
than 10 sec 
clear choice clear choice in 
less than 10 sec 
 
Test 2 11; 7 
p=.48 
6; 6 
p=1 
7; 5 
p=.77 
4; 5 
p=1 
 
Test 3 10; 8 
p=.81 
9; 6 
p=.60 
9; 6 
p=.60 
9; 5 
p=.42 
 
Test 4 7; 8 
p=1 
7; 8 
p=1 
7; 5 
p=.77 
7; 5 
p=.77 
 
Table AC5-1. For different measures of choice in Study 9, the first number represents the 
number of 5-month-olds choosing the reciprocator; the second number, the number of 5-
month-olds choosing the keeper; and the p-value the result of the two-tailed binomial 
probability test for these responses. 
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Development of the sense of ownership: Social and moral evaluations 
 
Since a very young age, the majority of human social interactions involve objects. In 
these interactions, children seem to take into account who owns what. How does the sense of 
ownership develop? Our work deals with children’s understanding of the notion of ownership. 
Before an explicit mastery of the notion of ownership, do children have a more implicit 
understanding of it? We explored the understanding and evaluation of illegitimate and 
legitimate transfers of property in children from 5 months to 5 years of age. We studied two 
types of ownership transgressions: illegitimate acquisition of an object, and absence of 
restitution of an object to its owner. In all our studies, we presented to children property 
transfers between two characters using non-verbal animated cartoons or movies with puppets 
as actors, and then measured children’s understanding and evaluation of those transfers. We 
showed that 5-year-old children make the distinction between a character acquiring an object 
by theft, and a character acquiring an object by gift. They make this distinction both in their 
attribution of property rights, and in their social/moral evaluation, preferring the legitimate 
recipient. In contrast, 2- and 3-year-old children evaluate comparatively these situations only 
in the presence of emotional cues (the first possessor being sad after the transfer). It is 
interesting to remark that the legitimate transfers that we presented to the participants were 
interpreted by default as loans by the adults. Investigating the restitution of an object to its 
first possessor, we showed that 5-year-old children evaluate more positively a character 
returning an object to its first possessor compared to a character keeping it. At 3 years of age, 
children do not make any distinction between the two situations. Adding cues potentially 
expressing a request for restitution, in some conditions (depending on the rapidity and clarity 
of choice) 5-month-olds and 2-year-olds tend to prefer the character restituting the object. The 
studies of this dissertation show an important development in the explicit understanding of 
ownership between 3 and 5 years. With younger children, our results show tendencies to 
implicitly evaluate illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. We also underlie the 
importance of the methodology used to test young children. 
 
Ownership, property rights, moral development, moral judgment, social cognition, social 
evaluation, cognitive development. 
 
